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ABSTRACT
The e f f e c t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  on v a lu a t io n  and sh a reh o ld er  
w ealth  o f  th e  banking f irm  was examined both t h e o r e t i c a l l y  and 
e m p i r i c a l l y .  I t  was assumed t h a t  market im p e r f e c t io n s  made p o s s i b l e  
th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a bank which would o p era te  in c a p i t a l » l o a n ,  and 
d e p o s i t  markets .  The v a l u a t io n  o f  e q u i ty  shares  was assumed to be 
d e s c r ib e d  by B la c k ' s  z e r o - b e ta  v e r s io n  o f  th e  C api ta l  A s s e t  P r i c in g  
Model. Although the  Black model i s  a p e r f e c t  market model,  i t  
served  as a framework w i th in  which im p e r f e c t io n s  could  be in trod u ced .
A f irm o p e r a t in g  in  a market w i thou t  an in term e d ia ry  was 
converted  to  a bank, charged w ith  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  p rov id in g  
banking s e r v i c e s ,  and a llowed to  i s s u e  demand d e p o s i t s .  The d e p o s i t s  
were o f  the form o f  an i n i t i a l  in f lo w  fo l lo w e d  by o u t f lo w s  which equal  
in f lo w s  so t h a t  a c o n s t a n t  l e v e l  o f  d e p o s i t  f i n a n c i n g  was mainta ined .
A p e r p e t u i t y  model was assumed in  th e  t e x t  a l though  a s i n g l e - p e r i o d  
v e r s io n  was presen ted  in  an appendix.  No ta x es  were assumed. D ep os i t s  
were i n i t i a l l y  c o n s id e r e d  to be c o s t l e s s ,  r i s k l e s s ,  n o n - i n t e r e s t  
b e a r i n g ,  and r e q u ir in g  no r e s e r v e s .  I t  was shown t h a t  the  v a lu e  o f  
th e  bank and the  w ea lth  o f  i t s  sh areh o ld ers  cou ld  be in c r e a s e d  by us ing  
d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e  in l i e u  o f  e q u i t y .  I t  was l a t e r  v e r i f i e d  t h a t  the  
presen ce  o f  c o s t l y  d e p o s i t s ,  i n t e r e s t  on d e p o s i t s ,  and r e s e r v e  
requirements  would reduce the b e n e f i t s  o f f e r e d  by d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e  
but would not  l i k e l y  e l i m i n a t e  them. Required r a t e  o f  re turn  and c o s t  
o f  c a p i t a l  formulas were d er ived  and r e f l e c t e d  th e  advantage  o f  
d e p o s i t s  as a source  o f  f in a n c in g .
Next,  the bank was assumed to  i s s u e  r i s k - f r e e  i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  
l i a b i l i t i e s .  I t  was shown th a t  the  use o f  t h i s  form o f  l e v e r a g e  was 
a l s o  advantageous to  banks and t h e i r  owners but l e s s  so than were 
d e p o s i t s .  An i n c e n t i v e  f o r  banks to  maximize t h e i r  use o f  such 
f in a n c in g  was shown to e x i s t .  Required r a t e  o f  return and c o s t  o f  
c a p i t a l  formulas were p resen ted  and th ey  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  the advantage  
o f  t h i s  source  o f  f i n a n c i n g .
Empirical t e s t s  examined the  e f f e c t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  on 
th e  s y s t e m a t i c  r i s k  o f  banks.  I t  was proven t h a t  i f  banks p o s s e s s  
an advantage  over  non-banks in t h e i r  f in a n c in g  o p e r a t i o n s ,  then t h a t  
advantage would r e s u l t  in sm a l le r  i n c r e a s e s  in s y s t e m a t i c  r i s k  as 
u n i t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  are added.
A sample o f  banks and two samples o f  non-banks were c o l l e c t e d .  
Time s e r i e s  e s t i m a t e s  o f  s y s t e m a t i c  r i s k  were c a l c u l a t e d  and r eg r es sed  
on the d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o .  I t  was found th a t  the model worked 
reason ab ly  well  a lthough the  p resen ce  o f  o u t l y i n g  o b s e r v a t io n s  and 
er r o r s  in the measurement o f  beta  made i t  somewhat d i f f i c u l t  to  
e x p la i n  a l a r g e  percentage  o f  v a r ia n c e .
A t e s t  was d er ived  to measure the  s t a t i s t i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  between 
banks and non-banks in the e f f e c t s  o f  in c r e a s e s  in f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  
on s y s t e m a t i c  r i s k  w h i l e  ta k in g  i n t o  account  d i f f e r e n c e s  in the  
under ly ing  b u s in e s s  r i s k  o f  the  samples .  The r e s u l t s  showed t h a t  an 
in c r e a s e  in  l e v e r a g e  ap paren t ly  does not  produce as l a r g e  o f  an 
i n c r e a s e  in s y s t e m a t i c  r i s k  f o r  banks as i t  does fo r  non-banks.
The i m p l i c a t io n  o f  t h i s  f i n d i n g  i s  th a t  i n v e s t o r s  appear to  
r ec o g n ize  t h a t  f o r  banks b e n e f i t s  are a s s o c i a t e d  with debt f in a n c in g
x
which do not  accrue  to  non-banks; t h u s ,  th e  well-known M odig l iani  
and M i l l e r  th eory  which s t a t e s  t h a t  in the absence o f  t a x e s  the  
amount o f  l e v e r a g e  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  does not apply  to  banks. The 
r e s u l t s  have important  im p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  r e g u l a to r y  i s s u e s  and in  
e x p l a i n i n g  bank f i n a n c i a l  management b eh av ior .
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Theories  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  have provided a u se fu l  a n a l y t i c  
framework f o r  determining the e f f e c t  o f  f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n s  on sh are ­
holder  w ea lth .  P r e s e n t l y  t h e s e  t h e o r i e s  are s t r i c t l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to  
the n o n - f i n a n c ia l  e n t e r p r i s e  l e a v in g  us with no c l e a r  exp lan at ion  o f  
whether the i s s u a n c e  o f  debt  c l a i m s ,  a primary fu n c t io n  o f  banks,  o f f e r s  
any b e n e f i t s  to  t h e i r  s h a reh o ld ers .
Banks are s a id  to op erate  in im p erfec t  markets.^  Provided th a t  
they  are ab le  to  e x p l o i t  im p e r fe c t io n s  in t h e s e  markets ,  i t  would seem 
t h a t  shareh o ld er  w ea l th  might be enhanced by e s t a b l i s h i n g  and f o l l o w i n g  
a well  d e f in ed  c r i t e r i o n  fo r  optimal f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n s .  This n o t i o n ,
however,  i s  o n ly  i n t u i t i v e  and not wel l  supported in the l i t e r a t u r e .
2 3Previous t h e o r e t i c a l  papers by P r i n g le  and Taggart and Greenbaum have
addressed the  q u es t io n  among o t h e r s .  Their models ,  however,  seem
im p o ss ib le  to  e m p i r i c a l l y  t e s t ;  and we are simply  l e f t  with no a c c e p ta b le
and v e r i f i e d  theory  o f  bank f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n s .
The need fo r  t h e o r e t i c a l  and em pir ica l  ev idence  on t h i s  t o p i c  i s  
underscored by the  emergence in rec en t  years  o f  two s i g n i f i c a n t
^See John J.  P r i n g l e ,  "The Imperfect-Markets Model o f  Commercial 
Bank F inancia l  Management," Journal o f  F inancia l  and Q u a n t i ta t iv e  A n a l y s i s , 
9 :6 9 - 8 7 ,  January,  1974 f o r  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the  banking f irm in im perfect  
markets.
9 John J.  P r i n g l e ,  "The Capital  D ec is ion  in Commercial Banks,"
Journal o f  F in an ce , 2 9 :7 7 9 -9 5 ,  June,  1974.
^Robert A. T aggart ,  Jr .  and Stuart  I .  Greenbaum, "Bank Capital  and 




p r a c t i c e s  o f  banks. One i s  the  tendency fo r  banks to  u n d e r c a p i t a l i z e  
th e m s e lv e s ,  l e a d in g  to  the well-known " cap ita l  adequacy" i s s u e /  A 
su gges te d  approach to  th e  problem i s  to a l lo w  the  c a p i t a l  markets to  
r e g u l a t e  bank c a p i t a l .  Much research  has been conducted in to  the ques­
t i o n  o f  whether the  market can r e g u l a te  bank c a p i t a l  and th e  outcome i s  
s t i l l  in doubt .  Part o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  seems t o  l i e  in an improper 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l e v e r a g e  and e i t h e r  the  
required  e q u i t y  re turn  or the  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .  Most o f  the  models t e s t e d  
are ad hoc fo rm u la t io n s  r e f l e c t i n g ,  as p r e v i o u s l y  i n d i c a t e d ,  the lack  
o f  a w e l l - d e f i n e d  theory  d e p i c t i n g  the e f f e c t s  o f  bank f in a n c in g  
d e c i s i o n s .
The o th er  p r a c t i c e  t h a t  has come in to  vogue i s  t h a t  o f  " l i a b i l i t y  
management" and i t s  concomitant  "spread management banking." In the
e a r l y  1 9 7 0 ' s  i t  became apparent  t h a t  loan demand was o u t s t r i p p i n g
d e p o s i t  growth. Banks then began to  turn i n c r e a s i n g l y  to  debt markets  
fo r  t h e i r  f in a n c in g  n eed s ,  w h i le  co n c u r r e n t ly  a t tem p t ing  to  mainta in  a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  "spread" between borrowing and le nd in g  r a t e s .  I t  i s  not  
a t  a l l  c l e a r  how banks determine the spread ,  but f o r  reasons  t h a t  w i l l
^For a rev iew  o f  the c a p i t a l  adequacy i s s u e  s e e  Yair Orgler  and 
Benjamin Wolkowitz,  Bank Capital  (New York: Von Nostrand Reinhold Co.,  
1976) .
5
For arguments in  favor  o f  t h i s  approach s e e  Merton H. M i l l e r  and
Richard A. Posner ,  "An Approach to  the Regulat ion o f  Bank Holding
Companies," Journal o f  B u s i n e s s , 51 :3 7 9 -4 1 2 ,  J u ly ,  1978 and John J .  
P r i n g l e ,  "Bank Capital  and the  Performance o f  Banks as F inancia l  
I n te r m e d ia r i e s ,"  Journal o f  Money, C r e d i t ,  and Banking, 7 :5 4 5 -5 0 ,  
November, 1975. In the  next  chapter  a review o f  the  ev id e n c e  on t h i s  
i s s u e  w i l l  be presen ted .
r
See f o r  example Arnold D i l l ,  " L i a b i l i t y  Management Banking,"
Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank o f  A t l a n t a , 56 :223 ,  December, 1974.
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subseq u en t ly  be r e v e a l e d ,  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  i s  not wel l  supported in 
f i n a n c i a l  th eory .
Assume a very  s im ple  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  in which a bank's a s s e t s  
are f in an ced  by 80 p erce n t  debt c o s t i n g  6 p ercen t  and 20 percent  e q u i t y  
c o s t i n g  12 p erce n t .  The weighted average c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
7 .2  p e r c e n t .  I f  the bank does not charge a t  l e a s t  7 . 2  percent  on l o a n s ,  
i t  w i l l  not earn i t s  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .  In p r a c t i c e  the r a te  i t  charges  
i s  f r e q u e n t ly  pegged to  the  c o s t  o f  borrowed funds r a th er  than the o v e r ­
a l l  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l . ^  I t  i s  no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  r u le  has
O
been l a b e l e d  "the Banker Theory o f  b u s in e ss  expans ion ."
The problem with th e  "Banker Theory" i s  t h a t  i t  ig n o r e s  the  e f f e c t  
o f  marginal u n i t s  o f  debt  on the r i s k i n e s s  o f  the  stream o f  cash f low  
a v a i l a b l e  to  e q u i ty  h o ld e r s .  The real  thorn in r e c o n c i l i n g  t h i s  i s s u e ,  
however,  may be a r e s u l t  o f  app ly ing  an in a p p ro p r ia te  theory  o f  f i n a n ­
c i a l  s t r u c tu r e  to  banks.
The th eory  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  a l lud ed  to  i s  the  well-known
Q
M o d ig l ia n i - M i l l e r  (MM) th e o r y .  I t  i s  tempting to simply  apply the MM 
theory  to  a bank and c o n s e q u e n t ly  to  draw s i m i l a r  c o n c l u s io n s  to  those  
one might draw f o r  f i r m s .  I t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  q u e s t i o n a b l e ,  however,  
whether the MM theory  i s  d i r e c t l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to  banks.  For example,  
the MM theory  assumes t h a t  th e  owners o f  f irms and the  f irms them selves
^See Paul S. N adler ,  " L i a b i l i t y  Management and Loan P r ic in g ,"  
Journal o f  Commercial Bank Lending, 5 5 : 2 0 - 2 5 ,  February,  1973.
O
Ezra Solomon, The Theory o f  F inancia l  Management (New York: 
Columbia U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 963 ) ,  p. 33.
^Franco Modig l iani  and Merton H. M i l l e r ,  "The Cost o f  C a p i ta l ,  
Corporation Finance ,  and the  Theory o f  Investment ,"  American Economic 
Review, 4 8 : 2 6 1 -9 7 ,  June,  1958 and "Corporate Income Taxes and the  Cost  
o f  C ap i ta l :  A C orrect ion ,"  American Economic Review, 5 3 :4 3 3 -4 4 ,  June,
1963.
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borrow and lend  a t  the  same r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t .  I t  a l s o  assumes p e r f e c t  
l i q u i d i t y  o f  a s s e t s ,  no t r a n s a c t i o n s  c o s t s ,  and c o s t l e s s  information  
among o th er  assumptions .  In sh or t  the assumptions  which combine to  
produce the  o v e r a l l  assumption o f  a p e r f e c t  market are th o se  which must 
be v i o l a t e d  in order  fo r  banks to  e x i s t .  Furthermore,  when the MM th eory  
i s  combined with  the  Capital  A s s e t  P r i c in g  Model o f  Sharpe,  L in tn er ,  and 
M o s s in ^  and a l l  i n v e s t o r s  and f irms are assumed to  be borrowing and 
l end ing  a t  a r i s k  f r e e  r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  i t  becomes e s p e c i a l l y  apparent  
t h a t  banks would serv e  no u se fu l  purpose in t h i s  market.  Thus, in order  
t o  accommodate banks i t  become n e c e s s a r y  to  d iv er g e  from the t r a d i t i o n a l  
p e r f e c t  market theory  o f  f in a n c e .
The purpose o f  t h i s  re sea r ch  i s  to  deve lop  a th eory  o f  bank f i n a n ­
c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  This  o b j e c t i v e  w i l l  be pursued by s e t t i n g  up a model 
which i s  capable  o f  accommodating the im p e r fe c t io n s  c o n s i s t e n t  with the  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  banks and then us ing  the  model t o  examine the  e f f e c t s  o f  
l e v e r a g e  on v a lu a t io n  and shareho lder  wealth  o f  the banking f irm .  The 
bank w i l l  be viewed as a wealth  maximizing f irm which i s  shown to  have 
a c o m p e t i t i v e  advantage over non-banking f irms in both the  r i s k  and 
c o s t  o f  c la im s  i s su ed  a g a i n s t  t h e m . ^
Two typ es  o f  c la im s  w i l l  be examined.  One i s  the demand d e p o s i t ,  
here assumed to  be c o s t l e s s ,  r i s k l e s s ,  n o n - i n t e r e s t  b ea r in g ,  and
^ W i l l i a m  F. Sharpe,  "Capital A ss e t  P r i c e s :  A Theory o f  Market
Equil ibr ium Under Condi t ions  o f  Risk,"  Journal o f  F in an ce , 19 :4 2 5 -4 2 ,  
September,  1964; John L in tn er ,  "The Valuat ion  o f  Risk A s s e t s  and the  
S e l e c t i o n  o f  Risky Investments  in Stock P o r t f o l i o s  and Capital  Budgets,"  
Review o f  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , 4 7 :1 3 - 3 7 ,  February, 1965; and Jan 
Mossin,  "Equil ibrium in a Capital  A ss e t  Market," Econometrica , 3 4 :7 6 8 -8 3 ,  
October ,  1966.
^ I n  Chapter 3 th e  q u es t io n  o f  whether wealth  maximizat ion i s  an 
appropria te  o b j e c t i v e  f o r  banks w i l l  be co n s id ered .
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re q u ir in g  no r e s e r v e s .  Although t h e s e  assumptions  and some o th e r s  
which are invoked are  not n e c e s s a r i l y  r e a l i s t i c ,  they  serv e  a u se fu l  
purpose in f a c i l i t a t i n g  an i n i t i a l  and r e l a t i v e l y  s imple  view o f  the  
model.  Later the  assumptions  are dropped. I t  w i l l  be shown th a t  the  
model' s  e s s e n t i a l  f i n d i n g s  are  maintained even when r e l a x i n g  th o se  
assumptions .
A second form o f  debt i s su ed  i s  an i n t e r e s t  bearing l i a b i l i t y  
which w i l l  be i d e n t i f i e d  as simply  " c r e d i t  market f in a n c in g . "  Such 
f in a n c in g  i s  e m p i r i c a l l y  observed in the form o f  federa l  fu n ds ,  c e r t i ­
f i c a t e s  o f  d e p o s i t ,  and E u rod o l lars .  The r o l e  o f  t h i s  form o f  f in a n c in g  
i s  to  support  a s s e t  expansion when d e p o s i t  growth i s  inadequate .
An important f e a t u r e  o f  the model i s  the  f a c t  th a t  a t e s t a b l e  
im p l i c a t io n  can be d e r i v e d .  I t  w i l l  be shown th a t  the  model im p l i e s
th a t  a s p e c i f i c  f u n c t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i l l  e x i s t  between a measure o f
e q u i t y  r i s k  and f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  f o r  banks t h a t  w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t  
from t h a t  o f  f i r m s .  Some p re l im inary  ev idence  w i l l  be presen ted  th a t  i s  
shown to  provide support  fo r  the model.
Chapter 2 w i l l  p r e s e n t  an overv iew o f  the l i t e r a t u r e  to  in c lud e  
i s s u e s  such as  (1)  corp o ra te  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  theory  and i t s  
em pir ica l  e v id e n c e  and (2) th e  s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t  in bank f i n a n c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  theory  and t h e  ev idence  on the e f f e c t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  
on v a lu a t io n  and e q u i t y  re turns  o f  the banking f irm.  Chapter 3 w i l l  
provide th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  development o f  the bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
model t h a t  forms th e  nuc leus  o f  t h i s  re s e a r c h .  Also covered in t h i s
chapter  w i l l  be the  formulas fo r  the  bank's required r a te  o f  return  and
c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  and the  m odel' s  i m p l i c a t io n s  under re laxed  assumptions .  
Chapter 4 w i l l  p r e s e n t  the d e r i v a t i o n  o f  a t e s t a b l e  s ta tement  p lus  a
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general  overv iew o f  the  t e s t  procedures ,  r e l e v a n t  econometric i s s u e s ,  
and answers to  a n t i c i p a t e d  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  the  t e s t i n g  p r o c e s s .  Chapter 5 
w i l l  r e p o r t  the  empir ica l  ev id e n c e .  In Chapter 6 the  r e s u l t s  o f  the  
research  w i l l  be summarized and c o n c l u s io n s  and im p l i c a t i o n s  w i l l  be 
p r e s e n te d .
Chapter 2
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose o f  t h i s  resear ch  i s  to i n t e g r a t e  fundamental con cep ts  
from the  theory  o f  co rp ora te  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  with  c o n d i t i o n s  con­
s i s t e n t  with  the  e x i s t e n c e  and managerial o b j e c t i v e s  o f  a banking f irm.  
The l i t e r a t u r e  survey  w i l l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  b e n e f i t  from a b r i e f  review o f  
th e  current  s t a t e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  th eory  as i t  i s  a p p l ied  to  
non-banking f irm s .  A ccord ing ly  t h i s  ch ap ter  proceeds  with  a review  o f  
such theory  and the  empir ica l  s t u d i e s  t h a t  have purported to  t e s t  the  
theory  fo l lo w ed  by the  ra th er  l i m i t e d  th eory  o f  bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c tu r e  
and i t s  empir ica l  ev id e n c e .
The theory  o f  bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  bears  l i t t l e  resemblance  
to  the  theory  o f  c o rp o ra te  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  The reason i s  due to  
th e  f a c t  th a t  no prev ious  study has e v er  at tempted  to  provide a t h e o r e ­
t i c a l  l i n k  between f irm and bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  p r i n c i p l e s .  The 
author would be r e m i s s ,  however,  t o  imply t h a t  such a l i n k  has not  
evolved  from prev ious  papers on th e  s u b j e c t s .  N o n e t h e le s s ,  i t  i s  f e l t  
th a t  the p resen t  research  may provide  even fu r t h e r  c l u e s  as to  the  
mystery surrounding bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  d e c i s i o n s .
One problem t h a t  q u ic k ly  a r i s e s  in examining sep ara te  but r e l a t e d  
areas  o f  study i s  t h a t  term inology  appearing in the  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  not  
n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n s i s t e n t  from one study to  the n ex t .  The problem i s  
most e v id e n t  in the use o f  the term " c a p i t a l . "  In co rp ora te  f i n a n c i a l  
or " cap ita l"  s t r u c t u r e  th e o r y ,  "cap ita l"  r e f e r s  to  debt and e q u i ty  with  
no s p e c i f i c  d i s t i n c t i o n  being made between short  and long term debt .
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N o n e th e le s s ,  e q u i t y  i s  o f t e n  r e f e r r e d  to  as " c a p i t a l , "  i . e . ,  e q u i ty  
c a p i t a l ,  and debt i s  o c c a s i o n a l l y  r e f e r r e d  to as debt  c a p i t a l .  In 
banking theory  the term " cap ita l"  i s  somewhat more co n fu s in g  pr im ar i ly  
because the  Comptroller o f  the Currency,  the r e g u l a to r  o f  the  n at ion a l  
banks,  a l l o w s  banks to  count a p o r t io n  o f  t h e i r  long term s e n i o r  debt  
as c a p i t a l  when computing " ca p i ta l  adequacy" r a t i o s  such as  c a p i t a l  
to t o t a l  a s s e t s .  Thus, the  Comptroller and a l s o  o th er  r e g u l a t o r s ,  
d e s ir o u s  o f  banks meeting  c e r t a i n  minimum r a t i o s  o f  " cap i ta l  adequacy,"  
are l a b e l i n g  e q u i t y  as  th e  primary d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " c a p i t a l , "  with  the  
Comptroller a l l o w in g  some debt to a l s o  count .
I t  i s  th e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h i s  w r i t e r  to avo id  any co n fu s io n  over  
terminology .  In t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  " f in a n c ia l  s tructure"  w i l l ,  h en ce fo r th ,  
r e f e r  to the r e l a t i v e  p ro p o r t io n s  o f  debt and e q u i ty  in the  f in a n c in g  
o f  a f i r m ' s  a s s e t s .  "C apita l ,"  used s i n g u l a r l y  w i l l  r e f e r  to  e q u i t y .  
The ex p r e s s io n  " cos t  o f  c a p i t a l "  w i l l  i n d i c a t e  the weighted  average  
c o s t  o f  debt and e q u i t y .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  th e r e  w i l l  be a few minor 
abrogat ions  to  the  general  r u l e ,  but t h e s e  w i l l  be c l e a r l y  noted ,  kept  
to a minimum, and should  cause  no undue bewilderment.
The Theory o f  Corporate F inancia l  S tructu re
The theory  o f  co rpora te  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  has been a foca l  po in t  
o f  f i n a n c i a l  research  f o r  many y e a r s .  I t s  o r i g i n s  are g e n e r a l l y  
traced  to the  seminal work o f  M odig l iani  and M i l l e r  (MM).* MM p o s tu ­
l a t e d  t h a t  in a no tax  world ,  the  va lue  o f  the  f irm and shareholder
*Franco Modig l iani  and Merton H. M i l l e r ,  "The Cost o f  C a p i t a l ,  
Corporation Finance ,  and the  Theory o f  Investment," American Economic 
Review, 4 8 :2 6 1 -9 7 ,  June,  1958 and "Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost  
o f  C api ta l :  A C orrec t ion ,"  American Economic Review, 5 3 :4 3 3 -4 4 ,  June,
1963.
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wealth  could not be enhanced by the  use o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e .  They 
argued t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  c a p i t a l i z e  a f i r m ' s  n e t  o p era t in g  income, or  
cash f low  from o p e r a t i o n s ,  which i s  determined s o l e l y  by th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the re tu rn s  on the  f i r m ' s  investment  a c t i v i t i e s .
Their proof  r e s t e d  on the  in d iv idu a l  being a b le  t o  engage in a r b i t r a g e  
o p e r a t io n s  t h a t  e f f e c t i v e l y  s u b s t i t u t e  personal l e v e r a g e  f o r  corp orate  
l e v e r a g e .  The f irm can do nothing f o r  the in d iv id u a l  t h a t  he cannot  
a lr ead y  do f o r  h i m s e l f ,  implying t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  and, th u s ,  
f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  i s  i r r e l e v a n t .  The in tr o d u c t io n  o f  a corporate
income tax  would,  however,  modify t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n .  The tax  d e d u c t i ­
b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t  payments would augment the  stream o f  earn ings  
a v a i l a b l e  to  the e q u i ty h o ld e r s  so t h a t  i t  would be l a r g e r  than th a t  o f  
an unlevered f irm o f  e q u i v a l e n t  b u s in e ss  or op era t in g  r i s k .  The va lue  
o f  the  f irm and sh areho lder  wea lth  would then i n c r e a s e .  Under th e s e  
assumptions the  f irm should use as much debt as  i t  cou ld  ob ta in  in i t s  
f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .
The MM theory  was the  f i r s t  counterargument to  a t r a d i t i o n a l  view
2
o f  f irm financi-a l  s t r u c t u r e  as s e t  f o r th  in  Solomon. R ebutta ls
3
o f  MM were publ ish ed  by Solomon and Baumol and M a lk ie l .  They argued 
t h a t  even in a no tax  w orld ,  the  moderate use o f  debt would provide  
b e n e f i t s  t h a t  would more than o f f s e t  any a d d i t io n a l  r i s k .  Up to  a 
c e r t a i n  p o i n t ,  e q u i t y h o ld e r s  would not i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  required  r a t e s  
o f  return  by enough t o  c o m p le te ly  o f f s e t  the use o f  low c o s t  d ebt .
O
Ezra Solomon, The Theory o f  F inancia l  Management (New York: 
Columbia U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 963 ) ,  pp. 92-98 .
Ezra Solomon, "Leverage and the Cost o f  C a p i ta l ,"  Journal o f  
Finance , 1 8 : 2 7 3 -9 ,  May, 1963; Will iam J.  Baumol and Burton M a lk ie l ,
"The Firm's Optimal Debt-Eauity  Combination and the Cost o f  C a p i ta l ,"  
Quarter ly  Journal o f  Economics, 8 1 : 5 4 7 -7 8 ,  November, 1967.
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The MM theory  was examined fu r th e r  in two papers by S t i g l i t z .
In the 1969 paper he developed  the theory  in a s t a t e  p r e fer en ce  frame­
work assuming margin r e s t r i c t i o n s  and d i f f e r e n t i a l  personal and 
corp orate  borrowing r a t e s .  He found th a t  i f  the in d iv id u a l  in v e s t o r  
were a b le  to  r e c r e a t e  co rp ora te  l e v e r a g e  on a personal b a s i s  by s e l l i n g  
s h o r t ,  the MM r e s u l t s  could  be upheld.  He a l s o  der ived  the  theory  us ing  
the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin  (.SLM) Capital  A sse t  P r ic in g  Model (CAPM)
5
o f  market e q u i l ib r iu m .  At approxim ately  the same t im e ,  Mossin and
/r
Hamada der ived  the MM p r o p o s i t io n s  us ing  the SLM model, but S t i g l i t z ' s  
proof  as well  as t h a t  o f  Rubinstein^ were more general  as they  
incorporated  r i s k y  debt  whereas Hamada and Mossin had assumed r i s k l e s s  d ebt .
In the 1974 paper S t i g l i t z  extended the MM theory  t o  the  q u es t ion  
o f  whether the d e b t / e q u i t y  d e c i s i o n  f o r  f irms in aggregate  were r e l e v a n t  
to  the economic w e l f a r e  o f  s o c i e t y .  Under very general  c o n d i t io n s  he 
proved th a t  i t  was indeed i r r e l e v a n t .  A s i m i l a r  c o n c lu s io n  was reached
Joseph E. S t i g l i t z ,  "A Re-Examination o f  the M o d ig l ia n i -M i l l e r  
Theorem," American Economic Review, 59: 784 -93 ,  December, 1969;
S t i g l i t z ,  "On the I r r e l e v a n c e  o f  Corporate F inancia l  P o l i c y , "  American 
Economic Review, 64: 8 5 1 - 6 6 ,  December, 1974.
^William F. Sharpe,  "Capital A sse t  P r i c e s :  A Theory o f  Market
Equil ibr ium Under Condi t ions  o f  Risk," Journal o f  F inan ce , 19: 425 -42 ,  
September,  1964; John L in tn e r ,  "The Valuat ion o f  Risk A s s e t s  and the  
S e l e c t i o n  o f  Risky Investments  in Stock P o r t f o l i o s  and Capita l  Budgets,"  
Review o f  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , 47: 13 -37 ,  February,  1965; Jan 
Mossin,  "Equil ibrium in a Capital  A sset  Market," Econometrica , 34: 
7 68 -8 3 ,  October ,  1966.
Jan Mossin,  " Se cu r i ty  P r ic in g  and Investment C r i t e r i a  in 
Competit ive Markets," American Economic Review, 59: 749 -5 6 ,  December, 
1969; Robert S. Hamada, " P o r t f o l i o  A n a l y s i s ,  Market Equil ibr ium,  and 
Corporation Finance ," Journal o f  F inance , 24: 13 -31 ,  March, 1969.
^Mark R u b in s te in ,  "A Mean-Variance S y n th e s i s  o f  Corporate F inancia l  
Theory," Journal o f  F in an ce , 28: 1 75 -6 ,  March, 1973.
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o
by M i l l e r  but d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h a t  paper w i l l  de ferred  to  a l a t e r  paragraph.  
S t i g l i t z  a l s o  provided an i n s i g h t  in to  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s .  He argued t h a t  i f  l e v e r e d  f irms were overvalued r e l a t i v e  
to  un levered  f irm s  o f  e q u iv a l e n t  b u s in e ss  r i s k ,  and i f  f o r  some reason  
i n d i v i d u a l s  were unable to  engage in the a r b i t r a g i n g  o p e r a t io n s  n e c e s s a r y  
to  e l i m i n a t e  d i s e q u i l i b r i a ,  then f i n a n c i a l  in t e r m e d ia r ie s  would be 
c r e a t e d .  The in te r m e d i a r i e s  would then undertake the buying and s e l l i n g  
o f  f i n a n c i a l  s e c u r i t i e s  th a t  would r e s t o r e  eq u i l ib r iu m .  I t  should be 
noted t h a t  t h i s  argument r e s t s  on the assumption o f  c o s t l e s s  c r e a t io n  
o f  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s .
S e t t i n g  a s i d e  the  no tax  c a s e ,  academics have found themselves
unable to  r e c o n c i l e  th e  MM recommendations t h a t  f irms should seek maximal
use o f  debt w ith  th e  empir ica l  o b s e r v a t io n  t h a t  e x c e p t in g  f i n a n c i a l
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ,  f irms simply  do not  use n in e t y - n i n e  percent  d ebt .  To
q
h o p e f u l ly  r e s o l v e  t h i s  conundrum, Kim deve loped a mean-variance f i n a n c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  theory  in which an optimal l e v e l  o f  debt f in a n c in g  was found 
to  occur where the  p r e s e n t  va lu e  o f  the i n t e r e s t  tax subs idy  eq ua ls  the  
p res en t  va lu e  o f  bankruptcy c o s t s .  Also Kraus and L i t z e n b e r g e r ^  reached  
a s i m i l a r  c o n c l u s io n  with a s t a t e  p re fe r e n c e  model where an optimal  
f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  was shown to  e x i s t  a t  the  p o in t  where the  f irm "jumps"
^Merton H. M i l l e r ,  "Debt and Taxes," Journal o f  F inan ce , 32: 2 6 1 -7 5 ,  
May, 1977.
g
E. Han Kim, "A Mean-Variance Theory o f  Optimal Capi tal  S tructu re  
and Corporate Debt Capacity ,"  Journal o f  F in an ce , 33: 4 5 - 6 3 ,  March, 1978.
^ A l a n  Kraus and Robert L i t z e n b e r g e r ,  "A S t a t e - P r e f e r e n c e  Model 
o f  Optimal F inancia l  Leveraqe," Journal o f  Finance ,  27: 911 -2 2 ,  September,  
1972.
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from the  d i s c r e t e  s t a t e  o f  so lv e n c y  to  th e  s t a t e  o f  bankruptcy.
These papers ,  however,  are  s u b j e c t  to  c o n s id e r a b le  q u e s t i o n in g .  The
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  bankruptcy c o s t s  are  s u f f i c i e n t l y  g r e a t  enough to  d e te r
management from maximizing the use o f  debt f in a n c in g  has been denounced
by Haugen and S e n b e t ^  and empir ica l  ev id e n c e  th a t  bankruptcy c o s t s
appear to  be t r i v i a l  r e l a t i v e  to  the  va lue  o f  the  f irm was presented  
12by Warner.
Another but as y e t  u n te s te d  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  the agency c o s t  model 
13o f  Jensen and Meckling.  They s u g g e s t  th a t  the sep a ra t io n  o f  ownership  
and contro l  c r e a t e s  agency c o s t s  i f  owner and managerial  o b j e c t i v e s  do 
not  c o i n c i d e .  Managers in seek in g  to  maximize t h e i r  own w e l f a r e  w i l l  
trade o f f  c o s t s  o f  b r in g in g  in o u t s i d e  f in a n c in g  ( f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  
bonding c o s t s ,  e t c . )  w ith  re tu rn s  from having o u t s i d e r s  share c o s t s  o f  
p e r q u i s i t e s .  In t h i s  manner an optimal mix o f  debt and e q u i t y  along  
with an optimal r a t i o  o f  i n s i d e  to  o u t s i d e  f in a n c in g  i s  found.
M i l l e r  has extended the  b a s i c  MM model with co rp ora te  ta x e s  to  
in c lu d e  personal t a x e s .  Because o f  the  r e l a t i v e l y  h igher  tax  r a t e  on 
i n t e r e s t  income than on d iv id en d s  and c a p i t a l  g a i n s ,  bondholders requ ire  
compensation in the form o f  h igher  p r e - ta x  y i e l d s .  Any advantages  o f
**Robert A. Haugen and Lemma W. S enb et ,  "The I n s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  
Bankruptcy Costs  to  th e  Theory o f  Optimal Capital  S t ru c tu re ,"  Journal  
o f  F inan ce , 33: 383 -93 ,  May, 1978.
1 O
Jero ld  B. Warner, "Bankruptcy Costs:  Some Evidence," Journal
o f  F inan ce , 32: 337 -47 ,  May, 1977.
1 3
Michael C. Jensen and Will iam H. Meckl ing,  "Theory o f  the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior ,  Agency C o s t s ,  and Ownership S tru c tu re ,"  Journal  
o f  F inancia l  Economics, 3: 305 -6 0 ,  October,  1976.
^ M i l l e r ,  l o c .  c i t .
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debt  are  erased as the p r o g r e s s iv e  income tax f o r c e s  f irms to  o f f e r  
higher  p r e - ta x  y i e l d s  as they  s e l l  a d d i t io n a l  debt to  the marginal  
i n v e s t o r .  In e q u i l ib r iu m  no optimal f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s ;  however,  
ev id e n c e  g iven  by Kim, Lew el len ,  and McConnell p rov id e  l i t t l e  support  
f o r  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  c l i e n t e l e s ,  an im p l i c a t io n  o f  
M i l l e r ' s  model
Empirical Evidence on Corporate F inancia l  S tru c tu re  Theory 
Attempts to  v e r i f y  the  MM th eory  have co n cen tra ted  on t e s t i n g  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l e v e r a g e  and the c o s t  o f  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l ,  s t a t e d  
as MM‘ s P ro p o s i t io n  II
Ke = Kq + CK0 -  K .) (D/S)
where Kg i s  the c o s t  o f  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l  f o r  a le v e r e d  f irm ,  Kq i s  the
c o s t  o f  e q u i ty  c a p i t a l  f o r  the same firm i f  u n lev er ed ,  i s  the  c o s t
o f  debt c a p i t a l ,  D i s  th e  market va lu e  o f  the d e b t ,  and S i s  the  market
va lue  o f  the  e q u i t y  ( s t o c k ) .
T e s t s  fo c u s in g  on the above r e l a t i o n s h i p  are v a l i d  t e s t s  o f  the
MM th eory  because P r o p o s i t i o n  I -  the va lue  o f  the  f irm and the c o s t
o f  c a p i t a l  are u n a f fe c te d  by the use o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  -  and
P ro p o s i t io n  II are j o i n t  h ypotheses .  Such t e s t s , however,  are not e a s i l y
performed. Most im portan t ly ,  an accepted  e q u i ty  v a lu a t io n  model i s
needed and the CAPM, the most popular one to  d a t e ,  has n o t ,  according  
1 fi
to R o l l ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s tood the t e s t  o f  econometric r i g o r  and may not
^ E .  Han Kim, Wilbur G. Lew el len ,  and John J .  McConnell , "Financial  
Leverage C l i e n t e l e s , "  Journal o f  F inancia l  Economics, 7: 83 -1 0 9 ,  1979.
16Richard R o l l ,  "A C rit iq u e  o f  the A sse t  P r i c in g  Theory 's  T e s t s .
Part I:  On Past and P o te n t ia l  T e s t a b i l i t y  o f  the  Theory," Journal o f
F inancia l  Economics,  4: 129-76 ,  March, 1977.
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even be t e s t a b l e  a t  a l l .  Furthermore,  f irms used in a sample must be
o f  e q u iv a le n t  b u s in e ss  r i s k  which i s  n o t ,  as  e m p i r i c a l l y  v e r i f i e d  by
17Gonedes and Martin,  S c o t t ,  and V a n d e l l , n e c e s s a r i l y  e q u i v a l e n t  to  
belonging  to  the  same Standard I n d u s tr ia l  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  (SIC) " in dustry ."  
Another problem l i e s  in the measurement o f  the c o s t  o f  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l .  
N eith er  the  r a t i o  o f  earn ings  to  p r i c e  nor the  d i v i d e n d / p r i c e  r a t i o ,  
o f t e n  used in o th er  s t u d i e s ,  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  proxy f o r  Kg . 
A ls o ,  the  use o f  market v a lu e s  as  implied  by the  theory  c r e a t e s  some 
spur ious  c o r r e l a t i o n  i f  p r i c e  i s  used to  measure Kg . Another problem 
occurs  in the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  tax  e f f e c t .  P r o p o s i t io n  II with  
t a x e s  simply  c o n ta in s  a (1 -  t ) f a c t o r  m u l t i p l i e d  by D where x i s  the  
c o rp ora te  marginal income tax  r a t e .  I f  t e s t s  are found to  uphold 
P r o p o s i t i o n  II some i r r a t i o n a l i t y  on the part  o f  managers f o r  not  
maximizing debt f in a n c in g  i s  im p l ied .  On the  o th er  hand, the t r a d i t i o n a l  
theory  im p l i e s  t h a t  th e r e  i s  some advantage t o  debt  f in a n c in g  and i t  i s  
e a s i l y  seen t h a t  t h i s  advantage might be i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from the MM 
c a s e  with t a x e s .  Consequently  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t e s t  r e s u l t s  must be 
tempered with c a u t io n .
18Modig l iani  and M i l l e r  found r e s u l t s  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  t h e i r  views  
f o r  samples o f  o i l  and e l e c t r i c  u t i l i t y  s t o c k s .  Using the  CAPM f o r  a
17
N ich o las  Gonedes, "A T es t  o f  the  Equiva lent  Risk Class  Hypothes is ,"  
Journal o f  F inancia l  and Q u a n t i t a t iv e  A n a l y s i s , 4: 159-77 ,  June,  1969;
John D. Martin,  David F. S c o t t ,  J r . ,  and Robert F. V an d e l l ,  "Equivalent  
Risk C la s s e s :  A Mult idimensional  Examination," Journal o f  F inancia l  and
Q u a n t i ta t iv e  A n a l y s i s , 14: 101-18 ,  March, 1979.
■^Modigliani and M i l l e r ,  "The Cost o f  C a p i t a l ,  Corporation Finance ,  
and the  Theory o f  Investment,"  pp. 280-86;  Merton H. M i l l e r  and Franco 
M o d ig l ia n i ,  "Some Est im ates  o f  the Cost o f  Capital  to  the E l e c t r i c  U t i l i t y  
Industry ,"  American Economic Review, 56: 333 -9 1 ,  June,  1966.
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19sample o f  f irms from n in e  SIC " i n d u s t r i e s , "  Hamada found ev idence
t h a t  l e v e r a g e  was in c r e a s i n g  the f irms' beta  c o e f f i c i e n t s  where beta  i s
the r e l e v a n t  measure o f  r i s k  in the  CAPM. He concluded t h a t  s i n c e  the
required  return on e q u i t y  i s  determined in the market by the beta
20c o e f f i c i e n t ,  the  r e s u l t s  were c o n s i s t e n t  with MM. Joy and Jones us ing
the  CAPM a l s o  purported to  have found r e s u l t s  support ing MM; however,
they  err o n e o u s ly  attempted to s a t i s f y  the  e q u iv a le n t  r i s k  c l a s s  assumption
by holding t o t a l  r i s k  c o n s ta n t  ra th er  than b u s in e s s  r i s k .  Furthermore,
they  m is in t e r p r e t e d  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  which could  e a s i l y  have been c o n s i s t e n t
with the t r a d i to n a l  view.
Other ev idence  f u l l y  supports  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  view.  Brigham and
Gordon in an e q u i t y  v a l u a t io n  model in c o r p o r a t in g  l e v e r a g e  and o th er
f a c t o r s  found t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  did  not  appear to  be req u ir in g  complete
22compensation f o r  marginal u n i t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k .  VJippern us ing  a
modif ied  l e v e r a g e  measure des igned  to  remove the  problem o f  h e t e r o g e n e i t y
o f  b u s in e ss  r i s k ,  found l e v e r a g e  to  have a s m a l le r  e f f e c t  than p red ic te d
23by MM. Sarma and Rao t e s t e d  the theory  on a sample o f  Indian f irms
^ R o b e r t  S. Hamada, "The E f f e c t  o f  the  Firm's Capital  S tructu re  
on the Sys tem at ic  Risk o f  Common S tock s ,"  Journal o f  F in an ce , 27: 43 5 -5 2 ,  
May, 1972.  
on
0.  Maurice Joy and Charles P. J o n e s ,  "Leverage and the  Valuat ion  
o f  Risk A s s e t s ,"  Quarter ly  Review o f  Economics and B u s i n e s s , 15: 8 1 -9 2 ,  
Winter,  1975.
71
Eugene F. Brigham and Myron J .  Gordon, "Leverage,  Dividend P o l i c y ,  
and th e  Cost o f  C a p i ta l ,"  Journal o f  F in an ce , 23: 85 -1 0 4 ,  March, 1968.
??
Ronald F. Wippern, "Financia l  S tru c tu re  and the Value o f  the  
Firm," Journal o f  F in a n ce , 21: 615-33 ,  December, 1966.
OO
L. Sarma and K. Rao, "Leverage and the  Value o f  the  Firm," Journal  
o f  F inance , 24: 6 7 3 -7 7 ,  September,  1969.
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24and found l e s s  o f  a l e v e r a g e  e f f e c t  than implied  by MM. Barges c a r e ­
f u l l y  reviewed the MM th eory  and the s t a t i s t i c a l  problems involved  in 
t e s t i n g  i t  and des igned  t e s t s  which supported the t r a d i t i o n a l  view o f  
no l e v e r a g e  e f f e c t  a t  low l e v e l s  o f  d e b t ,  but a r i s i n g  c o s t  o f  e q u i ty
a t  h igher  l e v e l s  o f  d eb t .  A summary and c r i t i q u e  o f  t h e s e  and o ther
25
general  e q u i ty  v a lu a t io n  models i s  found in Keenan.
The s t a t e  o f  c o rp o ra te  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  theory  i s  an u n s e t t l e d  
one.  To extend the  uneasy case  f o r  or a g a i n s t  an optimal f i n a n c i a l  
s t r u c tu r e  to  a banking f irm might wel l  be i l l - a d v i s e d ,  but the s e v e r i t y  
o f  contemporary problems in banking demands some form o f  r igorous  model 
f o r  which the  preceeding  i s  a t  l e a s t  b e t t e r  than nothing a t  a l l .  The 
next  important t a s k ,  th en ,  i s  to examine e x i s t i n g  t h e o r i e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  banking f irms to  determine th e  e x t e n t  to  which t h e i r  pre­
d i c t i o n s  concur with  or d iv e r g e  from cu rre nt  t h e o r i e s  o f  corporate  
f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .
The Theory o f  F inancia l  S tru c tu re  and the Banking Firm 
Theories  o f  banking f irm s  have g e n e r a l l y  been o f  the microeconomic  
p a r t ia l  e q u i l ib r iu m  natu re .  An e x c e p t io n  i s  a paper by Santomero and 
Watson26 who d e r i v e  a formula fo r  a s o c i a l l y  optimal l e v e l  o f  bank c a p i t a l ;  
however, the approach i s  void  o f  any d i r e c t  p r a c t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  as
OA
Alexander Barges ,  The E f f e c t  o f  Capita l  S tru c tu re  on the  Cost  
o f  Capital  (Englewood C l i f f s ,  New J e r s e y :  P r e n t i c e - H a l1 ,  I n c . ,  1963) .
26Michael Keenan, "Models o f  Equity Valuat ion:  The Great SERM
Bubble," Journal o f  F inance , 25: 243 -7 6 ,  May, 1970.
26Anthony M. Santomero and Ronald D. Watson, "Determining Optimal 
Capital  Standards f o r  the Banking Industry ,"  Journal o f  F inance , 32: 
1267-82,  September,  1977.
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i t  would r e q u ir e  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  s ev era l  non-measureable f a c t o r s .
A l s o ,  i t  p rov id es  no th eory  o f  bank f i n a n c i a l  d e c i s i o n s .
Focusing on the  microeconomic models ,  i t  was found t h a t  the  r o l e
o f  c a p i t a l  in models o f  banking f irms has f r e q u e n t l y  been r e s t r i c t e d
to  serv in g  as  the r e s id u a l  c la im ant  o f  the bank's earn ings  stream and
27not p lay in g  an a c t i v e  r o l e  in  the  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s .  Such an approach
prov ides  i n t e r e s t i n g  i n s i g h t s  but  undermines the  importance o f  the
2 8
f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n .  Other models though supported by r ig o ro u s  
economic theory  have om it ted  e q u i t y  a l t o g e t h e r  provid ing  no answers
to  the q u e s t i o n s  addressed  h e r e in .
2 9Mingo and Wolkowtiz have developed a u se fu l  theory  under c e r t a i n t y .  
In t h e i r  model a binding r e g u l a t o r  im p o s e d -c o n s tr a in t  f o r c e s  the bank 
to  hold i n e f f i c i e n t  p o r t f o l i o s  and renders  r i s k  a v e r s io n  an unnecessary  
requirement.  The bank would s im ply  maximize p r o f i t s  g iven  the  soundness  
c o n s t r a i n t .  S o lv ing  th e  c o n s t r a in e d  o p t im iz a t i o n  problem, th ey  found 
t h a t  a bank would respond to  an in c r e a s e  in soundness requirements by 
r a i s i n g  new c a p i t a l ,  improving loan q u a l i t y ,  reducing  d e p o s i t s ,  or
2 7 Michael K le in ,  "A Theory o f  the  Banking Firm," Journal o f  Money, 
C r e d i t ,  and Banking, 3: 2 0 5 -1 8 ,  May, 1971.
^ J o h n  J .  Mingo, "An Imperfect  Markets Model o f  th e  Banking Firm 
Under Regulat ion" (Washington,  D.C: Board o f  Governors o f  the  Federal
Reserve System, October ,  1 9 7 7 ) ,  Research Paper No. 18; O l iv e r  D. Hart 
and Dwight M. J a f f e e ,  "On the  A p p l i c a t io n  o f  P o r t f o l i o  Theory to  
D epos i tory  F inancia l  I n s t i t u t i o n s , "  Review o f  Economic S t u d i e s , 41:
129-47 ,  January,  1974.
OQ
John J.  Mingo and Benjamin Wolkowitz,  "The E f f e c t s  o f  Regulation  
on Bank Balance Sheet  D e c i s io n s , "  Journal o f  F inan ce , 32: 1605-16 ,
December, 1977.
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reducing  lo a n s .  The c h o ic e  would depend on the bank's r e l a t i v e  advantage  
in the markets f o r  c a p i t a l ,  l o a n s ,  and d e p o s i t s .  The f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
d e c i s i o n ,  th u s ,  might well  be d i c t a t e d  by r e g u l a to r y  soundness r e q u i r e ­
ments though i t  would seem l i k e l y  t h a t  a bank would command more o f  an 
advantage in the  loan and d e p o s i t  markets and would choose not to  r a i s e  
a d d i t io n a l  c a p i t a l .
30Taggart and Greenbaum deve loped another c e r t a i n t y  model with  
fu r th e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s .  They view the bank as a maximizer o f  net  
p resen t  va lue  o f  e q u i t y  and gen era t in g  cash  f low s  from loan s  and d e p o s i t  
s e r v i c e  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  Mo t a x e s  are assumed. Debt i s  o f  the form o f  
d e p o s i t s  which may or may not pay i n t e r e s t .  Under r e s e r v e  requirements  
and i n t e r e s t  on d e p o s i t s ,  the bank would s u b s t i t u t e  e q u i t y  f o r  d e p o s i t s  
which would r e l e a s e  r e s e r v e s  f o r  l e n d in g .  At the same time t r a n s a c t i o n s  
s e r v i c e  p r o f i t s  from d e p o s i t s  would be foregon e .  An optimal p o in t  would 
be reached when the a d d i t io n a l  p r o f i t s  generated by th e  r e l e a s e d  r e s e r v e s  
o f f s e t  the foregone t r a n s a c t i o n  s e r v i c e  p r o f i t s .  In the  absence  o f  
re s e r v e  requ irem ents ,  d e p o s i t s  would be s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  e q u i t y  i n d e f i n i t e l y .  
With r e s e r v e  requirements  but no t r a n s a c t io n  s e r v i c e  p r o f i t s ,  an a l l  
e q u i ty  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  would be op t im al .  In the  absence o f  re ser v e  
requirements  and t r a n s a c t io n  s e r v i c e  p r o f i t s ,  no optimal f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
would e x i s t .  Under r e s e r v e  requirements  and no i n t e r e s t  on d e p o s i t s ,  
the s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  e q u i ty  fo r  d e p o s i t s  would in c r e a s e  the  s a f e t y  o f  the  
bank's remaining d e p o s i t s .  Banks would con t in u e  to do so u n t i l  no bank
on
Robert A. Taggart ,  Jr .  and S tu art  I .  Greenbaum, "Bank Capital  
and P u b l ic  R egula t ion ,"  Journal o f  Money, C r e d i t ,  and Banking, 8: 158-69 ,  
May, 1978.
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in the market could  gain  a c o m p e t i t i v e  advantage.  An optimal f i n a n c i a l  
s t r u c tu r e  would then e x i s t .  Under r e s e r v e  requ irem en ts ,  no i n t e r e s t  
on d e p o s i t s ,  and d e p o s i t  in su ran ce ,  the i n c e n t i v e  to  in c r e a s e  the s a f e t y  
o f  d e p o s i t s  by r a i s i n g  e q u i t y  i s  m i s s in g .  D ep os i t  in surance  would 
serv e  t h i s  purpose .  New e q u i t y  would o n ly  be i s s u ed  i f  loan demand 
o u t s t r ip p e d  the bank's  a v a i l a b l e  sources  o f  borrowing.  This  p a r t i c u l a r  
c a s e  i s  the most r e a l i s t i c  and i t s  p r e d i c t i o n s  are  c o n s i s t e n t  with the  
em pir ica l  o b s e r v a t io n  t h a t  banks seen r e l u c t a n t  to  r a i s e  new e q u i t y .
The model coming c l o s e s t  to  br idg ing  the  gap between banking and
31co rp ora te  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  theory  i s  a t t r i b u t e d  to  P r i n g l e .  P r i n g le  
argues t h a t  the  Sharpe-L intner-Mossin  model i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  in i t s  
b a s i c  form f o r  e x p la i n i n g  bank b ehav ior .  He s u g g e s t s  t h a t  the e x i s t e n c e  
o f  banks im p l ie s  th a t  markets are  im p erfec t  whereas the  SLM model assumes  
t h a t  markets are  p e r f e c t .  A m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  SLM model to  
in corpora te  a premium in the p r i c in g  o f  a s s e t s  due to  im p e r fe c t io n s  in 
lo a n ,  d e p o s i t ,  and c a p i t a l  markets i s  made. The premiums are i d e n t i f i e d  
as "excess" re turn s  and c o s t s  over eq u i l ib r iu m  v a l u e s .  Banks are viewed  
as r i s k  averse  expected  u t i l i t y  o f  terminal wealth  maximizers who 
command c e r t a i n  advantages  in the  loan market and f a c e  f r i c t i o n s  in the  
money and c a p i t a l  markets .  Two s c e n a r io s  and c o n s id e r e d .  In the f i r s t  
c a s e  the  bank f a c e s  a s i n g l e - p e r i o d  sh or t  run world where c a p i t a l  i s  
f i x e d ,  loan s  are  the d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e  and d e p o s i t s  are s t o c h a s t i c .
The optimal l e v e l  o f  loan s  would occur a t  th e  p o in t  where e x c e s s  marginal
31John J .  P r i n g l e ,  "The Capital  D e c i s io n  in Commercial Banks," 
Journal o f  F inance , 29: 779 -95 ,  June,  1974; P r i n g l e ,  "The Imperfect  
Markets Model o f  Commercial Bank F inancia l  Management," Journal o f  
Financia l  and Q u a n t i ta t iv e  A n a l y s i s , 9: 6 9 - 8 7 ,  January,  1974.
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loan revenue equ a ls  e x c e s s  marginal c o s t  and would be a f u n c t io n  o f  
e x c e s s  loan revenue ,  e x c e s s  sh or t  term borrowing c o s t ,  the  parameters  
o f  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  d e p o s i t s ,  the market p r i c e  o f  r i s k ,  
and the  chosen l e v e l  o f  c a p i t a l .  In the second case  th e  bank f a c e s  a 
long run m u l t ip e r io d  world where c a p i t a l  i s  an a c t i v e  d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e .  
Optimal loan volume then would occur a t  the p o in t  where e x c e s s  marginal  
loan revenue equ a ls  e x c e s s  marginal c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l ;  th u s ,  the  on ly  
f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  loan p o l i c y  would be a t t r i b u t e d  to  market im p e r fe c t io n s .  
The optimal l e v e l  o f  c a p i t a l  would depend on th e  e x t e n t  o f  im p e r fe c t io n s  
in the borrowing and c a p i t a l  markets .  Capi tal  i s  seen as a medium fo r  
avo id ing  th e  high e x c e s s  c o s t s  o f  sh or t  term borrowing.  I f  the  e x c e ss  
c o s t  o f  sh ort  term borrowing exceed s  the  e x c e s s  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l ,  banks 
would in c r e a se  c a p i t a l  to  the  p o in t  where i t  i s  equal to  or l e s s  than the  
optimal l e v e l  o f  l o a n s .  I f  e x c e s s  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  are  g r e a t e r  than or  
equal to  e x c e s s  short  term borrowing c o s t s ,  c a p i t a l  o f f e r s  no b e n e f i t s  
and would not be used a t  a l l .
I f  one were w i l l i n g  to  a cce p t  the  e x t e n t  o f  market im p e r fe c t io n s  
implied  by P r i n g l e ,  then the  above model may be a c c u r a te ;  but f o r  i t s  
p r e d i c t i o n s  to conform to  the  observed d e c l i n e  in bank c a p i t a l  r a t i o s ,  
the  degree  o f  im p e r fe c t io n s  in the short  term money market must be o v e r ­
shadowed by the degree  o f  im p e r fe c t io n s  in th e  c a p i t a l  market.  Ergo,  
P r i n g l e ' s  theory  depends on the r e l a t i v e  e x c e s s  c o s t s  o f  long versus  
sh or t  term borrowing and the e x i s t e n c e  o f  a d i f f e r e n t i a l  between them.
The preceeding survey  o f  banking models i s  not e x h a u s t i v e .  Most 
o f  the o ther  m odels ,  however,  do not address  the  l e v e r a g e  i s s u e  whereas  
t h e s e  models do. At t h i s  p o in t  i t  w i l l  be b e n e f i c i a l  to f o l l o w  t h i s  
d i s c u s s i o n  with an examination o f  th e  e v ide n c e  on t h i s  c o n tr o v e r sy .
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Empirical Evidence on the  Theory o f  F inancia l  
S tr u c tu r e  and the Banking Firm 
None o f  the t h e o r i e s  o f  bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  p r e v i o u s ly  mentioned  
have been d i r e c t l y  t e s t e d .  A p le th ora  o f  empir ica l  s t u d i e s ,  however,  
have been concerned w ith  the  e f f e c t  o f  l e v e r a g e  on th e  c o s t  o f  e q u i t y ,  
v a l u a t i o n ,  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l ,  e t c .  o f  banks. Most o f  t h e s e  t e s t s  r e p r e se n t  
examinat ions  o f  ad hoc models being supported ra th er  l o o s e l y  by a minimum 
t h e o r e t i c a l  foundat ion  and f r e q u e n t ly  la c k in g  econometric r i g o r .  Few 
address the  q u es t io n  o f  whether the  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  i f  any,  between l e v e r a g e  
and e q u i t y  c o s t  c o m p le te ly  o f f s e t s  any advantage o f  debt f in a n c in g .
Rather,  th e  p o in t  o f  i n t e r e s t  has f r e q u e n t ly  been the  q u es t io n  o f  
whether the market can s u f f i c i e n t l y  d i s t i n g u i s h  banks by t h e i r  l e v e r a g e  
so t h a t  i t  might be a su rro g a te  f o r  government r e g u l a t i o n  o f  banking
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  with  p u b l i c l y  traded sh a res .
32Humphrey and T a l l e y  used a system o f  s im ultaneous  equ at ions  to  
measure the response  o f  the  c o s t  o f  e q u i t y  to  changes in  l e v e r a g e  f o r  
f i f t y - f i v e  bank hold ing  companies in 1973 and 1974.  C r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  
r e g r e s s i o n s  o f  p r i c e / e a r n i n g s  on d i v i d e n d s / e a r n i n g s ,  growth in ea r n in g s ,  
v a r i a t i o n  in e a rn in g s ,  and l e v e r a g e  measured as t o t a l  a s s e t s / e q u i t y  
c a p i t a l  p lus  r e s e r v e s  were t e s t e d .  To examine whether le v e r a g e  d e c i s i o n s  
were being a f f e c t e d  by market behav ior ,  the l e v e r a g e  v a r i a b l e  was r e g r e s se d  
on the  r a t i o  o f  e a r n i n g s / p r i c e  to  th e  c o s t  o f  debt lagged one p e r io d ,  
a r i s k  a s s e t  r a t i o ,  and the y e a r l y  change in t o t a l  d e p o s i t s  o f  the banking
^ D a v i d  B. Humphrey and Samuel H. T a l l e y ,  "Market Regulat ion o f  
Bank Leverage," (Washington,  D.C: Board o f  Governors o f  the Federal
Reserve System, January,  1977) ,  Research Paper No. 7.
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system.  In the  1974 r e g r e s s i o n s  l e v e r a g e  was found to  be r e l a t e d  to  
the  c o s t  o f  e q u i t y ,  but in n e i t h e r  1973 nor in 1974 was the  market having  
any impact on th e  l e v e r a g e  d e c i s i o n .  They concluded t h a t  the  market
may be r e c o g n i z in g  but not  r e g u l a t i n g  bank l e v e r a g e .
33Gahlon and S tover  examined t h i r t y - s e v e n  banks and hold ing  
companies in the  p e r i o d s ,  1963-67 and 1972-76 .  Using the CAPM they f i r s t  
p o s tu l a t e d  t h a t  bank b e tas  would be r e l a t e d  to  th e  bank's degree  o f  
op era t in g  l e v e r a g e ,  degree  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e ,  and the c o r r e l a t i o n  
o f  i t s  common s to c k  ea rn in g s  with the  market.  Standard tex tbook  d e f i n i t i o n s  
o f  degree  o f  o p era t in g  l e v e r a g e  and degree o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  were 
used.  The degree  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  was found to be c o r r e l a t e d  with
beta in the  1963-67 per iod  but not in  the  1972-76 p er iod .
14Pettway conducted s ev era l  t e s t s  o f  the  m arket 's  s e n s i t i v i t y  to  
bank l e v e r a g e .  For a sample o f  t h i r y - e i g h t  banks and hold ing  companies,  
he r e g r e s s e d  th e  beta  c o e f f i c i e n t  from a t ime s e r i e s  r e g r e s s i o n  on 
div idend  y i e l d ,  d iv id e n d s  per s h a re ,  d iv idend payout r a t i o ,  th e  change 
in earn ings  per share from the t h i r d  to  fou rth  q u a r te r ,  earn ings  growth 
over  th e  l a s t  e i g h t  q u a r t e r s ,  p r i c e / e a r n i n g s  r a t i o ,  t o t a l  c a p i t a l / r i s k  
a s s e t s ,  s t a b i l i t y  o f  e a rn in g s  growth,  and s i z e  o f  the f irm.  I t  should  
be noted t h a t  c a p i t a l  inc luded  e q u i t y  and long term debt .  The r e g r e s s i o n s  
were performed f o r  each o f  the years  from 1971 through 1974.  The le v e r a g e
James M. Gahlon and Roger D. S to v e r ,  "On the R e la t io n s h ip  Between 
Management D e c i s io n  V ar iab le s  and Bank Holding Company S ys tem at ic  Risk,"  
(paper presen ted  a t  th e  meet ing  o f  the  F inancia l  Management A s s o c i a t i o n ,  
M inn eapo l i s ,  Minnesota ,  October,  1978) .
14 Richard H. Pettway,  "Market T e s t s  o f  Capital  Adequacy o f  Large 
Commercial Banks," Journal o f  Finance ,  31: 8 6 5 -7 5 ,  June,  1975.
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r a t i o ,  c a p i t a l / r i s k  a s s e t s ,  was s i g n i f i c a n t  o n ly  in 1974.  For th e  same 
sample he in terchanged  the  p r i c e / e a r n i n g s  r a t i o  and beta  c o e f f i c i e n t  
as the dependent and independent v a r i a b l e s ,  and the  l e v e r a g e  v a r i a b l e  
was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e l a t e d  to  p r i c e / e a r n i n g s  in  1972 and 1974 but u nre la ted  
in 1971 and 1973.
qc
Durand c o l l e c t e d  a sample o f  117 banks and e s t im a te d  c r o s s -  
s e c t i o n a l  r e g r e s s i o n s  f o r  s i x  geographic  groups o f  banks f o r  each o f  
the  y e a r s  from 1946 through 1953.  He r e g r e s se d  the  s tock  p r i c e  on 
e a r n i n g s ,  d i v id e n d s ,  book v a lu e  per s h a re ,  s i z e  o f  the f i r m ,  a s s e t s /  
c a p i t a l ,  r i s k  a s s e t s / c a p i t a l ,  d iv id en d  payout r a t i o  d iv id e d  by an average  
o f  p a s t  d iv iden d  payout r a t i o s ,  and earn ings  s t a b i l i t y .  N e i th er  a s s e t s /  
c a p i t a l  nor r i s k  a s s e t s / c a p i t a l  were found to  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .
O C.
Shick and Verbrugge a p p l ie d  m u l t i p l e  d i s c r i m in a n t  a n a l y s i s  to  
the  p r i c e / e a r n i n g s  r a t i o s  o f  f i f t y - f o u r  banks over  th e  y e a r s  1963-67  
to determine i f  f o r t y  f i n a n c i a l  s ta tem ent  v a r i a b l e s  would be accu ra te  
d i s c r i m i n a t o r s .  Using a s t e p w is e  t e c h n iq u e ,  l e v e r a g e  v a r i a b l e s  d e f in ed  
as c a p i t a l  n o te s  p lu s  p r e fer red  s tock  d iv id e d  by common e q u i t y  and debt  
plus  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l  d iv id e d  by t o t a l  a s s e t s  l e s s  cash and government  
s e c u r i t i e s  did  not  e n t e r  th e  model s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  Worth not in g  i s  the  
f a c t  t h a t  simply  because  a computer program r e j e c t s  a p a r t i c u l a r  indepen­
dent v a r i a b l e  does  not n e c e s s a r i l y  imply t h a t  the v a r i a b l e  i s  u n re la ted  
to the dependent v a r i a b l e .
^ D a v i d  Durand, "Bank Stock P r i c e s  and the  Bank Capital  Problem," 
Occasional Paper No. 54 (New York: National  Bureau o f  Economic Research ,
1957) .
Richard A. Shick and James A. Verbrugge,  "An A n a ly s i s  o f  Bank 
P/E R at io s ,"  Journal o f  Bank Research ,  6: 1 4 0 -9 ,  Summer, 1975.
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37Magen used a sample o f  f o r t y - f i v e  banks and e s t im a ted  c r o s s -  
s e c t i o n a l  r e g r e s s i o n s  f o r  each o f  the y e a r s  from 1962 through 1966.
The c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  d e f in e d  as n e t  o p e r a t in g  earn in gs  d iv id ed  by market  
va lu e  was r e g r e s s e d  on l e v e r a g e  measured as debt d iv id ed  by debt p lus  
e q u i t y  c a p i t a l ,  d iv id en d  payout ,  growth in n e t  op era t in g  e a r n i n g s ,  
c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r i a t i o n  o f  the d e v i a t i o n  o f  ne t  o p era t in g  earn ings  from 
a trend l i n e ,  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r i a t i o n  o f  the  d e v i a t i o n  o f  earn ings  
b efore  i n t e r e s t  and t a x e s  from a trend l i n e ,  and the  l o a n / d e p o s i t  r a t i o .  
Several  a l t e r n a t i v e  measures o f  l e v e r a g e  were a l s o  t e s t e d ,  but no measure 
o f  l e v e r a g e  was found t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s s o c i a t e d  with t h i s  measure
o f  the  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .
38S i lv e r b e r g  r e g r e s s e d  the  d iv idend y i e l d  as a proxy f o r  Kg on 
f irm s i z e ,  l e v e r a g e ,  e a r n i n g s ,  and growth f o r  a sample o f  s i x t y  hold ing  
companies f o r  1973 and 1974.  Leverage was found to  have no e f f e c t  on 
the d iv idend  y i e l d .  The d o u b t fu ln e s s  o f  d iv idend  y i e l d  being a proxy
f o r  the requ ired  e q u i t y  return would tend to  e x p la in  t h e s e  r e s u l t s .
39Fraser  r e g r e s s e d  p r i c e / e a r n i n g s  f o r  f i f t y  banking f irms f o r  the  
y ea rs  1974 and 1975 on v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  return on a s s e t s ,  earn ings  growth,  
d iv idend  payout ,  e q u i t y / a s s e t s ,  and long term d e b t / t o t a l  c a p i t a l .  Using 
a s t e p w i s e  t e c h n iq u e ,  l e v e r a g e  did  not e n t e r  the  model s i g n i f i c a n t l y .
3 7 S. D. Magen, "Cost o f  Capital  and Dividend P o l i c i e s  in Commercial 
Banks," Journal o f  F inan c ia l  and Q u a n t i t a t iv e  A n a l y s i s , 6: 7 3 3 -4 6 ,  March, 
1971; Magen, The Cost o f  Funds to  Commercial Banks (New York: Dunellen
P u b l i sh in g  C o . , 1971) .
3 8 S ta n le y  S i l v e r b e r g ,  "Bank Holding Companies and Capital  Adequacy," 
Journal o f  Bank R esearch , 6: 2 0 2 - 7 ,  Autumn, 1975.
3 9 Donald R. F raser ,  "Further Evidence on Bank E q u i t i e s  and I n ves tor  
Risk P e r c e p t io n s ,"  Journal o f  Bank R esearch , 8: 189-91 ,  Autumn, 1977.
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Again,  the  ca v e a t  i s  t h a t  s t e p w i s e  procedures  sometimes obscure  r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip s  which are  s i g n i f i c a n t .
Van Horne and He!wig40 examined a sample o f  small Michigan banks 
in 1964 and found t h e i r  s to c k  p r i c e s  to  be u n re la ted  to  t h e i r  use o f  
f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e .
The f o l l o w i n g  papers in c o n t r a s t  found a d e f i n i t e  l e v e r a g e  e f f e c t .  
Gendreau and Humphrey41 re-examined the  Humphrey-Talley model d i s c u s se d  
e a r l i e r .  They converted  the model to  t ime s e r i e s  form and r eg r es sed  p r i c e /  
earn ings  on the  same v a r i a b l e s  but added d iv idend  growth and the Standard 
and Poor 's  500 Stock Composite Index.  For th e  c o s t  o f  debt r e g r e s s i o n s  
they  added the Consumer P r ice  Index to  r e f l e c t  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e f f e c t s .
The le v era g e  r e g r e s s i o n  was maintained  as b e fo r e .  The sample c o n s i s t e d  
o f  f i f t y  l a r g e  banking f irm s  over  the  period  1970-75 .  Leverage was 
found to  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  to  both the  p r i c e / e a r n i n g s  r a t i o  and 
l e v e r a g e  d e c i s i o n s  d id  seem to  be a f f e c t e d  by market a c t i v i t y .  They 
then r e - e s t i m a t e d  the  r e g r e s s i o n s  c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l l y .  No l e v e r a g e  e f f e c t  
was found f o r  the  e n t i r e  sample al though a s i g n i f i c a n t  l e v e r a g e  e f f e c t  
was e v i d e n t  f o r  a s ep a ra te  r e g r e s s i o n  with  th e  h ig h e s t  l e v e r e d  banks.
Then going back to  a t ime s e r i e s  r e g r e s s i o n  f o r  th e  h ig h e s t  l e v e r e d  banks 
r ev e a led  no l e v e r a g e  e f f e c t .  They concluded th a t  the market was appar­
e n t l y  not  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  banks by t h e i r  degree  o f  l e v e r a g e  but acknowledged
40James C. Van Horne and Raymond C. He!wig,  The Valuat ion o f  Small 
Bank Stocks  (East  Lansing,  Michigan: Michigan S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  Graduate
School o f  Bus iness  A d m in is tra t io n ,  1966) .
41 Brian C. Gendreau and David B. Humphrey, "Feedback E f f e c t s  in the  
Market Regulat ion  o f  Bank Leverage: A T im e -S er ie s  and C ro s s -S ec t io n
Analys is"  (Washington,  D.C: Board o f  Governors o f  the  Federal Reserve
System, A p r i l ,  1 978 ) ,  Research Paper No. 23.
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p o s s i b l e  r a i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n  and a sample range o f  l e v e r a g e  t h a t  was f a i r l y  
l i m i t e d .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  they  had found some ev id e nc e  t h a t  v a r i a t i o n s  in
bank l e v e r a g e  r a t i o s  were being d e t e c t e d  by the  market.
42B e i g h l e y ,  Boyd, and Jacobs found no r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l e v e r a g e
and s to c k  p r i c e  in 1970 and 1971 but did  f i n d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p
in 1972 and 1973 f o r  a sample o f  n in e t y  banking f i r m s .  They subsequ ent ly
extended the  s tudy t o  a sample o f  1.13 ho ld ing  companies and banks fo r
43the y e a r s  1970-74 .  They r e g r e s s e d  p r i c e  on n e t  op era t in g  e a r n i n g s ,  
d iv id en d s  per sh are ,  t o t a l  cash  d iv id e n d s ,  a four  year  geometr ic  mean 
growth r a t e  in n e t  o p e r a t in g  e a r n i n g s ,  t o t a l  ho ld ing  company c o n s o l id a t e d  
a s s e t s ,  the r a t i o  o f  loan charge-offs net  o f  r e c o v e r i e s  to  t o t a l  l o a n s ,  
the r a t i o  o f  t o t a l  d e p o s i t s  and o th e r  l i a b i l i t i e s  to  the  book va lue  
o f  common s t o c k ,  common shares  o u t s t a n d in g ,  and a dummy v a r i a b l e  fo r  
whether net  o p era t in g  earn ings  had in cr ease d  each o f  the  l a s t  few y e a r s .  
Leverage was found to  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  each o f  the  
y ea rs  in c r e a s in g  in s i g n i f i c a n c e  in 1972 and 1973 over  1970 and 1971 but  
d ecre a s ing  in s i g n i f i c a n c e  in 1974.  When the  sample was p a r t i t i o n e d  
by s i z e ,  l e v e r a g e  had an even g r e a te r  e f f e c t  on l a r g e  banks' e q u i t y  p r i c e s .
Graddy and Kama44 c o l l e c t e d  a sample o f  f o r t y  l a r g e  bank hold ing  
companies over  the period  1969-76 .  They r e g r e s s e d  p r i c e / e a r n i n g s  on
A O
Donald P. J a co b s ,  H. P r e s c o t t  B e i g h l e y ,  and John H. Boyd, "The 
Financia l  S tru c tu re  o f  Bank Holding Companies" (Chicago: A s s o c i a t io n
o f  Reserve City  Bankers,  1975).
43H. P r e s c o t t  B e i g h l e y ,  John H. Boyd, and Donald P. Jacob s ,  "Bank 
E q u i t i e s  and I n v e s to r  Risk P e r c e p t io n s ,"  Journal o f  Bank R esearch ,
6 : 190-201 ,  Autumn, 1975.
44Duane B. Graddy and Adi S. Kama, "Bank Holding Company Leverage  
and the  Cost o f  Capital"  (paper presented  a t  the meeting o f  the  
Financia l  Management A s s o c i a t i o n ,  Boston,  M assachuset t s ,  October ,  1979) .
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var ious  combinations  o f  d e b t / e q u i t y ,  d iv idend  y i e l d ,  r i s k  a s s e t s / d e b t  
plus  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l ,  account ing  in c o m e / a s s e t s ,  growth r a te  o f  e a r n i n g s ,  
demand d e p o s i t s / t o t a l  d e p o s i t s ,  and loan  l o s s e s / o p e r a t i n g  income.
Linear and n o n - l i n e a r  models were t e s t e d .  A p o s i t i v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
l e v e r a g e  e f f e c t  was found; however,  when net  income/book va lue  o f  e q u i t y ,  
a proxy f o r  e q u i t y  r e t u r n ,  was used as the  dependent v a r i a b l e ,  the  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  n e g a t i v e .  When average c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l ,  
d ef in ed  as earn ings  b e fo re  i n t e r e s t  and taxes /m arket  va lue  o f  the f irm ,  
was r e g r e s se d  on the  above v a r i a b l e s ,  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
n e g a t iv e  and a qu ad r a t ic  model implying a U-shaped curve provided the  
b e s t  f i t .  D ia m e t r i c a l l y  o p p o s i t e  r e s u l t s  were found when the va lue  o f  the  
f irm was the dependent v a r i a b l e .
The c o n c l u s io n s  drawn from t h e s e  s t u d i e s  would l e a v e  us with no 
s o l i d  id eas  one way or th e  o th e r  on whether the  f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n  a f f e c t s  
v a lu a t io n  and e q u i t y  c o s t  f o r  banking f irm s .  Beyond the c o n f l i c t i n g  
r e s u l t s ,  i t  i s  apparent t h a t  measurement e r r o r s ,  h e t e r o s k e d a s t i c i t y ,  and 
m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y  were c e r t a i n l y  p res en t  in a t  l e a s t  some o f  the  s t u d i e s ;  
in most c a s e s ,  th e  authors  f a i l e d  to  address th e s e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
Furthermore,  l e v e r a g e  was d e f in ed  in a v a r i e t y  o f  manners f u r th e r  con­
founding the  p o s s i b l e  fu n c t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between l e v e r a g e ,  v a l u a t i o n ,  
and e q u i ty  c o s t .  A ccord in g ly ,  fu r th e r  research  i s  warranted and the model 
t h a t  w i l l  be developed in Chapter 3 w i l l  h o p e f u l ly  turn over  another  
s ton e  in the  mystery surrounding the  re l e v a n c e  o f  bank f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n s .
Chapter 3
A THEORY OF BANK FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
The approach to  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  theory  used here w i l l  be t h a t
o f  mean-var iance  a n a l y s i s .  Mean-variance a n a l y s i s  has perhaps been the
most w id e ly  used framework f o r  f i n a n c i a l  theory  f o r  many y ea rs  but i s
not  without  i t s  drawbacks. The most c r i t i c a l  problem i s  th a t  i t  i s
b e s t  ap p l ied  to  the case  where i n v e s t o r s  have qu adrat ic  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s .
The quadrat ic  u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n  has the in herent  weakness o f  assuming
t h a t  in v e s t o r  r i s k  a v e r s io n  i n c r e a s e s  w ith  w ea l th .  The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
i s  th a t  as an i n v e s t o r  becomes w e a l t h i e r ,  he i s  l e s s  t o l e r a n t  o f  a g iven
amount o f  r i s k ,  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t h a t  seems i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  r a t io n a l
behavior .  A l s o ,  the qu adrat ic  u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n  reaches  a maximum at
a g iven l e v e l  o f  wealth  beyond which u t i l i t y  and wealth  are  n e g a t i v e l y
r e l a t e d ,  an im p la u s ib le  assumption; t h e r e f o r e ,  the  fu n c t io n  i s  on ly  v a l i d
up to  a s p e c i f i c  l e v e l  o f  w ea l th .  Furthermore,  the fu n c t io n  ig nores
skewness and o th er  h igher  order  moments o f  the p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n
o f  r e tu r n s .  All o f  t h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s  are more thoroughly  explored  in
Mossin'*' and the problems o f  app ly ing  mean-var iance  a n a l y s i s  to  f i n a n c i a l
2
s t r u c t u r e  models are  d i s c u s s e d  by Gonzales ,  L i tz e n b e r g e r ,  and R olfo .
■''dan Mossin,  Theory o f  F inancia l  Markets (Englewood C l i f f s ,  New 
Jersey :  P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . ,  1 9 7 3 ) ,  pp. 6 -3 5 .
n
N ester  Gonzales ,  Robert L i t z e n b e r g e r ,  and Jacques R o l fo ,  "On 
Mean-Variance Models o f  Capital  S tru c tu re  and the Absurdity  o f  Their  
P r e d i c t i o n s ,"  Journal o f  F inancia l  and Q u a n t i ta t iv e  A n a l y s i s , 12: 165-  
79,  June,  1977.
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N o n e t h e le s s ,  mean-var iance  a n a l y s i s  r e t a i n s  many d e s i r a b l e  p r o p e r t i e s ,  
p r im a r i ly  i t s  in h ere n t  s i m p l i c i t y ,  and s e r v e s  well  as a use fu l  
approximating framework. For t h i s  reason i t  has been s e l e c t e d  f o r  use  
in t h i s  model .
Fundamental to  any a n a l y s i s  i s  the  q u es t io n  o f  which o b j e c t i v e  
f irms and banks are i n t e r e s t e d  in m eet ing .  I t  would seem l i k e l y  th a t  
banks,  l i k e  many o th er  f i r m s ,  maximize m u l t i p l e  g o a l s ;  however,  
the  goal o f  shareho lder  weal th  maximizat ion p rov id es  the most t r a c t a b l e  
framework f o r  mean-variance  a n a l y s i s .  As a p o s i t i v e  model o f  bank 
(and corp o ra te )  f i n a n c i a l  management th eory ,  shareholder  wea lth  maxi­
m iza t ion  may be in a p p r o p r ia te .  As a normative model,  however,  i t  i s
3
e s p e c i a l l y  u s e fu l  but i s  more a p p l i c a b l e  to  the  case  o f  l a r g e  banks.
For th a t  reason the  model w i l l  be r e s t r i c t e d  to the group o f  l a r g e s t  
banks in the economy.
Also  n eces s a ry  to  an a n a l y s i s  such as t h i s  one i s  the assumption  
th a t  bank shares  are traded  in a r e l a t i v e l y  e f f i c i e n t  market.  Few s t u d i e s  
have addressed  t h i s  q u e s t io n  but Hagerman^ has reported  f in d in g  some 
ev id e n c e  o f  market e f f i c i e n c y  among bank sh a res .  Fol lowing the  s u g g e s t i o n s  
o f  Mason,0 t h i s  m od e l ' s  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  t h a t  c l a s s  o f  l a r g e  
banks with  p u b l i c l y  traded  s h a r e s ,  th u s ,  a s su r in g  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a 
reasonably  e f f i c i e n t  market.
3John M. Mason, F inan c ia l  Management o f  Commercial Banks (Boston:  
Warren, Gorham, and Lamont, 1 9 7 9 ) ,  pp. 24-25 .
^Robert T. Hagerman, "The E f f i c i e n c y  o f  the Market fo r  Bank Stocks:
An Empirical T e s t ,"  Journal o f  Money, C r e d i t ,  and Banking, 4: 8 4 6 -5 5 ,  
August,  1973.
3Mason, op. c i t . ,  pp. 2 0 8 -1 0 ,  222-3 .
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Before  proceeding to  the development o f  the  model,  i t  w i l l  f i r s t  
be n e c e s s a r y  t o  rev iew  some fundamental concepts  o f  c a p i t a l  a s s e t  p r i c in g  
theory  and the  eq u i l ib r iu m  model t h a t  w i l l  be used f o r  t h i s  a n a l y s i s .
Equil ibr ium Models o f  Equity Returns  
The Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin  model o f  c a p i t a l  market e q u i l ib r iu m  i s  
g iven  as
E(Rn.)  = Rf  + [ECRJ -  Rf ] B .  (3 -1 )
where E(R^) i s  the  eq u i l ib r iu m  expected  return on the  i ^  s e c u r i t y  held
in an e f f i c i e n t l y  d i v e r s i f i e d  p o r t f o l i o ,  R̂  i s  the r i s k - f r e e  borrowing 
and le nd in g  r a t e ,  E( Rfn) i s  the expected  return on the  market p o r t f o l i o  
o f  a l l  r i s k y  a s s e t s ,  s.. i s  cov(Ri ,Rm) /v a r (R m) and i s  the  s y s t e m a t i c  or
j .  i_
n o n - d i v e r s i f i a b l e  r i s k  measure o f  the  i s e c u r i t y  which r e p r e s e n t s  
t h a t  s e c u r i t y ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  the  r i s k  o f  an e f f i c i e n t  p o r t f o l i o .
The t i l d e  (~)  d enotes  a random v a r i a b l e .  The model i s  o f t e n  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  
w r i t t e n  as
E(Ri ) = Rf  + A c o v t R ^ R j  (3 -2 )
where A = [E(Rm) -  Rf ] / v a r ( R Jn) .  Assumptions o f  the  model are r i s k  averse  
i n v e s t o r s  who maximize expected  u t i l i t y  o f  terminal wealth  in a s i n g l e ­
p eriod  w orld ,  i n v e s t o r s  are p r i c e  ta k e r s  and have homogeneous e x p e c t a t i o n s  
about the  j o i n t  m u l t i v a r i a t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s e c u r i t y  re turns  which i s  
assumed to  be o f  the normal or Gaussian ty p e ,  a l l  i n v e s t o r s  may borrow 
and lend in u n l im i te d  q u a n t i t i e s  a t  a r i s k - f r e e  r a t e ,  the supply o f  a s s e t s  
i s  f i x e d ,  a l l  a s s e t s  are  marketable  and i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e ,  markets are  
p e r f e c t  and e f f i c i e n t ,  in format ion  i s  c o s t l e s s ,  and th ere  are no t a x e s ,  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  c o s t s ,  or o th er  f r i c t i o n s  i n h i b i t i n g  t r a d in g .
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The e s s e n t i a l  im p l i c a t io n  o f  the model i s  t h a t  in eq u i l ib r iu m  a l l  
i n v e s t o r s  hold o n ly  two a s s e t s .  One i s  the r i s k - f r e e  s e c u r i t y  e i t h e r  
held  long ( l e n d in g )  or s o ld  s h o r t  (borrowing).  The o ther  i s  the market 
p o r t f o l i o .  Each s e c u r i t y ' s  weight  in the r i s k y  p o r t f o l i o  o f  an 
in d iv id u a l  i n v e s t o r  i s  the r a t i o  o f  the market va lue  o f  the s e c u r i t y  
to  the  market va lue  o f  a l l  r i s k y  s e c u r i t i e s .
Empirical  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the model has proven to  be d i f f i c u l t
indeed.  T es t s  by B lack ,  Jen sen ,  and S c h o le s ,  Fama and MacBeth, and
7
M i l l e r  and S ch o les  have been q u es t ion ed  by R o l l .  Roll argues th a t  
the  o n ly  true  t e s t  o f  c a p i t a l  a s s e t  p r i c in g  theory  i s  a t e s t  to  
determine whether the market p o r t f o l i o  i s  e f f i c i e n t .  S ince  the e x a c t  
composit ion  o f  the  market p o r t f o l i o  cannot  be s p e c i f i e d ,  the  model 
cannot be t e s t e d .  He proves  th a t  r e s u l t s  which support the  model can 
be found by s e l e c t i n g  an e f f i c i e n t  proxy fo r  th e  market p o r t f o l i o  even 
though the  true  market p o r t f o l i o  may not  be e f f i c i e n t .  Converse ly ,  
r e s u l t s  which r e j e c t  the  model may be found by simply  s e l e c t i n g  an 
i n e f f i c i e n t  proxy f o r  the  market p o r t f o l i o  which may i t s e l f  be e f f i c i e n t .
Bearing R o l l ' s  c r i t i c i s m  in mind, i t  i s ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  worthwhile  
to c o n s id e r  one e s s e n t i a l  im p l i c a t io n  from the B lack,  Jensen and
C
Fish er  Black,  Michael C. Jen sen ,  and Myron S c h o l e s ,  "The Capital  
A sset  P r i c in g  Model: Some Empirical T e s t s ,"  S tu d ie s  in the  Theory o f
Capital  Markets , ed .  Michael C. Jensen (New York: Praeger P r e s s ,  1 972 ) ,
pp. 79-121;  Eugene F. Fama and James D. MacBeth, "Risk,  Return, and 
Equil ibr ium: Some Empirical  T e s t s ,"  Journal o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy,
76: 607 -36 ,  May-June, 1973; Merton H. M i l l e r  and Myron S c h o l e s ,  "Rates 
o f  Return in R e la t ion  to  Risk: A Reexamination o f  Some Recent F ind ings ,"
S tu d ie s  in the Theory o f  Capital  Markets, ed.  Michael C. Jensen (New 
York: Praeger P r e s s ,  1 972 ) ,  pp. 47 -78 .
^Richard R o l l ,  "A C r i t iq u e  o f  the A sse t  P r i c in g  Theory's  T e s t s .
Part I:  On Past  and P o t e n t ia l  T e s t a b i l i t y  o f  the Theory," Journal
o f  F inancia l  Economics,  4: 129 -76 ,  March, 1977.
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Scho les  t e s t s .  They s u g g e s t  t h a t  a second term,  c a l l e d  a "beta f a c t o r , "  
should be incorporated  i n t o  the  model.  The "beta fac tor"  i s  a second  
p o r t f o l i o  which has the property  o f  p o s i t i v e  v ar iance  but zero  cov a r ia n ce  
with the  market p o r t f o l i o .  Instead  o f  combining the market p o r t f o l i o
with the  r i s k - f r e e  a s s e t  as in the SLM model,  i n v e s t o r s  are assumed to
combine the  market p o r t f o l i o  with the z e r o -b e ta  p o r t f o l i o .  The 
e q u i l ib r iu m  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between expected  return  and r i s k  f o r  s e c u r i t i e s  
i s  g iven  as:
E(Ri ) = E(RZ) + [E(Rm) -  E(Rz ) ] e -  ( 3 -3 )
where E(RZ) i s  the expected  return  on the z e r o - b e ta  p o r t f o l i o  and a l l  
o ther  terms r e t a i n  the same d e f i n i t i o n s  as in the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin  
model.  Black Jensen ,  and S cho les  have s t a t e d  th a t
I t  seems to  us t h a t  we have e s t a b l i s h e d  the
presence  and s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the beta f a c t o r  in e x p l a i n ­
ing s e c u r i t y  re tu rn s  but ,  as mentioned e a r l i e r ,  we have 
not provided any d i r e c t  t e s t s  aimed a t  e x p la i n i n g  the  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  the beta  f a c t o r .  We have,  however,  suggested  
an economic r a t i o n a l e  f o r  why c a p i t a l  market eq u i l ib r iu m  
i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  the  f in d in g  o f  t h i s  second f a c t o r .
g
The "economic r a t io n a l e "  was to  be found more p r e c i s e l y  in Black.
In t h i s  paper Black examines the  e q u i l ib r iu m  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a c a p i t a l  
market in which no r i s k l e s s  borrowing or le n d in g  e x i s t s .
O
Black,  Jensen ,  and S c h o l e s ,  op.  c i t . ,  p. 115.
^Fisher  B lack ,  "Capital Market Equil ibr ium with R e s t r i c t e d  
Borrowing," Journal o f  B u s i n e s s , 45: 446 -5 2 ,  J u l y ,  1972.  I t  should  
be noted t h a t  the  zero  beta model i s  the more general  v e r s io n  o f  the  
c a p i t a l  a s s e t  p r i c in g  model.  The Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin  model s imply  
in cor p or a te s  a r i s k - f r e e  a s s e t  even though the e x i s t e n c e  o f  such an 
a s s e t  i s  not  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t io n  f o r  e q u i l ib r iu m  so long as e f f i c i e n t  
p o r t f o l i o s  have i n e f f i c i e n t  orthogonal p o r t f o l i o s  and the  market  
p o r t f o l i o  i s  e f f i c i e n t .  The f i r s t  c o n d i t io n  has been proven among 
o ther  p la c e s  in R o l l ' s  c r i t i q u e .  The second c o n d i t i o n ,  as mentioned  
e a r l i e r ,  remains u n t e s t a b l e  according to  R o l l .
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Consider Figure 1 in which the opp ortun i ty  s e t  o f  a v a i l a b l e  
s e c u r i t i e s  and p o r t f o l i o s  i s  p l o t t e d  in E( R ) , ct( R ) sp ace .  The only
r r
a d d i t io n a l  assumption needed over the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin  model i s  
t h a t  o f  u n r e s t r i c t e d  s h o r t  s e l l i n g  o f  p o s i t i v e  var ian c e  s e c u r i t i e s .
The s e t  o f  minimum var ianc e  p o r t f o l i o s  i s  g iven  by the  parabola  
beginning  a t  the lower r i g h t  hand corner .  All p o r t f o l i o s  on t h i s  
curve are minimum va r ia nc e  p o r t f o l i o s  because  they  have the  low es t  
p o s s i b l e  var ian c e  f o r  any g iven  expected  re tu rn .  I t  i s  e v i d e n t ,  however,  
th a t  i n v e s t o r s  would o n ly  choose p o r t f o l i o s  on the p o s i t i v e l y  s loped  
segment o f  the  minimum v ar iance  s e t  because  th ose  p o r t f o l i o s  o f f e r  
higher  re tu rn s  f o r  the same l e v e l  o f  r i s k  as corresponding p o r t f o l i o s  
on the  n e g a t i v e l y  s lop ed  segment o f  the minimum v a r ia n c e  s e t .  Such 
p o r t f o l i o s  are c a l l e d  e f f i c i e n t  p o r t f o l i o s .  The eq u i l ib r iu m  c o n d i t io n s  
o f  both the SLM and Black models r eq u ir e  t h a t  M, the market p o r t f o l i o  
o f  a l l  r i s k y  a s s e t s ,  be e f f i c i e n t .  The e f f i c i e n c y  o f  M can be proven 
by showing t h a t  a p o r t f o l i o  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  two e f f i c i e n t  p o r t f o l i o s  
each with p o s i t i v e  p rop ort ion s  o f  wealth  in v e s t e d  i s  e f f i c i e n t .  S ince  
i n v e s t o r s  hold o n ly  e f f i c i e n t  p o r t f o l i o s ,  and because the r e l a t i v e  
weight o f  each s e c u r i t y  in M i s  the r a t i o  o f  the  market va lue  o f  th a t  
s e c u r i t y  to  the market va lu e  o f  a l l  s e c u r i t i e s  which i s  p o s i t i v e ,  then  
the  market p o r t f o l i o  must be e f f i c i e n t .  The model fu r t h e r  req u ir e s  
th a t  in e q u i l i b r iu m ,  a l l  i n v e s t o r s  hold p o r t f o l i o s  which are  combina­
t i o n s  o f  the z e r o -b e ta  p o r t f o l i o  and the  market p o r t f o l i o .  That t h i s  
property holds  i s  v e r i f i e d  by the f a c t  th a t  a l l  minimum var iance  
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p o r t f o l i o s .  The two p o r t f o l i o s  chosen may simply  be the  z e r o -b e ta  
p o r t f o l i o  and the  market p o r t f o l i o .  I n v e s to r s  hold o n ly  e f f i c i e n t  
p o r t f o l i o s  and a l l  e f f i c i e n t  p o r t f o l i o s  are minimum var iance  
p o r t f o l i o s . 10
An extended v e r s io n  o f  the b a s ic  Black model i s  a l s o  g iven  by 
B l a c k . 11 In t h i s  v e r s io n  r i s k l e s s  lend in g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  e x i s t ,  but 
no r i s k l e s s  borrowing i s  a v a i l a b l e .  The model i s  d e p ic t e d  in  
Figure 2.  The minimum v a r ia n c e  s e t  o f  r i s k y  p o r t f o l i o s  i s  the same 
as in the b a s ic  Black model,  but the e f f i c i e n t  s e t  i s  d i f f e r e n t .  Here 
i n v e s t o r s  who are the  most r i s k  a v e r s e ,  i . e . ,  d e s i r e  low expected  
re tu rn - low  r i s k  p o r t f o l i o s ,  choose p o r t f o l i o s  a long the  segment from 
Rf to  C. These i n v e s t o r s  are combining r i s k - f r e e  l end in g  with r i s k y  
p o r t f o l i o  C. Note t h a t  C l i k e  o th er  minimum va r ia n c e  p o r t f o l i o s  w i l l  
a l s o  be a combination o f  the  market p o r t f o l i o ,  M, and the z e r o -b e ta  
p o r t f o l i o ,  Z. I n v e s to r s  who are  l e s s  r i s k  a v e r s e ,  i . e . ,  d e s i r i n g  
re turn s  g r e a te r  than would be expected  by i n v e s t i n g  one hundred percent  
o f  t h e i r  wealth  in C, w i l l  s e l e c t  p o r t f o l i o s  o f  both Z and M t h a t  l i e  
on the s o l i d  l i n e  ex tending  from C to  the  upper r i g h t  corner  o f  the  
f i g u r e .  The e f f i c i e n t  s e t ,  hence ,  runs from to  C i n f i n i t e l y  upward 
and to the r i g h t  a long the  curved l i n e  o f  minimum v ar iance  p o r t f o l i o s .  
Black has shown t h a t  the  eq u i l ib r iu m  a s s e t  p r i c i n g  equat ion  i s  the  
same as in the  no r i s k l e s s  borrowing or le nd in g  case  (Equation 3 -3 )  
and th a t  the o n ly  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  in the l o c a t i o n  o f  the s e t  o f  
e f f i c i e n t  p o r t f o l i o s .
1(1Eugene F. Fama, Foundations o f  Finance (New York: Bas ic  Books,
1 975 ) ,  pp. 279-84 .
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Two f i n a l  p o in t s  should  be noted about the Black model.  One i s  
t h a t  Black proved th a t  R  ̂ must be l e s s  t h a t  E(RZ) and t h a t  t h i s  r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p  i s  a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t io n  f o r  market eq u i l ib r iu m .  The f a c t  
t h a t  R.p i s  l e s s  than E(R ) w i l l  take on a very important r o l e  in the  
model developed here .  The o th er  p o in t  i s  t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  are ab le  
to borrow a t  the r a te  o f  E(RZ) .  They do so by s e l l i n g  short  the  
z e r o -b e ta  p o r t f o l i o .  In f a c t  t h i s  i s  how i n v e s t o r s  obta in  p o r t f o l i o s  
which are on the e f f i c i e n t  s e t  but to  the r i g h t  o f  M.
12A th ir d  v a r i a t i o n  o f  the model g iven  by Brennan in v o lv e s  
borrowing and le nd in g  a t  r i s k  f r e e  but d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s .  The a s s e t  
p r ic in g  equat ion  i s  aga in  g iven  by Equation ( 3 - 3 ) .  The Brennan model 
w i l l  not be pursued here because  i t  would not be u sefu l  in a n a ly z in g  
the e f f e c t s  o f  bank l e v e r a g e  s i n c e  i t  would r e q u ir e  th a t  banks a c t  as  
pure i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  p r i c i n g  t h e i r  loan s  so as to  e x t r a c t  o n ly  a f e e  
f o r  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s  ra th e r  than a r i s k  premium.
The assumption o f  r i s k - f r e e  borrowing and le n d in g  in the  SLM
world i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  with the e x i s t e n c e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  in t e r m e d i a r i e s .
Banks would serve  no u s e fu l  purpose i f  l i q u i d i t y  needs could  be met
by the  c o s t l e s s  i s s u a n c e  o f  r i s k l e s s  c l a im s .  Some degee o f  market
im p erfec t ion  must c r e a t e  the  need fo r  in t e r m e d ia t io n .  Several  j u s t i -
13f i c a t i o n s  have been proposed.  Benston and Smith have argued th a t  
the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t r a n s a c t i o n s  c o s t s  impedes the  f r e e  f u n c t io n  o f  the
19
Michael J.  Brennan, "Capital Market Equil ibr ium with  Divergent  
Borrowing and Lending Rates ,"  Journal o f  F inancia l  and Q u a n t i ta t iv e  
A n a l y s i s ,  6: 1197-1205 ,  December, 1971.
13 George Benston and C l i f f o r d  W. Smith, "A Tran sact ions  Cost  
Approach to  the Theory o f  F inancia l  I n term ed ia t ion ,"  Journal o f  F inan ce , 
31: 215 -31 ,  May, 1976.
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market and t h a t  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  can reduce th e s e  c o s t s  by c o n s o l i d a t i o n
o f  surp lus  funds and i s s u a n c e  o f  t h e i r  own c la im s .  I n te r m e d ia r i e s ,
they  s u g g e s t ,  have economies o f  s c a l e ,  are ab le  to  ach ie ve  a degree  o f
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  might not be a b le  to a t t a i n ,  and o f f e r
a package o f  f i n a n c i a l  commodities t h a t  i s  more d e s i r a b l e  to  i n v e s t o r s
than the s e r v i c e s  they  would r e c e i v e  w ithout  in t e r m e d ia t io n .  Leland
and P y l e ^  b e l i e v e  t h a t  the t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t  argument i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t
and th a t  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  asymmetries in the market f o r  information
i s  the m o t iv a t in g  f a c t o r .  I n te rm ed ia r ie s  c o l l e c t  and c o n s o l i d a t e
information and s e l l  i t  to  the  market. Their c o m p e t i t i v e  advantage
in information c o l l e c t i o n  and p r o c e s s in g  c r e a t e s  p r o f i t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s
15which they  are m ot ivated  to e x p l o i t .  Klein argues t h a t  im perfect
d i v i s i b i l i t y  o f  s e c u r i t i e s  c r e a t e s  the  need fo r  in t e r m e d i a r i e s  which
16can i s s u e  c la im s  which are more p e r f e c t l y  d i v i s i b l e .  S t i g l i t z  has 
added th a t  f i n a n c i a l  in te r m e d i a r i e s  may e x i s t  to e x p l o i t  d i s e q u i l i b r i a  
in the v a lu a t io n  o f  f i r m s ,  and P y l e ‘S  developed a theory  where i n t e r ­
m ed iar ies  e x i s t  to  e x p l o i t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in m atur i ty  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  and l i a b i l i t i e s .  For whatever j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ,  the Black model w i l l  be shown to  provide  
a con ven ient  mechanism f o r  accommodating them. The model acknowledges
^Hayne E. Leland and David H. P y l e ,  "Informational Asymmetries,  
Financia l  S t r u c t u r e ,  and Financia l  In term ed ia t ion ,"  Journal o f  F inance , 
32: 371 -8 7 ,  May, 1977.
1 RMichael K le in ,  "The Economics o f  S e c u r i ty  D i v i s i b i l i t y  and Finan­
c i a l  In te rm ed ia t ion ,"  Journal o f  F inance , 28: 923-32 ,  September,  1973.
1 r
Joseph E. S t i g l i t z ,  "On the I r r e l e v a n c e  o f  Corporate F inancia l  
P o l ic y ,"  American Economic Review, 64: 864 -6 6 ,  December, 1974.
17
David H. P y l e ,  "On the Theory o f  Financia l  In term ed ia t ion ,"  
Journal o f  F inance ,  26: 737-48 ,  June,  1971.
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the e x i s t e n c e  o f  another  market p a r t i c i p a n t  and does not  a l low  
i n v e s t o r s  t o  i s s u e  r i s k l e s s  s e c u r i t i e s  on themselves  o th er  than by 
s h o r t in g  the z e r o -b e ta  p o r t f o l i o .  Although B la c k ' s  model i s  an 
eq u i l ib r iu m  model and the  in t r o d u c t io n  o f  im p e r fe c t io n s  must r e s u l t  
in d i s e q u i l i b r i u m ,  the  model,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  c r e a t e s  a s e t t i n g  w i th in  
which to  an a lyze  the l e v e r a g e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a bank. The n ex t  s e c t i o n ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  proceeds  with  the c r e a t io n  o f  a bank by the  i s s u a n c e  o f  
demand d e p o s i t s .
The A n a ly s i s  o f  Bank Leverage: Demand D epos i t  Financing
Assume t h a t  a c a p i t a l  market such as the one d e scr ib ed  by the  
Black model e x i s t s .  No r i s k l e s s  borrowing or lend in g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
are a v a i l a b l e .  Taxes are  assumed to  be n o n - e x i s t e n t ,  not because they  
are i r r e l e v a n t ,  but because  th e  tax  e f f e c t s  o f  debt f in a n c in g  remain 
the  same whether the  borrower i s  a bank or non-bank. A ls o ,  the  
i n t e r e s t  tax  subs idy  i s  not s u f f i c i e n t  to  e x p la i n  why banks use l a r g e  
amounts o f  debt s i n c e  i t  cannot ex p la in  why f irms do not maximize 
debt f in a n c in g .
Although the  CAPM i s  a s i n g l e  period  model,  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  a p p l ied
to the p e r p e t u i t y  c a s e  when an a lyz in g  the e f f e c t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e .
The model,  however,  does  not  s t r i c t l y  hold in the  m u l t i - p e r i o d  world.
The problem has been addressed in the l i t e r a t u r e  d e a l in g  with the use o f
the  CAPM in the  general  m u l t i - p e r i o d  c a p i t a l  budgeting  problem and i t s
18s o l u t i o n  i s  a complex one in v o lv in g  dynamic programming. N o n e th e le s s ,  
1RMarcus C. Bogue and Richard R o l l ,  "Capital Budgeting o f  Risky  
P r o j e c t s  w ith  'Im p erfec t '  Markets fo r  Phys ica l  C a p i ta l ,"  Journal o f  
Finance ,  29: 601 -1 3 ,  May, 1974; Eugene F. Fama, "Risk-Adjusted  
Discount  Rates and Capital  Budgeting Under U nc erta in ty ,"  Journal o f  
Financia l  Economics, 3: 3 - 2 4 ,  August,  1977.
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the p e r p e t u i t y  assumption i s  used here as i t  i s  f r e q u e n t ly  e l sew here  
f o r  i t s  in herent  s i m p l i c i t y  and f o r  t e s t i n g  purposes.  I t  w i l l  be 
shown l a t e r  in Appendix B th at  the  e s s e n t i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  the  
model can be confirmed in the s i n g l e - p e r i o d  c a s e .
Given reasons  p r e v i o u s l y  c i t e d  plus  needs o f  l i q u i d i t y  and a 
payments mechanism, a f i n a n c i a l  in term e d ia ry ,  h enceforth  r e f e r r e d  to  as  
a bank, i s  found to  be needed.  Let a f irm c u r r e n t l y  engaged in some 
o t h e r ,  though probably r e l a t e d ,  l i n e  o f  commerce be granted a ch ar ter  
to  become a bank. I t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  are to  accept  demand d e p o s i t s  
and extend c r e d i t .  I t  i s  i n i t i a l l y  assumed t h a t  r e s e r v e  requirements  
are not imposed and t h a t  f i x e d  and v a r i a b l e  c o s t s  o f  provid ing  demand 
d e p o s i t  s e r v i c e s  are f u l l y  recovered  through th e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  s e r v i c e  
ch arges .  These assumptions  are r e la x ed  in a l a t e r  s e c t i o n .  I t  should  
be noted th a t  recovery  o f  the i n i t i a l  investment  in demand d e p o s i t  
s e r v i c e  f a c i l i t i e s  would not l i k e l y  be p o s s i b l e  from s e r v i c e  charge  
revenue a lo n e .  By assuming th a t  the  f irm granted the  ch a r te r  has some 
e x c e s s  c a p a c i ty  p lus  th e  tech n o logy  and know-how to  provide d e p o s i t  
s e r v i c e s ,  t h i s  f a c t o r  can be over look ed .  Assume f u r th e r  t h a t  the  
f irm i s  unlevered p r ior  to  engaging in in term e d ia t io n  s e r v i c e s .  Other­
w i s e ,  the e f f e c t s  o f  p r e - e x i s t i n g  l e v e r a g e  would be comingled with  the  
incremental  d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e .
The expected  return on the  un levered  f i r m ' s  e q u i t y  i s  g iven  from 
the Black model as
E(Ry ) = E(R2 ) + Xcov(Ru ,Rhl) (3 -4 )
where ElR^) i s  the expected  return  on the unlevered  f i r m ,  E(RZ) i s  the  
expected  return  on the minimum var ianc e  z e r o - b e ta  p o r t f o l i o ,  A =
[E(Rm) -  E(Rz ) ] /v a r ( R m) and i s  c a l l e d  the market p r i c e  o f  r i s k ,  and
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cov(Ry,Rm) i s  the covar ian ce  between the  unlevered  f i r m ' s  e q u i t y  
return and the return on the  market p o r t f o l i o .
Assume th a t  the f irm a c c e p t s  d o l l a r s  o f  d e p o s i t s  paying no
19i n t e r e s t  and being f u l l y  insured so t h a t  they  are cons idered  r i s k l e s s .
In order  to  analyze  the e f f e c t s  o f  d e p o s i t  l e v era g e  in i s o l a t i o n ,  the  
f irm w i l l  use the  proceeds  t o  repurchase shares  o f  i t s  s t o c k ,  thus  
mainta in ing  the e x a c t  a s s e t  p o r t f o l i o  composit ion  as before  the  d e p o s i t s  
were a ccepted .  To do o th e r w is e  could  a l t e r  the  stream o f  op era t in g  
e a r n i n g s ,  i n j e c t  growth or d e c l i n e  i n t o  the  model,  and a l lo w  v a lu a t io n  
to  be a f f e c t e d  by the  n e t  p r e s e n t  v a lu e s  o f  investments  the f irm under­
ta k e s  with  the proceeds;  th u s ,  i s o l a t i n g  the e f f e c t s  o f  l e v e r a g e  would 
be d i f f i c u l t .
Fol lowing the assumption o f  a p e r p e t u i t y ,  the  d e p o s i t  d o l l a r s ,  D^, 
must be assumed to  r e p r e s e n t  an immediate f low  in to  the  bank which i s  
maintained throughout n p er iods  where n=l , 2 , . . . ,°°. No in term edia te  
cash f low s  are a s s o c i a t e d  with the  d e p o s i t s  and o n ly  a f i n a l  p r i n c i p l e  
repayment a t  i n f i n i t y  i s  made. Although in r e a l i t y  d e p o s i t s  do f l u c t u a t e  
from per iod  to  per iod and repayments are  made when customers withdraw 
funds ,  the  bank i s  assumed to  c o n t i n u a l l y  r e f i n a n c e  by i s s u i n g  new 
d e p o s i t s .  At the end o f  each period a c e r t a i n  percentage  o f  d e p o s i t s  
are withdrawn but a l i k e  amount are newly d e p o s i t e d .  The assumption  
i s  somewhat s i m p l i f y i n g  and i s  done so to bypass the problems a s s o c i a t e d  
with i d e n t i f y i n g  the s t o c h a s t i c  nature  o f  d e p o s i t s .  I t  i s  not an
1 QThe approach taken here had been suggested  e a r l i e r  in Wilbur G. 
Lewellen ,  "Some E xtens ions  o f  Capital  S tructure  Theory," Journal  
o f  Bus iness  R esearch , 3: 22 ,  January,  1975. Lewellen analyzed the  
e f f e c t s  o f  n o n - i n t e r e s t  bear ing trade c r e d i t  and suggested  t h a t  t h i s  
methodology might apply  to  banks i s s u i n g  demand d e p o s i t s .
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e s p e c i a l l y  c r i t i c a l  assumption ,  however.  As p r e v i o u s l y  mentioned ,  a
d e r i v a t i o n  o f  the model in Appendix B w i l l  v e r i f y  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  i t s
primary i m p l i c a t io n s  in a s i n g l e - p e r i o d  world.
Two p o in t s  are worth not in g  be fore  determining how le v e r a g e  a f f e c t s
v a l u a t i o n .  I t  i s  assumed t h a t  second order  e f f e c t s  on A, the  market
p r i c e  o f  r i s k ,  are i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  Some co n tro v er sy  has appeared in  the
20l i t e r a t u r e  over t h i s  i s s u e ,  but i t  would serve  no purpose to  address
t h i s  debate here .  A l s o ,  the  assumption t h a t  the i s s u a n c e  o f  debt by
f irms with  no p r e - e x i s t i n g  debt  produces the  same r e s u l t  as the  i s s u a n c e
o f  debt by f irms which a lr e a d y  have some debt  depends on the e x i s t e n c e
21and e n f o r c e a b i l i t y  o f  " m e-f ir s t"  r u l e s .  Such r u l e s  p r o t e c t  e x i s t i n g  
debt s u p p l i e r s  from e r o s io n  o f  t h e i r  c la im s  caused by a f i r m ' s  s t o c k ­
p i l i n g  o f  a d d i t io n a l  debt  p o s s e s s in g  equal or g r e a t e r  c la im s  to  the f i r m ' s  
a s s e t s .  With r e s p e c t  to  t h i s  model,  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  a l l  d e p o s i t o r s  
are e q u a l l y  insured and p r o t e c t e d .
The unlevered  f irm now having added d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e ,  and h e n c e fo r th ,  
being r e f e r r e d  to  as  a bank, has an expected  e q u i t y  re turn  g iven  as
E(Rl ) = E{RZ) + xcov(RL, y  ( 3 -5 )
where E(R^) i s  the  exp ected  return on the le v e r e d  bank's s h a r e s ,  E(RZ) 
and x are as b e f o r e ,  and cov(RL,Rm) i s  the  cov a r ia n ce  between the return  
on the l e v e r e d  bank's shares  and the market p o r t f o l i o .  The expected  
returns  on the un levered  and l e v e r e d  bank's  shares  may a l s o  be d e f in ed
on
Prem Kumar, "Market Equil ibr ium and Corporation Finance: Some
I s s u e s ,"  Journal o f  F in a n ce , 29: 1175-88 ,  September,  1974.
21 Eugene F. Fama and Merton H. M i l l e r ,  The Theory o f  Finance  
(H insd a le ,  I l l i n o i s :  Dryden P r e s s ,  1972) ,  pp. 151-2 .
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in th e  p e r p e t u i t y  case  as
ECRjj) = 0 - 6 )U i y
and
E(R. ) = I M H  (3 -7 )
L L
where E(NOI) i s  the  expected  va lu e  o f  the n e t  o p era t in g  income, Sy i s  
the  market va lue  o f  the e q u i t y  o f  the un levered  bank, and Sy i s  the  
market va lue  o f  the e q u i t y  o f  the  l e v e r e d  bank. Equating ( 3 -4 )  with  
( 3 -6 )  and (3 -5 )  with (3 -7 )  and m u l t ip ly i n g  through by Sy and Sy,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  l e a v e s
E(NOI) = Sy[E(Rz ) + Acov(Ry,Rm )] (3 -8 )
and
E(NOI) = Sy[E(Rz ) + xcov(Ry,Rm )] . ( 3 -9 )
The covar ian ce  terms can be r e s t a t e d  by n o t in g  t h a t  cov(Ry,Rm) = 
cov(N0I /Sy,R m) which s i m p l i f i e s  to  c o v ( N 0 I . R ^ / S y .  L ik ew ise ,  
cov(N0I /Sy,Rm) can be s t a t e d  as co v (N 0 I ,Rm) / S y .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  th e s e  
r e s u l t s  and equat ing  ( 3 - 8 )  with ( 3 -9 )  g i v e s
SU [E(RZ ) + Acov(Nbl,Rm )/Sy] = Sy[E(Rz ) + Acov(NOI,Rm )/Sy].
Removing brackets  l e a v e s
S y E ( R z ) + Acov(N0I,Rm) = S y E ( R z ) + Acov(N0I . R j .
I t  f o l l o w s  th a t
Sy = S y .  (3 -10)
Now d e f i n e  Vy,  the  v a lu e  o f  the  unlevered  bank and Vy,  the va lu e  o f  the
le v e r e d  bank as f o l l o w s :
Vy = Sy (3 -11)
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and
\  5 SL + Dd- ( 3 - 1 2 )
Rearranging (3 -12 )  to  o b ta in  = Vy -  Dy and s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  r e s u l t
and (3 -1 1 )  i n t o  (3 -10 )  l e a v e s  Vy = Vy -  Dy or more a p p r o p r ia t e l y ,
VL = vu + Dd _ (3 -13)
The va lue  o f  the  bank i n c r e a s e s  d o l l a r  fo r  d o l l a r  with the amount o f
d e p o s i t  f in a n c in g  added, a s ta tem ent  which i s  t h i s  model ' s  counterpart  
to  MM's P ro p o s i t io n  I .
The reader  might note  t h a t  hold ing an a s s e t  which re turns  no 
in term e d ia te  i n t e r e s t  payments but o n ly  a p r i n c i p l e  repayment a t  i n f i n i t y  
seems to be an i r r a t i o n a l  a c t  on the  part  o f  d e p o s i t o r s .  D ep os i tors  
would appear to  simply  abnegate a p o r t io n  o f  t h e i r  wealth  to  the bank. 
R e c a l l ,  however,  th a t  d e p o s i t o r s  r e c e i v e  the s e r v i c e s  provided by the  
bank ( l i q u i d i t y ,  payments mechanism, s a f e t y ,  e t c . )  although they  pay 
a f e e  f o r  them. A ls o ,  th e  wealth  t r a n s f e r  i s  not a t r a n s f e r  from any 
s i n g l e  d e p o s i t o r  but from d e p o s i t o r s  as a group. Any d e p o s i t o r  can 
withdraw h i s  money on demand but the e x i s t e n c e  o f  d e p o s i t  insurance  
p rec ludes  a run on the bank. All  d e p o s i t o r s '  funds a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
s a f e  and a v a i l a b l e  and a l l  withdrawals  are assumed to  be o f f s e t  by d e p o s i t s .  
In sh ort  the r e s u l t i n g  e f f e c t  i s  t h a t  d e p o s i t o r s  f r e e l y  l e a v e  a port ion  
o f  t h e i r  wea lth  with the  bank. No i n t e r e s t  i s  paid and any d e p o s i t o r  
w i l l  be paid o f f  on demand but the d e p o s i t o r  group as a whole i s  not  
repaid  u n t i l  i n f i n i t y .  The p res en t  va lue  o f  the p r i n c i p l e  repayment i s ,  
t h u s ,  zero .  In the  in ter im  the bank co n v e r t s  the proceeds in to  ga ins  
f o r  i t s  s to c k h o l d e r s .  The advantage to  the  bank from d e p o s i t  f in a n c in g  
w i l l  be reduced somewhat when reser v e  requ irem ents ,  i n t e r e s t ,  and
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non-recovered  c o s t s  are l a t e r  introduced but on ly  in extreme c a s e s  i s  
the gain e l im in a t e d .
Although i t  might not be r e a d i l y  apparent ,  the in c r e a s e  in the 
va lue  o f  the bank im p l i e s  th a t  there  i s  an in c r e a se  in shareholder  wealth  
which i s  r e f l e c t e d  in the  e q u i ty  market by an in c r e a s e  in the p r ic e  o f  
th e  s to c k .  A s imple  numerical example w i l l  be usefu l  to v i s u a l i z e  t h i s  
e f f e c t .  Let the unlevered  bank c o n s i s t  o f  50 shares  o f  s tock  priced  
a t  $20 per share .  Hence, Vy = Sy = $1000.  I s s u e  Dy = $200 and repurchase  
$200/$20 = 10 shares  l e a v in g  40 shares  o f  s tock  o u t s ta n d in g .  S ince  
Sy = Sy,  then (5 0 ) ($ 2 0 )  = ( 4 0 ) ( P y )  and P y ,  the new p r ic e  per ( l e v e r e d )  
sh are ,  i s  $25.  Shareholder  wea lth  was i n i t i a l l y  the $1000 e q u i t y  in 
the bank. A f ter  the repu rch ase ,  sh areh o ld ers  have the $200 re c e iv e d  
from the s a l e  o f  10 s h a r e s ,  p lus  an e q u i ty  p o r t f o l i o  valued a t  Sy = $1000.  
Their wea lth  has grown by $200,  the amount o f  Dy. A more general  proof  
o f  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  i s  found in Appendix A. I t  should be noted t h a t  the  
share repurchase i t s e l f  i s  s imply  a mechanical procedure f o r  d i s t r i b u t i n g  
the proceeds to  s t o c k h o l d e r s .  In the absence o f  t a x e s  and t r a n s a c t i o n s  
c o s t s ,  a s imple  d iv idend payment would have accomplished the same e f f e c t .
Another means o f  c o n s id e r in g  how the e f f e c t s  are e m p i r i c a l l y  
observed i s  to  imagine the case  where in v e s t o r s  wish to  ob ta in  a ch ar ter  
f o r  a new bank. When the c h a r ter  i s  granted ,  the doors are opened,  and 
d e p o s i t s  are r e c e iv e d .  A type o f  "windfall" gain then accrues  to  the  
owners. Each time d e p o s i t s  in c r e a se  to  a s u s t a i n a b l e  l e v e l  ( i .  e . ,  where 
subsequent in f lo w s  equal o u t f l o w s ) ,  a d d i t io n a l  ga in s  are made. I t  i s
22not s u r p r i s in g  then t h a t  a bank ch a r te r  i s  such a h ig h ly  prized  p o s s e s s i o n .
2?
Other reasons  may e x i s t  f o r  d e s i r i n g  a bank c h a r te r .  The above 
mentioned one i s  on ly  a p o s s i b i l i t y .
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I t  should be apparent  th a t  with the in t r o d u c t io n  o f  d e p o s i t s  the  
Black CAPM would no lo n g er  s a t i s f y  eq u i l ib r iu m  c o n d i t i o n s .  Indeed i t  
should not  as the e x i s t e n c e  o f  banking f irms would be an u n l i k e l y  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  an eq u i l ib r iu m  market.  N o n e th e le s s ,  market e q u i l ib r iu m  
i s  s t i l l  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  framework f o r  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  s i n c e  a l l  markets  
must e v o lv e  toward eq u i l ib r iu m .
Returning to  the  a n a l y s i s  i t  i s  e a s i l y  seen t h a t  the bank's  required
r%J
e q u i ty  return  does not change by adding d e p o s i t s .  I f  E(NOI) i s  co n s ta n t  
and S y  = S y ,  then ( 3 -6 )  equals  (.3-7) and E ( R y )  =  E ( R y ) .  This r e s u l t  
f o l l o w s  from the  f a c t  t h a t  f u l l y  in s u r e d ,  c o s t l e s s ,  and n o n - i n t e r e s t  
bearing  d e p o s i t s  do not a l t e r  the stream o f  earn ings  a v a i l a b l e  to  the  
bank's s to c k h o l d e r s .  D ep os i t s  are a form o f  " r i s k le s s "  l e v e r a g e  and i t  
i s  to  the  bank's advantage to  ob ta in  as many d o l l a r s  o f  d e p o s i t s  as  
p o s s i b l e .  Furthermore,  the i n c l u s i o n  o f  d e p o s i t s  in  t r a d i t i o n a l  measures  
o f  bank l e v e r a g e  would seem to  o v e r s t a t e  the  bank's r i s k .
Having e s t a b l i s h e d  th es e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  i t  w i l l  now be p o s s i b l e  to  
d e r iv e  formulas f o r  the c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  f o r  the bank. The approach taken  
here w i l l  be to  d e r iv e  the c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  f o r  p r o j e c t s  o f  any r i s k ,  
c a l l e d  here the g e n e r a l i z e d  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l ,  and then to determine from 
t h a t  r e s u l t  the more t r a d i t i o n a l  weighted average c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  f o r  
p r o j e c t s  o f  homogeneous r i s k .
The Genera lized  and Weighted Average Costs o f  C api ta l :
Deposi t  Financing  
The concept  o f  a g e n e r a l i z e d  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  r e f e r s  simply  to  the  
required  r a te  o f  return on the f irm and in a mean-variance world w i l l  
be determined by the  r i s k l e s s  r a t e ,  the market p r i c e  o f  r i s k ,  and the
f i r m ' s  covar ian ce  r i s k .  Any s p e c i f i c  p r o j e c t  the f irm is  c o n s id er in g
a cce p t in g  w i l l  have i t s  own required r a te  o f  return based on the p r o j e c t '
covar ian ce  r i s k .  P r o je c t s  which are o f  e q u iv a le n t  r i sk  to the f irm 's
e x i s t i n g  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  r e q u ir e  a ra te  o f  return equal to that  required
on those  p r o j e c t s .  This  p a r t i c u l a r  r a t e  has a s p e c ia l  i d e n t i t y  in the
f in a n c e  l i t e r a t u r e ;  i t  i s  known as the c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .  The c o s t  o f
c a p i t a l  then i s  a s p e c ia l  case  o f  the required  r a te  o f  return or
g e n e r a l i z e d  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .
The g e n e r a l i z e d  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  (and the more s p e c i f i c  c a s e )  may
be der ived  from c o n d i t i o n s  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  the maximizat ion o f  firm
eg
v a lu e .  The theorems are  presented  among o th e r  p la c e s  in liamada.'"
Mow they  are  deve loped fo r  the banking f irm using d e p o s i t  f in a n c in g .
Again the p e r p e t u i t y  model i s  assumed.
From Equation (3 -1 2 )  i t  i s  t ru e  t h a t  Sy = E( NOI)/E(Ry).  Using 
E ( R y )  as d e f in ed  by Equation (3 -5 )  and s u b s t i t u t i n g  in to  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  Sy g iv e s
This  r i s k  ad justed  d i s c o u n t  ra te  formula i s  then converted  to the 
c e r t a i n t y  e q u iv a le n t  formula
S E(NOI) (3-171)
U E ( R Z )  +  A c o v ( R y , R m )
SU
-  E(NOI) -  / ,cov(NQI,Rrn) 
E(R ~z f  “
S ince  Sy = Sy, s u b s t i t u t e  (3 -15 )  in to  (3 -12 )  to  obta in
Robert S. Hamada, " P o r t f o l i o  A n a l y s i s ,  Market Equi1ibriurn, and 
Corporation Finance," Journal o f  F inan ce , 24: 2 0 -6 ,  March, 1969.
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VL = E(NOI) -  \cov(NOI,Rm) E(RZ)
(3-16)
The bank would want to  i d e n t i f y  the r a te  o f  return on an investment  
o f  I d o l l a r s  t h a t  would assure  i t  o f  an in c r e a s e  in v a lu e ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  
i t  should be tru e  t h a t  3V^/3l — 1. D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  and forming t h i s  
in e q u a l i t y  g iv e s
S in ce  3E(N 0I) /3 l  i s  the  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l ,  s o l v i n g  (3 -1 7 )  to  
i s o l a t e  t h i s  term g iv e s
Equation (3 -18 )  m e r i t s  some d i s c u s s i o n .  The bracketed  term,
1 -  s D ^ /sI ,  r e p r e s e n t s  the  proport ion  o f  the p r o j e c t  f in an ced  by new 
e q u i t y .  S ince  the second term on the r i g h t  hand s i d e  o f  ( 3 -1 8 )  i s  
o b v io u s ly  a f a c t o r  r e f l e c t i n g  the  p r o j e c t ' s  r i s k  and i s ,  f o r  a s p e c i f i c  
p r o j e c t ,  u n c o n t r o l l a b l e ,  the  bank can minimize the p r o j e c t ' s  required  
r a te  o f  re turn  by f in a n c in g  i t  with a l l  d e p o s i t  debt .  In such a case  
1 -  3Dd/ 3 l  approaches zero  and the  e n t i r e  f i r s t  term v a n i s h e s .  This  
r e s u l t  i s  o f  course  c o n s i s t e n t  with the prev ious  f in d in g  t h a t  the  bank 
should maximize i t s  use o f  d e p o s i t  f i n a n c i n g .  Again,  va lu e  maximizat ion  
and (g e n e r a l i z e d )  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  min im izat ion  are seen as two s i d e s  
o f  the same c o in .
Note t h a t  the second term,  X3cov(N0I, R^)/ 3 1 i s  a p r o j e c t  r i s k -  
capturing  f a c t o r .  I t  r e f l e c t s  the market p r i c e  o f  r i s k  t imes  the  
incremental  covar ian ce  r i s k  per d o l l a r  o f  incremental  in ves tm en t .  Should 
the f irm s e l e c t  a zero  r i s k  p r o j e c t ,  t h i s  term would d isap pear;  but ,
E(NOI) , 3 C O v ( N 0 I ,Rm) 
3 1 “ Kd l
3E(N0I) >_ p/p \ [, aPdl . 3cov(N0I,Rm) 
31 1 " 31 3l (3 -18 )
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again note  t h a t  the r i s k l e s s  p r o j e c t ' s  required  r a t e  o f  return would 
be lower than the r a t e  a t  which the market p r i c e s  r i s k l e s s  c l a im s ,
E(RZ) ,  provided t h a t  i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  f inan ced  with d e p o s i t s .
Bank sh areh o ld ers  a r e ,  th u s ,  rec o g n iz in g  t h a t  the bank can do something  
f o r  them t h a t  they  cannot  do f o r  th em se lves .  I f  the  bank's owners 
(and a l l  o th er  i n v e s t o r s )  d e s i r e  to  i s s u e  r i s k l e s s  c la im s  on th e m s e lv e s ,  
they  can s e l l  s h o r t  the  z e r o - b e ta  p o r t f o l i o .  They are in e f f e c t  borrowing 
a t  the r i s k - f r e e  r a t e ,  E(R ) .  The bank, however,  i s s u e s  d e p o s i t s  a t  
a zero  r a te  and with the assumption o f  f u l l y  r ec o v era b le  c o s t s  v ia  
s e r v i c e  c h a r g e s ,  p rov ides  a unique b e n e f i t  to  i t s  s h a r e h o ld e r s .  With 
t h i s  advantage p r o j e c t s  which would o th erw ise  be unacceptab le  become 
a c c e p t a b le .  For example,  a r i s k l e s s  p r o j e c t  should by market standards  
earn E( Rz ) ,  but the bank r e q u ir e s  t h a t  i t  earn on ly  E(Rz ) [ l  -  a D ^ / 3 l ] . 
R is k le s s  p r o j e c t s  may e x i s t  which are not  expected  to  earn as much as 
E(R ) but might be expected  to  earn E(RZ)[1  -  a D ^ / a l ] . These p r i n c i p l e s  
c l e a r l y  w i l l  hold a l s o  when p r o j e c t s  are  r i s k y  and A 3 c o v ( N 0 I , R ^ ) / 3 l  i s  
added to  the required  re turn .
Now the s p e c ia l  ca se  o f  p r o j e c t s  with r i s k  e q u iv a le n t  to  the r i s k  
o f  the bank's e x i s t i n g  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  be examined.  F i r s t ,  an e x p r e s s io n  
fo r  31 i s  needed.  I t  i s  assumed th a t  3V̂  = 31.  Upon acceptance  o f  a 
p r o j e c t ,  t h i s  s ta tem ent  would not n e c e s s a r i l y  be t ru e  u n le s s  the p r o j e c t ' s  
net  p resen t  va lue  (NPV) were zero;  but i f  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  a p r o j e c t ' s  
NPV i s  not z e r o ,  i t  would not be p o s s i b l e  t o  develop a meaningful  c o s t  o f  
c a p i t a l  con cep t .  The investment  d e c i s i o n  would be i n f lu e n c i n g  the c o s t  
o f  c a p i t a l ,  c l e a r l y  im p ract ica l  s i n c e  the c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  must be known 
p r io r  to  making the  investm ent  d e c i s i o n .  Using the ex p r e s s io n  
3V  ̂ = 3 l ,  i t  i s  true  from Equation (3 -1 2 )  t h a t  3V  ̂ = 3S^ + and from
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Equation (3 -1 0 )  th a t  sVy = aSy + aD^; t h e r e f o r e ,  aSy = aVy aDj = al -
aDd or aSy = a I (1 -  a D y /a l ) .  From t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n ,  al i s  found to  be 
given  as
aS
al = U (3 -19 )
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 3 -1 9 )  i n t o  the  second term on th e  r i g h t  hand s id e  o f  (3 -18 )  
g i v e s
aE(NOI)
al ^  e ( r z )
3D,





I f  the  r i s k  complexion o f  the bank's a s s e t  p o r t f o l i o  does  not change
I-**# ^
from the  a d d i t io n  o f  th e  p r o j e c t ,  the acov(N 0I , Rm) / a S y  = cov (N 0I ,Rm) / S y
= cov(Ry,Rm ) ; t h e r e f o r e ,  
aE(NOI)
al
\  -  8Dd
9 1  -
E(RZ ) + Acov(Ry,Rm ) (3 -21)
Equation (3 -2 1 )  i s  analogous  to  the  tex tb ook  weighted  average  c o s t  o f  
c a p i t a l  s i n c e  the  f i r s t  term in brackets  i s  the  proport ion  o f  the f irm  
f in an ced  with  e q u i t y ,  the  second term in b rackets  i s  th e  c o s t  o f  e q u i t y ,  
E ( R y ) ,  and the  c o s t  o f  debt  i s  z e r o .  I t  i s  aga in  apparent th a t  the  bank 
should  maximize i t s  use o f  debt  f in a n c in g  s i n c e  to  do so would f o r c e  
1 -  aDy/al and,  t h u s ,  the  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  toward z e r o .
A t y p i c a l  p r o j e c t  o f  " eq u iva len t  r i sk" i s  the repurchase  o f  s h a res .  
I f  the  bank undertakes a share  repurchase ,  i t  r e q u ir e s  o n ly  the  r a te  o f  
return  g iven  in (3 -2 1 )  whereas the  shares  purchased by any o th er  i n v e s t o r  
in c lu d in g  i t s  current  owners would r eq u ir e  E ( R y ) .  So an optimal p o l i c y  
i s  to  repurchase  shares  which n a t u r a l l y  f o r c e s  1 -  aDy/al toward zer o .  
This s ta tement  should come as no s u r p r i s e .  The i s s u a n c e  o f  d e p o s i t  debt  
and the  repurchase o f  shares  was e a r l i e r  shown t o  be va lue  maximizing
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and the bank should  have continued  to  do t h i s  u n t i l  i t  had as much d e p o s i t  
debt as i t  could  o b t a in .
In r e a l i t y  d e p o s i t s  may not be c o s t l e s s ,  r e s e r v e  requirements  are  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r ,  and th ere  remains the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  reg u la to r y  
reform w i l l  r e s u l t  in th e  payment o f  i n t e r e s t  on demand d e p o s i t s .  These 
f a c t o r s  w i l l  o b v io u s ly  a f f e c t  the model,  and they  w i l l  be d e a l t  with in 
a l a t e r  s e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  ch ap ter .  In the  in ter im  i t  i s  worthwhile to  
address the q u e s t io n  o f  the assumptions  concerning  the supply  o f  u e p o s i t s .
Were the bank capable  o f  f o l l o w i n g  the  ad v ice  su ggested  here o f  
maximizing i t s  d e p o s i t  f in a n c in g  u n t i l  i t  were v i r t u a l l y  one-hundred 
percent  d e p o s i t  f in a n c e d ,  d e p o s i t s  would have to  be su pp l ied  in u n l im i ted  
q u a n t i t i e s  i f  th ere  were many banks f o l l o w i n g  the  same p o l i c y .  The 
supply o f  d e p o s i t s  i s  in f lu e n c e d  by numerous f a c t o r s ,  most no tab ly  
Federal Reserve monetary p o l i c y ,  but i s ,  f o r  the  most p a r t ,  f i x e d  in  
the  sh or t  run.  Given th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  m u l t ip l e  banking f i r m s ,  a f i n i t e  
l i m i t  e x i s t s  on the  supply  o f  d e p o s i t s  a v a i l a b l e  to a g iven  bank.
Banks o f t e n  attempt a v a r i e t y  o f  promotional d e v i c e s  to  in c r e a s e  t h e i r  
share o f  the market f o r  d e p o s i t s .  A g iven  bank's  s u c c e s s  depends on 
a number o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  most im portant ly  the  degree o f  com pet i t ion  
in  the market.  These p o in t s  and a model in cor p or a t in g  them w i l l  be 
developed l a t e r .  F i r s t ,  assume th a t  the bank has obta ined  a l l  o f  the  
d e p o s i t s  i t  can p o s s i b l y  procure and i s  y e t  in need o f  a d d i t io n a l  
f in a n c in g  to  support an expanding an a s s e t  base .  I t  must then turn to  
the c r e d i t  markets.
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The A n a lys i s  o f  Bank Leverage: C red it  Market Financing
The increased  r e l i a n c e  o f  the commercial banking system on c r e d i t
market borrowing i s  a phenomenon o f  the 1970's  having been noted and
24documented by f o l l o w e r s  o f  the banking in d u s tr y .  The e x p r e s s io n  
" l i a b i l i t y  management" became synonymous with the p r a c t i c e  whereby 
banks recognized  t h a t  c r e d i t  market borrowing was a f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  
to  the problem o f  i n s u f f i c i e n t  d e p o s i t  growth.  This a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a ­
t i o n  by banks in the c r e d i t  markets has no doubt c o n tr ib u ted  to  the  
observed reduct ion  in c a p i t a l  as a percentage  o f  t o t a l  f in a n c i n g .  In 
t h i s  s e c t i o n  the use o f  t h i s  type o f  f in a n c in g  i s  in corporated  in to  the  
c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e  theory  in a world d e scr ib ed  by B la c k ' s  z e r o -b e ta  
a s s e t  p r i c in g  theory .  The e x a c t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  the i d e n t i t y  o f  
th e s e  " c r e d i t  markets" i s  a minor p o in t .  They could r e p r e s e n t  the  
fed era l  funds ,  E u ro d o l la rs ,  CD's,  or even bond markets.  No lo n g - t im e  
versu s  short- term  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  made. The c r e d i t  market as i t  w i l l  be 
used here w i l l  s imply  r e p r e s e n t  a market where the bank borrows funds  
and agrees  to  pay a s t i p u l a t e d  r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t .
In the second v e r s io n  o f  B la c k ' s  a s s e t  p r i c in g  model d escr ibed  
on pages 35 through 37 in v e s t o r s  are sa id  to  be ab le  to  lend a t  a r i s k ­
f r e e  ra te  even though th ey  borrow a t  a r i s k y  r a t e .  I f  i n v e s t o r s  can 
lend a t  t h i s  r a t e ,  i t  seems reasonable  to presume th a t  some p a r t i c i p a n t  
i s  prov id ing  th e s e  l end in g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  by borrowing a t  a r i s k l e s s  
r a t e .  A reasonable  assumption i s  t h a t  t h i s  p a r t i c i p a n t  i s  the bank.
on
Arnold D i l l ,  " L i a b i l i t y  Management Banking," Monthly Review. 
Federal Reserve Bank o f  A t l a n t a , 56: 218-24 ,  December, 1971; G. W. 
McKinney, " L i a b i l i t y  Management -  I t s  Costs and I t s  Uses,"  Bankers 
Magazine, 157: 19-26 ,  Winter,  1974: Paul S. Nadler,  " L i a b i l i t y
Management and Loan P r ic in g ,"  Journal o f  Commercial Bank Lending,
55: 20 -25 ,  February,  1973.
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The assumption o f  banks borrowing a t  a r i s k - f r e e  r a t e  may not
be co m p le te ly  r e a l i s t i c ,  but the rea l i sm  o f  a t h e o r y ' s  assumptions  i s
a minor p o in t .  N o n e th e le s s ,  banks can be r e a l i s t i c a l l y  sa id  to  be
borrowing a t  what amounts to  approximately  a r i s k - f r e e  r a t e .  F i r s t
o f  a l l ,  l a r g e  bank c r e d i t  market borrowings ,  w h i le  not com ple te ly
d e f a u l t - f r e e ,  bear l i t t l e  r i s k  s i n c e  r e g u l a to r s  seem determined to  not
a l lo w  such banks to  f a i l .  Although insurance  i s  not a p p l i c a b l e  to
n o n -d e p o s i t  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  the o r d e r ly  takeover  o f  a f a i l i n g  bank by a
f i n a n c i a l l y  sound one e l i m i n a t e s  the shock waves and in most c a s e s
would p r o t e c t  t h e s e  c r e d i t o r s  in a d d i t io n  to  d e p o s i t o r s .  Second, bank
n o n -d e p o s i t  l i a b i l i t i e s  c o n s i s t  e x t e n s i v e l y  o f  sh ort - term  borrowings
which bear r a t e s  very c l o s e  to  the  Treasury B i l l  r a t e .  Third ,  banks
a l s o  borrow, v ia  t ime and sa v in g s  d e p o s i t s ,  a t  r a t e s  which are
a r t i f i c i a l l y  c o n s tra in ed  and are o f t e n  f a r  below the  ( r i s k l e s s )
Treasury B i l l  r a t e .  Combining th es e  p o in t s  makes the assumption o f
r i s k - f r e e  borrowing by banks q u i t e  r e a s o n a b le .  Even i f  the r a te  at
which banks borrow does not e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  m yster ious  " r i s k - f r e e "
r a t e ,  i t  i s  t rue  th a t  o th er  market p a r t i c i p a n t s  ( i n d i v i d u a l s  and f irms)
borrow from banks by paying the prime r a t e  p lus  for  most borrowers
a premium. The prime r a te  must,  t h e r e f o r e ,  exceed  the r a t e  a t  which
banks borrow; th u s ,  banks appear to  have a d e f i n i t e  advantage in the
25c r e d i t  markets th a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  and f irms do not p o s s e s s .
25I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  many la r g e  f irms p o s s e s s  the advantage  
a l s o  from t h e i r  a c c e s s  to  the commercial paper market which enab les  
f irms to  o f t e n  borrow a t  l e s s  than the  prime r a t e .
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Let the bank l e v e r e d  from borrowing Dd o f  d e p o s i t s  now borrow
26D. o f  debt paying an i n t e r e s t  r a te  o f  where R^<E(Rz ) .  The
stream o f  earn ings  a v a i l a b l e  to  i t s  s to c k h o ld e r s  now becomes
E(NOI) -  D^R .̂ The n o t a t io n  o f  R^', E(R^') ,  ' 9 and V^‘ w i l l  be
used to  denote the f irm now l e v e r e d  by borrowing in th e  c r e d i t
market. I t s  required return on e q u i t y  i s  g iven as
E(NOI) -  Rf D. .  .  ~
E( rl . )  = -----------------------------E(fV  + Aco v ( RjJ>F^) (3 -22)
V
which i s  rearranged to  ob ta in
E(NOI) = S l ' [ E ( R z )  +  Ac o v ( R l ' , R m ) ]  + D.Rf  ( 3 - 2 3 )
.  .  /NOI -  D,Rf  ~ \  ~  -
Now note t h a t  cov(RL',Rm) = cov  , R j  = cov (N 0I , Rm) / S L'.
V V j
S u b s t i t u t i n g  in to  ( 3 - 2 3 ) ,  c l e a r i n g  b r a c k e t s ,  and equat ing with
Equation ( 3 -9 )  which d e f i n e s  E(NOI) f o r  the  f irm le v e r e d  with  d e p o s i t  
debt g iv e s
SL = SL‘ + D.[Rf /E(Rz )] (3 -24 )
or e q u i v a l e n t l y ,
V  = SL -  D i l V E(Rz )I ( 3 - 24a)
S ince  + D. + Dd = VL' ,  then SL' = VL' -  D. -  Dd and with s u b s t i t u ­
t i o n  and rearrangement (3 -24a)  becomes
VL ' = SL + D . [ l  -  Rf /E(RZ)] + Dd (3-24b)
and s in c e  » (3-24b)  becomes
V  = VL + D . [ l  -  Rf /E(RZ)1 (3 -25 )
26The c o n d i t io n  t h a t  Rf  was l e s s  than E(R ) i s  in h ere n t  in the  
Black model and was noted on page 37 o f  the t e x t .
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An a l t e r n a t i v e  way o f  w r i t in g  (3 -25)  i s  t o  exp ress  the bracketed term 
as (E(Rz ) - Rf )/E(R2 ) .
I t  i s  c l e a r  from Equation (3 -2 5 )  t h a t  the  bank can in c r e a s e  i t s  
v a lu e  by fu r th e r  l e v e r i n g  i t s e l f  w ith  d o l l a r s  o f  D^. From the proof  
in Appendix A, t h i s  ga in  i s  t ra n s m it ted  i n t o  an in c r e a s e  in shareholder  
wealth  and e q u i ty  p r i c e .  These s ta tem en ts  hold as long as 1 -  R^/E(Rz )>0.  
Such w i l l  be the c a s e  i f  c o n d i t i o n s  c o n s i s t e n t  with the Black model hold .  
S ince  R^<E(RZ) ,  the bracketed  term i s  g r e a t e r  than zero  and l e s s  than 
one.  This term r e f l e c t s  the advantage th a t  banks have in the  c r e d i t  
markets .  Other p a r t i c i p a n t s  ( i n v e s t o r s  and f irm s)  may e f f e c t i v e l y  
i s s u e  r i s k l e s s  c la ims  on themselves  by s e l l i n g  short  the z e r o -b e ta  
p o r t f o l i o .  They are then lend in g  a t  the E(RZ) r a t e ,  but by buying the  
bank's e q u i t y ,  they  can e f f e c t i v e l y  lend a t  the lower R̂  r a t e .  The 
c l o s e r  R̂  i s  to  E(RZ) ,  the l e s s  o f  an advantage the bank has and i f  
Rf = E(RZ) ,  the advantage erodes  c o m p le te ly .  Of c o u r s e ,  i f  Rf  = E(Rz ) ,  
the Black model then becomes e q u i v a l e n t  to  the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin  
model which as d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r  would be i n c o n s i s t e n t  with the e x i s t e n c e  
o f  b a n k s . ^
I t  i s  not c l e a r  p r e c i s e l y  why banks command an advantage in the
c r e d i t  markets.  I t  seems l i k e l y ,  however,  t h a t  they  must do so .
2 8Otherwise ,  they  would not  e x i s t .  Apparently s o c i e t y  has g iven  banks 
t h i s  advantage as a m ot iv a t io n  f o r  provid ing  e s s e n t i a l  s e r v i c e s  such 
as l i q u i d i t y  and a payments mechanism. As long as th a t  advantage e x i s t s ,
2 7 There remains,  o f  c o u r s e ,  the use o f  d e p o s i t  d eb t ,  a f a c t  s t i l l  
not compatib le  with th e  Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin  world.
2 8 They might ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  e x i s t  to  e x p l o i t  im p er fe c t io n s  in loan  
markets.
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banks w i l l  e x p l o i t  i t .  I t  i s  not  s u r p r i s in g  then t h a t  banks do appear 
to  seek  maximum use o f  both d e p o s i t  and c r e d i t  market l e v e r a g e .  Thus,  
s o c i e t y ' s  f e a r  t h a t  banks are o v er lev era g e d  and inad eq u ate ly  c a p i t a l i z e d  
i s  a product o f  a system which has g iven  banks an i n c e n t i v e  to  do so .  
Although in p r a c t i c e  such f e a r s  may not  be t o t a l l y  unwarranted,  they  
do not emanate from e x c e s s i v e  greed but r e f l e c t  s imply  r a t i o n a l e  wealth  
maximization by p r i v a t e  economic u n i t s .
Returning to  the a n a l y s i s ,  i t  i s  worthwhile to  develop  the  bank's  
required e q u i t y  re tu rn .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  cov(N0I,Rm)/S]_' f o r  cov(R^' ,Rm) 
in (3 -2 2 )  and cov(N0 I , Rm)/S|_ f o r  cov(RL,Rm) in (3 -5 )  and s u b tr a c t in g  
(3 -5 )  from (3 -2 2 )  l e a v e s
E(Rl ')  -  E(Rl ) = Acov(NOI,Rm) [ l / S L' -  1 / S j -  (3 -26)
I t  can be shown from rearranging  (3 -5 )  t h a t  Acov(N0I,Rm) = S^[E(R^) - 
E(R ) ] .  The bracketed  term in (3 -2 6 )  can be w r i t t e n  as (S^ -  S ^ ' ) / S L'SL 
which from (3 -2 4 )  i s  equal to  ( R^/E( Rz ) / S ^ ' .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e s e
r e s u l t s  in to  (3 -26 )  l e a v e s
E(Rl ')  = E(Rl ) + Sl [E(Rl ) -  E(Rz ) ] [ D . / S L'SL] [ R f /E(R2 )]  (3 -26a)
or a l t e r n a t i v e l y
E(Rl ')  = E(Rl ) + [E(Rl ) -  E(Rz ) ] [ D . / S L' ] [ R f /E(Rz )] (3 -27)
This  e x p r e s s io n  i s  the  co u nterp art  to  MM's P r o p o s i t io n  I I .  The required  
e q u i t y  return  beg in s  a t  E(R^) (which i s  a l s o  E(Ry)) .  As u n i t s  o f  
are added, i t  in c r e a s e s  but by a s m a l le r  increment than according  to  
MM's P r o p o s i t i o n  I I .  The a b i l i t y  o f  the bank to  command a c r e d i t  
market advantage,  r e f l e c t e d  in the r a t i o ,  R^/E(RZ) ,  dampens the  in c r e a se  
in r i s k  as a d d i t io n a l  l e v e r a g e  i s  added.  The comparison to MM's 
P r o p o s i t i o n  II i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in Figure  3.
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E(R)
s lo p e  = [E(Rl ) -  E(RZ)]
Bank
s lo p e  = [E(Rl ) -  E(Rz ) ] [R f /E(Rz )]E(R, )
Leverage
Figure  3 
The Required Return on Equity:
MM* Versus Bank Financia l  S tru c tu re  Theory
*MM Theory has been r e s t a t e d  in terms o f  the  
n o t a t io n  used here and the z e r o -b e ta  model.
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The Genera l ized  and Weighted Average Costs o f  C ap i ta l :
Credit  Market Financing
Given the v a lu a t io n  Equation ( 3 - 2 5 ) ,  ex p res s  as the  c e r t a i n t y
e q u iv a le n t  va lu e  o f  p lus  and r e - w r i t e  as
E(NOI) - Xcov(N0I,Rm)
— “  + Dd + D . [ l  -  Rf /E(Rz )] (3 -28)
E(RZ )
Assuming th a t  an amount I i s  i n v e s t e d ,  the  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  
i s  der ived  by f in d in g  s V ^ ' / a l ,  s e t t i n g  i t  equal to  or g r e a t e r  than 1 , 
and then s o lv in g  f o r  3E( NOI) / 2T. Also l e t  3Dd/ 3 l equal zero  s i n c e  
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Once again  the bank's c r e d i t  market advantage appears .  By comparing 
Equation (3 -3 0 )  with Equation ( 3 - 2 9 ) ,  i t  i s  seen t h a t  the e f f e c t  on the  
c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  i s  l e s s  with c r e d i t  market f in a n c in g  than with d e p o s i t  
f in a n c in g .  I t  i s  apparent ,  however,  t h a t  t h e i r  advantage s t i l l  e x i s t s  
as long as  R^<E(RZ) .  I f  the bank were to  maximize i t s  use o f  
f i n a n c i n g ,  i t  could  d r iv e  a p r o j e c t ' s  required r a te  o f  return down to  
simply A 3 c o v ( N 0 I , R ) / 3 1 . In the case  o f  a r i s k l e s s  p r o j e c t ,  i t  would 
be driven down to  z e r o .  Note th a t  as long as the p r o j e c t  i s  f inanced  
a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  by c r e d i t  market borrowing (and R^<E(RZ) ) ,  the  
p r o j e c t  w i l l  requ ire  a lower return th a t  i t  o th erw is e  would f o r  a f irm  
or i n v e s t o r  th a t  did not command such an advantage or in a p e r f e c t
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market world.  Again,  c e r t a i n  p r o j e c t s  become a c c e p ta b le  to the bank 
when they  o th erw ise  would be r e j e c t e d .
Now c o n s id e r  the  c a s e  where the p r o j e c t ' s  r i s k  i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  
th e  r i s k  o f  the  bank's e x i s t i n g  p r o j e c t s .  I t  was p r e v i o u s ly  argued  
(pages  49 and 50) t h a t  aV^ = a l .  Here t h i s  assumption i s  repeated  exce p t  
i t  i s  s t a t e d  as aV^'  = a l .  From Equation ( 3 - 2 4 b ) ,  aV^1 = aS^ + 
aD.j [1 -  Rf / E( RZ)] -  3Dd or aS,_ = aVL' -  a D . [ l  -  Rf / E ( R Z)] -  3Dd . 
S u b s t i t u t i n g  al  f o r  aV^'  and r e s t a t i n g  l e a v e s  aS^ = a l  [1 -  ( a D ^ / a l )
(1 -  Rf/E(RZ))  -  aDd/ a I ] .  I t  i s  assumed th a t  no a d d i t io n a l  d e p o s i t  
f in a n c in g  i s  a v a i l a b l e  so t h a t  aDd/ a I  = 0.  I s o l a t i n g  al  l e a v e s
aS,





L(1 -  Rf / E ( R Z))
Now s u b s t i t u t e  t h i s  e x p r e s s io n  f o r  al  in the r i s k  adjustment f a c t o r ,







^ 1  -  Rf /E(RZ))
acov (NOI t R j
aS,
aD.
1 -  - H i  -  Rf /E(R ) 
al  T 2
(3 -32)
With no change in r i s k  3cov(N0I ,Rm)/aS^ = cov(N0I , Rm)/S[_ = cov(R^,Rm)
^ 5 
3E(N0I)
or cov(Ru ,Rm).  S u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  r e s u l t  and rearranging g iv e s
al
aD.
1 - — 1 (1 - Rf /E(R ))  
a l  T 2
E(RZ) + Acov(Ru ,Rm) (3-33)
Equation (3 -3 3 )  can be exp ressed  as the  more f a m i l i a r  weighted average  
c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .  S u b s t i t u t e  E(Ry) f o r  E(R^) in ( 3 - 2 7 ) ;  th en ,  rearrange
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(3 -2 7 )  to  i s o l a t e  E(Ry).  With some a l g e b r a ic  m anipu lat ions  E(Ry),  the  
second term in b rackets  in ( 3 - 3 3 ) ,  i s  found to  be e q u iv a le n t  to  
(Sy'E(R y1) + R^D- ) / (SL' + Di R^/E(Rz ) ) .  Noting th a t  3D./3I  equals  
D . / (D i + Sy ' )  i f  the  same r e l a t i v e  proport ions  o f  f in a n c in g  are  
mainta ined ,  the  f i r s t  term in brackets  in (3 -3 3 )  equals  
(S y 1 + D^R^/E(RZ) ) / ( S y '  + D.j). Then, m u l t i p l y i n g ,  c a n c e l l i n g ,  and 
rearranging l e a v e s
9E(N0I) .  S. 1 D.
------------->  E(R. 1)-----------------+ Rf ------- ]-------  . (3 -34 )
31 “ L SL' + D. SL' + D.
In Equation (3 -3 3 )  the advantage o f  debt i s  r e f l e c t e d  in th e  c o s t  o f  
e q u i t y ,  E(RL' ) ,  which by Equation (3 -2 7 )  and Figure 3 i s  lower than i t  
would o therw ise  be w ith ou t  such an advantage.  I t  might seem unusual 
th a t  the R^/E(RZ) r a t i o  does not  appear in the component c o s t  o f  debt .
In f a c t  i t  does as a d e t a i l e d  d e r i v a t i o n  would show. The c o s t  o f  debt  
would be g iven  as E(RZ)(Rf /E(RZ) ) .  With E(RZ) appearing as the c o s t  
o f  d eb t ,  the equat ion  i s  r e f l e c t i n g  the market 's  p erce p t ion  o f  the  
c o s t  o f  i s s u i n g  r i s k l e s s  c l a i m s ,  E(RZ) ,  with t h i s  c o s t  being m u l t i p l i e d  
by the r e l a t i v e  advantage f a c t o r ,  R^/E(RZ) .  The r e s u l t  i s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  
the bank's true  c o s t  o f  d e b t ,  R .̂
Final Comments on the Bank Financia l  S tru ctu re  Theory 
I t  has been assumed throughout the s ta g e  o f  f in a n c in g  by c r e d i t  
market borrowing t h a t  the  supply o f  funds was u n l im i te d .  The assumption  
i s  maintained here but m e r i t s  some e x p la n a t io n .  The c r e d i t  market i s  
assumed to be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a l e s s  than p e r f e c t l y  i n e l a s t i c  supply  
curve .  The q u a n t i ty  o f  d o l l a r s  borrowed i s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  the  
r a te  p a id ,  Rf . Total  bank c r e d i t  demand w i l l  determine the market r a te
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o f  i n t e r e s t .  Moreover, no reason e x i s t s  f o r  l i m i t i n g  the number o f
banks to one.  More a p p r o p r ia t e l y  then a number o f  banks w i l l  e x i s t
and t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  needs determine the  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  As demand
f o r  c r e d i t  i n c r e a s e s ,  and assuming no o f f s e t t i n g  s h i f t  in the supply
cu rv e ,  Rf must i n c r e a s e .  The e f f e c t  on t h i s  model i s  s imply to  s h i f t
ev er y th in g  in the d i r e c t i o n  imposed by a h igher  R .̂ The s h i f t ,  w hi le
s i g n i f i c a n t ,  i s  no l e s s  c r i t i c a l  than a s h i f t  in X, E(R^) or any o ther
parameter o f  the  eq u i l ib r iu m  model.  Thus, the i s s u e  concerning the
supply  o f  funds to  banks,  though c o n t r o v e r s i a l  in p r a c t i c e  and in some 
29t h e o r i e s ,  i s  a t r i v i a l  p o in t  here .
I t  i s  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  many corp o ra t io n s  p o s s e s s  s i m i l a r  
advantages in the c r e d i t  markets .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  a w e l l -d e v e lo p e d  
commercial paper market a t t e s t s  to  the f a c t  t h a t  many la r g e  c r e d i t  
worthy co r p o r a t io n s  are capable  o f  c ircumventing  the f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r ­
mediat ion p rocess  to tap the low c o s t  short  term c r e d i t  markets .  Indeed  
many la r g e  c o r p o r a t io n s  with  t h e i r  c a p t i v e  f in a n c e  companies are almost  
c e r t a i n l y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  th em se lves ;  th u s ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  the theory  g iven  here a p p l i e s  to  many non-banking f irm s .
The q u es t io n  may a r i s e  as to  whether t h i s  theory  i s  modif ied  by 
r e c o g n i t io n  o f  the bank hold ing  company form o f  o r g a n iz a t i o n .  Although 
the ho ld ing  company i s  c e r t a i n l y  a more complex f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  
than the s imple  bank, the  model i s  in no way a l t e r e d  by apply ing i t  to  
a hold ing company. S ince  the e q u i ty  market e v a l u a t e s  the holding  
company as a u n i t  r a th er  than as  component p a r t s ,  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to
29The supply  curve c o n tro v er sy  i s  d i s c u s s e d  in John M. Mason, 
Financia l  Management o f  Commercial Banks (Boston: Warren, Gorham,
and Lamont, 1 9 7 9 ) ,  pp. 59-62 .
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co n s id e r  the  ho ld ing  company's b u s in e ss  r i s k  and l e v e r a g e  ra th er  than 
th a t  o f  i t s  bank a f f i l i a t e s .  The q u e s t io n  o f  hold ing company engagement  
in a c t i v i t i e s  not a v a i l a b l e  to  in d iv id u a l  banks i s  unimportant s i n c e  the  
s p e c i f i c  in vestment  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  bank or ho ld ing  company are not  
con s id ered  in t h i s  model.  Moreover,  th e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  "double 
leverag ing"  c o n c e p t ,  a s i g n i f i c a n t  contemporary i s s u e ,  i s  avoided  
here .  "Double leverag in g"  r e f e r s  to  the  p r a c t i c e  o f  the ho ld ing  company 
i s s u i n g  debt and us ing  the proceeds  to purchase newly i s s u e d  e q u i t y  in 
i t s  a f f i l i a t e  banks. This a c t io n  improves the c a p i t a l  r a t i o s  o f  the  
a f f i l i a t e  banks who may have been under some p ressure  from r e g u l a to r s  
because o f  inadequate  c a p i t a l ;  however,  the c o n s o l i d a t e d  ho ld ing  company 
now has more debt  and i s ,  t h u s ,  more r i s k y .  The appearance i s  o f  
f i n a n c i a l l y  improved a f f i l i a t e s  whereas the company as a whole i s  
l e s s  f i n a n c i a l l y  sound. In the model h e r e ,  however,  the market would 
not be m is le ad  by t h i s  c o sm et ic  f in a n c in g  as i t  would e v a l u a t e  the  
d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o  o f  the ho ld ing  company.
I t  i s  worth n o t in g  th a t  the f i n d i n g s  here do not  n e c e s s a r i l y  
imply th a t  loan s  w i l l  be pr iced  according  to  the bank's c o s t  o f  
c a p i t a l .  Rather,  banks may be capable  o f  e x t r a c t i n g  monopoly premiums 
r e s u l t i n g  from im p e r fe c t io n s  in loan markets;  however,  r e s t r i c t i n g  
the model to  the l a r g e s t  banking f irms does minimize t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  
somewhat.
The model has been d er ived  in the  r a th er  s p e c i a l i z e d  c a s e  o f  a 
p e r p e t u i t y .  In Appendix B the model i s  d er ived  under the c o n d i t io n s  
o f  a s i n g l e  per iod would.  The o n ly  e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e ,  however,  i s  
the f a c t  th a t  the  ga in  to  the  sh areh o lders  i s  reduced by the  p resent
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va lue  o f  the p r i n c i p l e  repayment.  I t  i s  e a s i l y  shown ( s e e  Appendix B) 
th a t  a gain to  the  owners w i l l  s t i l l  e x i s t .
The model has now been f u l l y  developed and d i s c u s s e d  under a 
s e t  o f  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s .  The next  s e c t i o n  w i l l  r e l a x  some o f  the  
assumptions  and examine the  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e s e  assumptions  on the  
e s s e n t i a l  c o n c l u s i o n s .
The Model Under Relaxed Assumptions  
Unti l  now i t  has been assumed th a t  d e p o s i t s  are  c o s t l e s s ,  non­
i n t e r e s t  b ea r in g ,  and do not  n e c e s s i t a t e  the  ho ld ing  o f  r e s e r v e s .  Also  
th e  e f f e c t  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  on the supply o f  d e p o s i t s  has been 
d is reg a rd ed .  These p o i n t s  are now cons id ered  s e p a r a t e l y .  I t  i s  
assumed th a t  the bank i s  us in g  no c r e d i t  market f in a n c in g  and i s  con­
s i d e r i n g  o n ly  d e p o s i t  f i n a n c i n g .  The p e r p e t u i t y  assumption i s  a l s o  
maintained .
C ost ly  D epos i t s
D e p o s i t s ,  u n l ik e  forms o f  debt  i s s u e d  by c o r p o r a t io n s  and 
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  r eq u ir e  t h a t  th e  bank perform s p e c i f i c  s e r v i c e s  such as  
check p r o c e s s in g  and bookkeeping.  These s e r v i c e s  are  not  w ith ou t  c o s t ,  
and although th ere  i s  c o n s id e r a b le  debate over  how to measure t h e s e  c o s t s ,  
th ey  are almost  u n i v e r s a l l y  con s id ered  to  be not i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  On the  
o th er  hand, banks do have the  op p ortu n i ty  to  rec o v er  some or a l l  o f  
t h e s e  c o s t s  through s e r v i c e  charges .  Unti l  now i t  has been assumed th a t  
the s e r v i c e  charge i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  recover  the  c o s t .  Now assume th a t  
d e p o s i t s  incur a p ercentage  c o s t ,  C, per d o l l a r  o f  d e p o s i t s  which 
r e p r e se n t s  e i t h e r  the  n e t  c o s t  a f t e r  s e r v i c e  charge revenue has been 
c o l l e c t e d  or a g r o s s  c o s t  in the absence o f  s e r v i c e  ch arges .  This
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c o s t  w i l l  a c t  e x a c t l y  l i k e  an i n t e r e s t  r a te  as the stream o f  earn ings
-NX*
a v a i l a b l e  to  s to c k h o ld e r s  w i l l  be E(NOI) -  D^C. Having e s t a b l i s h e d  
t h i s  f a c t ,  the e f f e c t  on v a lu a t io n  i s  the same as i f  the f irm had 
i s s u e d  debt  a t  an i n t e r e s t  r a te  o f  C. The bank's va lue  i s  found to  
equal
VL = vu + Dd [ l  - C/E(RZ) ] .  (3 -35)
D ep os i t s  a r e ,  t h u s ,  seen to  be l e s s  d e s i r a b l e  than in the case  where 
they  were c o s t l e s s .  They are s t i l l  b e n e f i c i a l  to the f irm i f  C<E(RZ).  
Since  banks seem to d e s i r e  d e p o s i t s ,  C must be l e s s  than E(RZ) .  I f  C 
were g r e a te r  than E(RZ) ,  i t  would be more c o s t l y  f o r  banks to  i s s u e  
d e p o s i t s ,  o b l i g a t i n g  them selves  to  provide  c o s t l y  s e r v i c e s ,  than i t  
would be fo r  t h e i r  owners to  s e l l  sh or t  the  z e r o -b e ta  p o r t f o l i o ,  
e q u iv a le n t  to  borrowing a t  the E(RZ) r a t e .  Obviously  a t  C = E(RZ) 
th ere  would be no e f f e c t  one way or the o th e r .  I t  can e a s i l y  be shown 
t h a t  the required  e q u i t y  return i s  the same as the  case  where D. o f  
debt  were i s s u e d  with C r e p la c in g  R  ̂ (Equation ( 3 - 2 7 ) ) .
I n t e r e s t - B e a r in g  D ep os i t s
The payment o f  i n t e r e s t  on demand d e p o s i t s  has been p ro h ib i t ed  
s in c e  d e p r e s s io n -e r a  r e g u l a t i o n  was en ac ted .  The i s s u e  has been 
r e s u r r e c t e d ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  and i t  now seems l i k e l y  th a t  r e g u la to r y  reform 
w i l l  someday a l lo w  (or  req u ir e )  banks to pay i n t e r e s t  on checking account  
b a la n ces .  The e f f e c t  on the model i s  e a s i l y  seen .  In f a c t  i t  meri ts  
no r e p e t i t i o n  o f  e q u a t io n s .  The i n t e r e s t  f a c t o r  w i l l  behave i d e n t i c a l l y  
to  the  c o s t  f a c t o r  in th e  p rev ious  s e c t i o n  making d e p o s i t s  l e s s  d e s i r a b l e  
but s t i l l  advantageous i f  the i n t e r e s t  r a te  i s  l e s s  than E(RZ) .  D e p o s i t s ,  
th u s ,  would become very  s i m i l a r  to  c r e d i t  market borrowing. One p o in t
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t h a t  i s  indeterm inate  i s  the ex a c t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .
I t  would most l i k e l y  be e s t a b l i s h e d  by Federal Reserve or Congressional  
order  and could  c o n c e iv a b ly  be as high as E(R ) .  I f  th a t  became the  
c a s e ,  d e p o s i t s  would not be a t t r a c t i v e  to  banks; however,  i t  i s  more 
l i k e l y  t h a t  s e r v i c e  charges  would in c r e a s e  or t h a t  th e r e  would be a 
general  in c r e a s e  in the p r i c e s  o f  o ther  bank s e r v i c e s  in c lu d in g  lo a n s .
Reserve Requirements
V i r t u a l l y  a l l  banks are  requ ired  to  maintain  l i q u i d  r e s e r v e s .  The 
e x a c t  percentage  requirement depends on a number o f  f a c t o r s .  Most 
major re s e r v e  c i t y  banks which are in the  Federal Reserve System keep 
from tw e lve  to  twenty p ercent  o f  t h e i r  d e p o s i t s  in v a u l t  cash or d e p o s i t s  
a t  the l o c a l  Federal Reserve Bank. This r e g u l a t i o n  prevents  banks from 
l end ing  the e n t i r e  amount o f  t h e i r  d e p o s i t s .  The r e s e r v e s  a l s o  earn 
no i n t e r e s t  a lthough th e r e  have been some s u g g e s t i o n s  made to  req u ire  
th a t  the  Federal Reserve Banks pay i n t e r e s t .
Assume in t h i s  model t h a t  a r e s e r v e  requirement  equal to  Rr percent  
o f  d e p o s i t s  i s  imposed. In order to hold the bank's s i z e  c o n s t a n t ,  
l e t  the bank s e l l  o f f  some o f  i t s  e x i s t i n g  a s s e t s  to  gen era te  the cash  
t h a t  w i l l  be held  or d e p o s i t e d  in the account  a t  the Federal Reserve.
The stream o f  earn ings  a v a i l a b l e  to  the  s to c k h o ld e r s  w i l l  be reduced  
from E(NOI) to  E(NOI) -  R ^ E t R y ) .  The va lue  Rr Dd i s  the d o l l a r  amount 
o f  r e s e r v e s  h e ld ,  which when m u l t i p l i e d  by E(Ry),  the return on the  
f i r m ' s  e x i s t i n g  a s s e t s ,  g i v e s  the  cash f low  foregone by having to  s e l l  
o f f  a s s e t s  to gen era te  cash f o r  r e s e r v e s .  In p r a c t i c e  the bank would 
simply lend Dd ( l  -  R ) and hold DdRr in r e s e r v e s ,  but t h i s  maneuver 
cannot be accommodated in the model s in c e  the bank's s i z e  and, t h u s ,
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i t s  va lue  would a u t o m a t i c a l l y  change.  The e f f e c t  o f  l e v e r a g e  in i s o l a ­
t i o n  would then be d i f f i c u l t  to  i d e n t i f y .  Working through the  a n a l y s i s  
given  t h a t  E(Ry) = [E(NOI) - ( Ry) } /S^ produces the v a lu a t io n
equation
VL = VU + Dd &  ‘ Rr E(Ru)/E(Rz )] (3 -36 )
and the  required  e q u i ty  return  o f
E(Rl ) = ECRy) + [E(RU) -  E(Rz ) ] [ R r E(Ru ) /E(Rz ) ] [D d/ S L] .  (3 -37)
The advantage o f  d e p o s i t s  remains as long as Rr E(Ry)<E(Rz ) . The
f a c t o r  Rr E(Ry ) r e p r e s e n t s  the t ru e  "cost" o f  d e p o s i t s  s i n c e  t h i s  c o s t
i s  the r a t e  o f  return  foregone  on a s s e t s  which could  be earning a 
return  in the  absence o f  r e s e r v e  requ irem ents .  As long as t h i s  "cost"  
o f  d e p o s i t s  i s  l e s s  than the  r a te  a t  which the  bank's owners can 
i n d i v i d u a l l y  borrow, E(Rz ) ,  th e  bank can con t in ue  to  provide them with  
b e n e f i t s  o f  in c r e a se d  w ea l th .  Changes in re s e r v e  requirements  c l e a r l y  
a f f e c t  the  v a lu a t io n  o f  bank shares  and the wea lth  o f  bank i n v e s t o r s .
The e f f e c t  i s  t o  make d e p o s i t s  become more or l e s s  e x p e n s iv e .
Less Than P e r f e c t l y  E l a s t i c  Supply o f  D epos i t s
The nature  o f  co m p et i t io n  in banking markets has been a s u b je c t  
o f  much c o n tro v er sy  in p r o f e s s io n a l  and academic c i r c l e s .  The p resent  
research  w i l l  make no c o n t r i b u t i o n s  in t h a t  area but w i l l  now in corpora te  
the  presence  o f  co m p et i t io n  i n t o  the model.  Assume t h a t  d e p o s i t s  again  
are  c o s t l e s s ,  n o n - i n t e r e s t  bear ing ,  and do not req u ir e  r e s e r v e s ,  but 
th a t  they  g en era te  s e r v i c e  charge income a t  a ra te  o f  r g percent  o f  
d e p o s i t s .  The supply o f  d e p o s i t s  i s  determined by the r e l a t i o n s h i p
Dd = f < V  irr  it2 ’ • * • *
where irp  t̂ ,  . . • ,  irn r e p r e se n t  N o ther  f a c t o r s  th a t  in f lu e n c e  the  
supply o f  d e p o s i t s ,  such as monetary p o l i c y ,  and are assumed to  be
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c o n s ta n t .  The supply  curve  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by f i r s t -  and second-order  
d e r i v a t i v e s
3D. 32D.
—  < 0 and  f  < 0 .
3r„ 3r„s s
These r e l a t i o n s h i p s  are  i l l u s t r a t e d  in Figure 4.  The shape o f  the  
curve cannot  be p r e c i s e l y  s p e c i f i e d ;  however,  c e r t a i n  f a c t s  can be 
e a s i l y  e s t a b l i s h e d .  The curve i s  not v e r t i c a l l y  asymptot ic  but 
i n t e r s e c t s  the  v e r t i c a l  a x i s  because even a t  a zero  s e r v i c e  charge ,  
on ly  a f i n i t e  q u a n t i ty  o f  d e p o s i t s  could  be s u p p l i e d .  The curve  
should ,  however,  be asym ptot ic  to  the  r g a x i s  or some l i n e  above but 
p a r a l l e l  to  i t ,  because  even a t  a very high s e r v i c e  ch arge ,  some 
d e p o s i t s  w i l l  almost  s u r e l y  be s u p p l i e d .
With s e r v i c e  charge revenue being generated  from d e p o s i t  d eb t ,  
the  stream o f  earn in gs  a v a i l a b l e  to  e q u i ty h o ld e r s  i s  equal to  
E(NOI) + '"gDj. S p e c i f y i n g  the  l e v e r e d  return  as E(Ry) = (E(NOI) + r s D<j)/S[j 
the a n a l y s i s  can proceed as i l l u s t r a t e d  in prev ious  s e c t i o n s  by
«**w »*v
rearranging the equat ion  to  i s o l a t e  E(NOI) and equat ing  E(NOI) to  
SyE(Ry). The l e v e r e d  and un levered  e q u i t y  are found to  be r e l a t e d  in 
the  f o l l o w i n g  manner:
SU = SL " r s Dd/E (R z ) .  (3 -38)
R e c a l l in g  t h a t  V(_ = \  + D<-| and 5 s g> ^  can be shown th a t
VL = Vy + Dd [ l  + r s /E(Rz ) ] .  (3 -39 )
Equation (3 -39 )  i s  s i m i l a r  to  Equation (3 -13 )  which g i v e s  the va lue  o f
the bank w ith  d e p o s i t s  and no s e r v i c e  c h a r g e s ,  c o s t s ,  e t c .  In a d d i t i o n ,
however,  a premium equal to Ddr s /E(RZ) i s  earned.  The r a t i o n a l e  i s  
q u i t e  ob v iou s .  D ep os i t s  not on ly  o f f e r  th e  advantage o f  zero  c o s t  or
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Figure 4 
The Supply Curve o f  D epos i t s
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i n t e r e s t  but a l s o  g en era te  a revenue t h a t  i s  here assumed to  exceed  
any c o s t  invo lved  in prov id ing  d e p o s i t  s e r v i c e s .
The above c o n d i t i o n s  would rep re se n t  an i d e a l i z e d  world f o r  banks 
e x ce p t  t h a t  u n le s s  the bank s e t  i t s  s e r v i c e  charge a t  an extremely  low 
r a t e ,  i t  might be unable to  a t t r a c t  a s u f f i c i e n t  q u a n t i ty  o f  d e p o s i t s  
f o r  the  b e n e f i t s  to  be s i g n i f i c a n t ;  but i f  the s e r v i c e  charge were s e t  
at  an extremely  low r a t e ,  the  gain from s e r v i c e  charge revenue would 
be very s m a l l .  The bank must,  t h e r e f o r e ,  f i n d  the optimal combination  
o f  d e p o s i t  volume and s e r v i c e  charge.  I t  does  so by maximizing  
with r e s p e c t  to r .
F i r s t  f in d  the  d e r i v a t i v e  and s e t  i t  equal t o  zer o .
r .
! ! k  = Dd ,
a r s  9 r s  E ( R Z ) E ( R Z )
9Dd
8r s
= 0.  ( 3 -4 0 )
Second-order  c o n d i t io n s  a s su r e  a maximum. Rearranging (3 -4 0 )  g i v e s
3D .
Dd = '  I>s + E(Rz )J-  (3“41)
3rs
The l e f t - h a n d  s i d e  r e p r e s e n t s  the va lue  o f  marginal u n i t s  o f  d e p o s i t  
l e v e r a g e .  Each marginal d o l l a r  o f  d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e  in c r e a s e s  shareholder  
wealth  by a d o l l a r .  The r ight-hand  s i d e  r e p r e se n t s  the "cost" o f  
marginal u n i t s  o f  d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e .  Note t h a t  t h i s  term i s  p o s i t i v e  
s i n c e  3D^/3r i s  n e g a t i v e .  I f  the  bank in c r e a s e s  the  s e r v i c e  charge ,  
i t  l o s e s  d e p o s i t s  in an amount determined by the d e r i v a t i v e ,  sD^/3r g .
Each d o l l a r  o f  d e p o s i t s  foregone r e s u l t s  in a l o s s  o f  s e r v i c e  charge  
revenue,  r s ; moreover,  shareholders  w i l l  have to  borrow on t h e i r  personal  
accounts  a t  a r a t e  o f  E(R ) to  make up f o r  the l e v e r a g e  l o s t .  At the  
optimum, s e r v i c e  charge i s  s e t ,  d e p o s i t  supply  i s  g i v e n ,  and the
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marginal b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  s p e c i f i e d  l e v e l  o f  d e p o s i t s  e x a c t l y  o f f s e t  the  
marginal c o s t .
An e lement  o f  somewhat more re a l i s m  might be added i f  i t  i s  assumed 
t h a t  d e p o s i t s  have a c o s t  o f  C p ercen t  and a s e r v i c e  charge o f  r g p ercent .  
Cost per u n i t  i s  f i x e d  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  does not i n f l u e n c e  demand. The 
c o s t ,  however,  exceeds  the  s e r v i c e  charge .  The va lue  o f  the bank i s  
given  as
r -  C
VL = VU + Dd 1 +  S
E(RZ) ,
(3 -4 2 )
Following the same procedure as b e fore  r e v e a l s  t h a t  the  optimum i s  
given  where
3Dj  3 D i
Dj  = -  — [E (R J  + r j .  (3 -43 )
3r 3rs s
Equation (3 -4 3 )  d i f f e r s  from Equation (3 -41 )  in t h a t  the marginal b e n e f i t s  
now in c lu d e  the  marginal c o s t  foregon e  from th e  l o s s  o f  d e p o s i t s  r e s u l t i n g  
from an in c r e a s e  in s e r v i c e  ch a rg es .  Thus,  a bank s e t t i n g  i t s  s e r v i c e  
charge should c o n s id e r  the v a lu a t io n  b e n e f i t s  o f  d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e ,  
th e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s ,  the  revenue r e c e iv e d  from s e r v i c e  c h a r g e s ,  and 
th e  c o s t  o f  a d d i t io n a l  borrowing by the  bank's sh areh o ld ers  th a t  would 
be n e c e s s a r y  to  a d ju s t  t h e i r  personal l e v e r a g e  p o s i t i o n s .  I t  i s  a l s o  
e asy  to  v i s u a l i z e  how r e s e r v e  requirements  would take  e f f e c t .  Reserves  
r e l e a s e d  from an in c r e a s e  in s e r v i c e  charges  would be a p o s i t i v e  
b e n e f i t .  L ik ew ise ,  i n t e r e s t  payments could  be incorporated  in to  t h i s  
v e r s io n  o f  the model.  These f a c t o r s  are not  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  
here but t h e i r  e f f e c t s  are n a t u r a l l y  recognized  as empir ica l  phenomena 
mandating c o n s id e r a t i o n  in p r a c t i c e .
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The a n a l y s i s  completed here more r e a l i s t i c a l l y  determines  the  
q u a n t i ty  o f  d e p o s i t s  t h a t  the bank w i l l  want to  o b t a in .  The bank 
r e o c g n i z e s  b e n e f i t s  to  d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e  but r e a l i z e s  t h a t  to  ob ta in  
t h e s e  b e n e f i t s  i t  must g iv e  up something.  In p r a c t i c e  banks tend to  
o f f e r  f r e e  g i f t s ,  s p e c i a l  s e r v i c e s ,  and o th er  monetary b e n e f i t s  in 
a d d i t io n  to  lower charges  on checking acco u n ts .  I t  i s  e a s i l y  seen  
t h a t  the model p resented  here provides  a more p r e c i s e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
o f  the  t r a d e - o f f  faced  by the  bank with  r e s p e c t  to i t s  e f f e c t  on 
market v a lu a t io n .
The theory o f  bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  developed in t h i s  research  
has been presented  in complete  d e t a i l .  I t  i s  now worthwhile to  con s id er  
whether the theory  has t e s t a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  This q u e s t io n  w i l l  be 
th e  s u b j e c t  o f  Chapter 4 where the development o f  some empir ica l  t e s t s  
w i l l  be p resen ted .
Chapter 4
EMPIRICAL TEST DESIGN
The model p resented  in Chapter 3 has the  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  producing  
t e s t a b l e  s ta te m e n ts .  Although the  t e s t s  are not s t r i c t l y  w ithout  
weaknesses ,  they  a r e ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  s u i t a b l e  as p re l im in ary  ev idence  
which can be used to  support or r e j e c t  the  th eory .  In order  to d e r i v e  
t e s t a b l e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  i t  w i l l  i n i t i a l l y  be n e c e s s a r y  to  extend the  model 
to  a more r e a l i s t i c  environment which r e c o g n i z e s  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  
corp orate  income ta x e s .  Again the p e r p e t u i t y  c a s e  i s  con s id ered .
The Model Under Corporate Income Taxes
The e f f e c t  o f  co rp ora te  income t a x e s  on f irm v a lu a t io n  i s  well  
known and was d i s c u s s e d  in Chapter 2 .  I t  w i l l  not  be n e c e s s a r y  to  
rep ea t  t h a t  d i s c u s s i o n  here nor w i l l  the i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h e r e o f  req u ire  
a complete  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  the model (as  in Chapter 3) with the tax  
f a c t o r  added. Rather,  o n ly  the high p o in t s  o f  the model and the d i r e c t  
e f f e c t s  o f  corporate  t a x e s  w i l l  be noted here .
In the f i r s t  case  where d e p o s i t  f i n a n c in g  was employed, corporate  
taxes  have no e f f e c t  a t  a l l .  S ince  o n ly  the  i n t e r e s t  tax subs idy  
causes  l e v e r a g e  to a f f e c t  v a l u a t i o n ,  the  i s s u a n c e  o f  n o n - i n t e r e s t  
bearing debt c r e a t e s  no tax  su bs id y  and, hence ,  has no v a lu a t io n  e f f e c t .  
The im p l i c a t io n  i s  not t h a t  t a x e s  have no impact on v a l u a t i o n .  In f a c t  
they do.  Obviously  t a x e s  reduce the  stream o f  earn ings  a v a i l a b l e  to  
s h a r e h o ld e r s ,  t h u s ,  reducing  the  va lue  o f  the  f irm.  Taxes ,  however,
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have no e f f e c t  on r i s k  and newly i s s u e d  n o n - i n t e r e s t  bearing debt  
g e n e r a te s  no advantages not a lready  e x ta n t  in the absence o f  t a x e s .
The use o f  i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  debt in the case  o f  c r e d i t  market  
f i n a n c i n g ,  however,  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  but f a m i l i a r  s t o r y .  The i s su ance  
o f  i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  debt  c r e a t e s  a tax  subs idy  which i s  t ran sm it ted  
to  the owners as an i n c r e a s e  in t h e i r  w ea l th .  In t h i s  model,  d eb t ,  
th u s ,  o f f e r s  two advantages .  One i s  the b e n e f i t  o f  the bank borrowing  
a t  a r a t e  l e s s  than the r a t e  a t  which i t s  owners can borrow. The o ther  
i s  the  subs idy  r e s u l t i n g  from the  tax d e d u c t i b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r e s t  
payments.
The model i s  e a s i l y  d e r iv e d .  Set  up the required  e q u i t y  re turns  
o f  the bank le v ered  with d e p o s i t s  and the bank l e v e r e d  with  d e p o s i t s  
plus  i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  d ebt .
E(N0I) (1  -  t ) „ - >
E(Rl ) = ------------------------= E(RZ) + Acov(RL,Rm) (4 -1 )
SL
(E(NOI) -  Rf D . ) (1  -  t ) .  -
E(RL')  = --------------------p ---------------- = E(RZ) + Xcov(RL' .R ,̂) ( 4 -2 )
V
Rearrange (4 -1 )  and ( 4 - 2 )  to i s o l a t e  E(NOI) (1  -  x ) ,  and equate th es e  
r e s u l t s .  Then rearrange  and s u b s t i t u t e  as in the procedure o u t l i n e d  
in Chapter 3 and the  r e s u l t  i s
Rf (1 -  x)
V -  VL + Di 1 - E(RZ)
(4 -3 )
Note t h a t  i f  x = 0 ,  ( 4 -3 )  reduces to  Equation (3 -2 5 )  and t h a t  i f  
Rf = E(Rz ) ,  (4 -3 )  reduces  to  the  f a m i l i a r  V^‘ = + D^x. By fo l l o w i n g
the  same procedure i l l u s t r a t e d  in Chapter 3 ,  the  required e q u i t y  return  
can be e a s i l y  der ived  and i s  found to  be g iven  as
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E(Rl ' )  = E(Rl ) + [E(Rl ) -  E(RZ)]-
Rf  D.
( 1  -  t ) . ( 4 -4 )
E(RZ> SL'
Note t h a t  the tax  f a c t o r  (1 -  x)  i s  in the zero  to  one in te r v a l  and,  
t h u s ,  f o r c e s  the  s lo p e  o f  the  l i n e  to be lower than i t  would be in the  
absence  o f  t a x e s .  In th e  presence  o f  t a x e s  i n v e s t o r s  req u ir e  even  
sm a l le r  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  premiums.
A T e s ta b le  Equation  
Equation ( 4 - 4 )  can be modif ied  to  produce an equat ion  which i s  
d i r e c t l y  t e s t a b l e  and somewhat e a s i e r  to  work with than ( 4 - 4 ) .  From 
Chapter 3 i t  i s  known t h a t  E(Ry) = E(Ry).  S u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  r e s u l t  and 
the CAPM d e f i n i t i o n  f o r  E(Ry)(Equation ( 3 - 4 ) )  in to  ( 4 -4 )  and 
rearranging g iv e s
E(Rl ‘ ) = E(RZ) + Acov(Ru ,Rm)
D,
1 +
E(RZ ) SL '
( 1  -  x ) (4 -5 )
From the theory  o f  c a p i t a l  a s s e t  p r i c i n g ,  i t  i s  known th a t  Acov(Ry,Rm) = 
[E(Rm) -  E(RZ)] By where By i s  the  beta i f  the  f irm were u n le v e r e d . 1 
S u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  r e s u l t  f o r  Acov(Ry,Rm) in (4 -5 )  l e a v e s
E(Rl ‘ ) = E(RZ) + [E(Rm) -  E(RZ)] By 1 + ( 1  -  t )
E(RZ) SL'
R e c a l l in g  t h a t  the e q u i t y  return  E(Ry')  can be w r i t t e n  in CAPM form 
(Equation ( 3 - 2 2 ) )  and t h a t  Acov(Ry',Rm) i s  e q u i v a l e n t  to  
[ E ^ )  -  E(R )]  B|_' where By1 i s  the  beta l e v e r e d  by adding i n t e r e s t -  
bearing d e b t ,  the CAPM equation f o r  E(Ry') i s  equal to
. ( 4 - 6 )
^ a r k  E. R u b in s te in ,  "A Mean-Variance S y n th e s i s  o f  Corporate  
Financia l  Theory," Journal o f  F inance , 28: 1 77 -8 ,  March, 1973.
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E(Rl ' )  = E(RZ) + [E(Rm) - E(RZ)] By'.  ( 4 -7 )
Comparing (4 -7 )  with  ( 4 - 6 )  r e v e a l s  t h a t
Rf  D.
1 +  — =--------------- (1 -  t )
. E ( R Z ) V
(4 -8 )
or e q u i v a l e n t l y ,
Rf  D,
3i ' = 61, +  B.I — -------------- (1 -  t ) .  (4 -9 )
L U U E(RZ) SL'
Equation ( 4 -9 )  m e r i t s  some d i s c u s s i o n .  F i r s t ,  the concept o f
an unlevered beta w h i le  not u n fa m i l ia r  to  f in a n c e  t h e o r e t i c i a n s  has
2
not  r e c e iv e d  much a t t e n t i o n  in the  l i t e r a t u r e .  Only R ubins te in ,
3 4Hamada, and more r e c e n t l y ,  Copeland and Weston have d e a l t  w ith  the
5
s u b j e c t  in any d e t a i l .  The u n levered  beta  i s  a measure o f  the  
covar ian ce  between the return generated  by the  f i r m ' s  inves tm ents  and 
the  return on the  market p o r t f o l i o .  I t  i s  e a s i l y  seen t h a t  in a 
mean-variance world ,  By i s  the  measure o f  b u s in e ss  r i s k .  Consequently ,  
the MM concept  o f  the  " e q u iv a le n t  r i s k  c l a s s "  i s  rep re se n ted  by f irms
with e q u iv a le n t  un levered  b e t a s .  A f irm with  no l e v e r a g e  would by
Equation ( 4 -9 )  have a l e v e r e d  b e t a ,  By' > equal to By. I t s  t o t a l  r i s k  
would simply  equal i t s  b u s in e s s  r i s k .  As each u n i t  o f  debt were added,
2 Ib id .
Robert S. Hamada, "The E f f e c t  o f  Capital  S tru c tu re  on the  S y s t e ­
matic  Risk o f  Common Stock ,"  Journal o f  F in an ce , 27: 435 -5 2 ,  May, 1972.
^Thomas E. Copeland and J .  Fred Weston, F inancia l  Theory and 
Corporate P o l i c y  (Reading,  M assachuset t s :  Addison-Wesley Pub l i sh in g  
Co.,  1979) ,  p. 294.
£T
The opt ion  p r i c in g  l i t e r a t u r e  has incorporated  the concept  r e ­
f e r r i n g  to  i t  as an " a s s e t  b e ta ."  See Dan Galai and Ronald W. M asu l i s ,  
"The Option P r ic in g  Model and the  Risk Factor o f  Stock,"  Journal o f  
Financia l  Economics,  3: 5 8 - 9 ,  March, 1976.
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By' would in c r e a s e  as i n v e s t o r s  re c o g n iz e  th a t  the a d d i t io n  o f  debt  
r e s u l t s  in the assumption o f  a new type  o f  r i s k ,  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k .  Beta 
i s ,  th u s ,  "hyped up" as debt i s  incremented.  This e f f e c t  i s  t r a n s ­
m i t te d  i n t o  the  c a p i t a l  markets as h igh er  required e q u i t y  r e tu r n s .
In SLM c a p i t a l  market theory  a l l  i n v e s t o r s  and f irms borrow 
and lend a t  the  same r i s k - f r e e  r a t e .  As in d ic a t e d  in the prev ious  
c h a p te r ,  t h i s  assumption i s  invoked by equat ing  to  E(Rz ) .  Equation  
( 4 - 9 ) ,  t h u s ,  reduces to
a r e s u l t  noted in the  works re fe r e n c e d  in f o o t n o t e s  2 ,  3 and 4 .  I t  i s  
apparent t h a t  the advantage  which banks may p o s s e s s  in the  c r e d i t  
markets r e s u l t s  in a lower f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  premium required  by bank 
shareh o ld ers  than required  by f irm s h a r e h o ld e r s .  Empirical e s t im a t io n  
o f  Equation ( 4 - 9 )  and (4 -1 0 )  then p r e s e n t s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  t e s t i n g  
the t h e o r y ' s  h y p o t h e s i s .
Equations ( 4 - 9 )  and (4 -1 0 )  may be j o i n t l y  s t a t e d  as the  l i n e a r
model
j .  i_
where the s u b s c r i p t  j_ r e f e r s  to  the j  f irm .  The hypotheses  are th a t
(4 -10)
banks
B y  ( 1  -  t )  f o r  f irms
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The d i f f e r e n c e ,  i f  any, between the  r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s  f o r  the bank 
and firm samples should  be a t t r i b u t e d  to  the  Rf /E(Rz ) f a c t o r  which 
r e f l e c t s  the  r e l a t i v e  advantage banks have over f irms in the  c r e d i t  
markets.  I f  t h i s  advantage i s  r e a l ,  then  th e  y^ va lu e  f o r  banks should  
be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l e s s  than the y^ va lue  f o r  f i rm s .  At t h i s  p o in t  no 
s ta tem en ts  can be made about the p o s s i b l e  va lue  o f  the  r a t i o  o f  R  ̂ to  
E(RZ) .  In f a c t  an e s t i m a t e  o f  t h i s  r a t i o  i s  not r e a l l y  n e c e s s a r y  as 
long as R  ̂ i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  ( i n  a s t a t i s t i c a l  s e n se )  l e s s  than E(RZ) .
In the next  s e c t i o n ,  however,  some d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l  be presen ted  on how 
e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h i s  r a t i o  might be used.
Several  important c o n d i t i o n s  must hold f o r  (4 -1 1 )  t o  be an 
ordinary  l e a s t  squares r e g r e s s i o n .  The well-known econometr ic  assump­
t i o n s  about the behav ior  o f  the  d i s tu r b a n c e  must be upheld and the  
parameter v a lu e s  o f  y Q and y^ must not vary a c r o s s  f irms in the  sample.  
This l a t t e r  c o n d i t io n  i s  the same as re q u ir in g  t h a t  the  unlevered  
b etas  be c o n s ta n t  a c r o s s  the sample.  That requirement  i s ,  not  
s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  the  same as the  MM e q u iv a le n t  r i s k  c l a s s  assumption.  I t
+■ h
i s  e a s i l y  seen t h a t  i f  Byj v a r i e s  from one j  u n i t  to  th e  n e x t ,  then 
the f irms are not  o f  th e  same b u s in e s s  r i s k  nor are the  r e g r e s s i o n  
parameters s t a b l e .
Another p o in t  t h a t  should be b r i e f l y  mentioned here i s  th a t  
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  the  c o r r e c t  d i r e c t i o n  in the  y^ va lu es  fo r  
banks and f irms w i l l  not  be s u f f i c i e n t  to  v a l i d a t e  the model u n le s s  
the yQ or By v a lu e s  are  the same fo r  the bank and f irm samples.  This  
c o n d i t io n  i s  not l i k e l y  to  hold;  t h e r e f o r e ,  some adjustment f o r  the  
samples' d i f f e r i n g  degrees  o f  b u s in e ss  r i s k  must be made. This p o in t
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w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  in some d e t a i l  l a t e r  and a d i f f e r e n t  t e s t  w i l l  be 
der ived  to  deal  with the problem.
General D is cu ss io n  o f  T es t  Procedures  
In t h i s  s e c t i o n  a r e l a t i v e l y  general  overview o f  the  t e s t  procedures  
w i l l  be p res en ted .  More complete d e t a i l s  w i l l  be g iven in Chapter 5 
where the  t e s t  r e s u l t s  are  a c t u a l l y  p r e s e n te d ,  an a ly ze d ,  and 
i n t e r p r e t e d .
One method o f  t e s t i n g  the theory  w i l l  in v o lv e  a comparison o f  
r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s  f o r  a sample o f  banks with samples o f  non-banks,  
h e n c e fo r th ,  r e fe r r e d  to  as "f irms."  Through a s e t  o f  t e s t s  which w i l l  
be d e t a i l e d  in Chapter 5 ,  r e g r e s s i o n  e s t im a t e s  w i l l  be compared to  the  
th e o r iz e d  parameters o f  Equations ( 4 - 9 )  f o r  banks and (4 -1 0 )  f o r  f i rm s .  
Note t h a t  the o n ly  d i f f e r e n c e  in the two eq u at ion s  i s  the Rf /E(Rz ) 
f a c t o r  in Equation ( 4 - 9 ) .  In ( 4 - 1 0 ) ,  R^/E(Rz ) i s  i m p l i c i t l y  assumed 
to  equal u n i t y ,  r e f l e c t i n g  the absence  f o r  f irms o f  the fa v o r a b le  
borrowing p o s i t i o n  claimed by banks.  Whether R^/E(RZ) = 1 f o r  f irms  
should be reve a led  by the  data .
Another method o f  examining the r e s u l t s  w i l l  i n v o lv e  a comparison  
o f  the  implied  e s t i m a t e s  o f  R^/E(RZ) d er ived  from the bank r e g r e s s i o n s  
with  ex te r n a l  e s t i m a t e s  o f  th a t  r a t i o .  The r i s k - f r e e  r a t e  was obtained  
from p u b l i c l y  quoted money market r a t e s  and the ex pos t  zero  beta  
p o r t f o l i o  re tu rns  were obta ined  from P r o fe s s o r  Richard Roll o f  the  
Graduate School o f  Management o f  th e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  a t  Los
g
A nge les .  The e s t i m a t e s  are the  i n t e r c e p t  e s t im a t e s  from Fama-MacBeth 
£
Eugene F. Fama and James D. MacBeth, "Risk,  Return,  and 
Equil ibr ium: Empirical T e s t s ,"  Journal o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy,
76: 607 -3 6 ,  May-June, 1973.
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t e s t s  which were mentioned in Chapter 2. Some s e r io u s  q u e s t i o n s  can 
be r a i s e d  about the u s e f u l n e s s  and unbiasedness  o f  t h e s e  e s t im a t e s  
and th es e  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  when the r e s u l t s  are p resented  in Chapter 5 ,  
but the re turns  should s t i l l  s erve  a p r a c t i c a l  purpose as some pre­
l im in a r y ,  a l b e i t  im p e r fe c t ,  ev id e nc e  on the m odel' s  accuracy.
The com posi t ion  o f  the samples i s  an important component o f  any 
empir ical  s tudy .  The banks and f irms examined must have a v a i l a b l e  
f i n a n c i a l  s ta tement  data and p u b l i c l y  traded  e q u i t y .  More im p o rta n t ly ,  
they  must be reasonably  homogeneous with  r e s p e c t  to b u s in e ss  r i s k .  Elton
7
and Gruber have shown how the  f a i l u r e  to  con tro l  f o r  b u s in e ss  r i s k  
can b ias  r e s u l t s  o f  t e s t s  o f  e q u i ty  v a lu a t io n  models .  With t h i s  
cavea t  in mind c o n s id e r a b le  care  was taken to p reserve  t h i s  assumption  
and o th er  d e s i r a b l e  q u a l i t i e s .  How t h i s  was done w i l l  be d i s c u s se d  
l a t e r .
The Bank Sample
The bank sample was s e l e c t e d  from COMPUSTAT's bank-and p r i c e -
O
d iv id e n d s -e a r n in g s  f i l e s .  Approximately 136 banks and bank hold ing
companies were a v a i l a b l e ;  however,  not  a l l  o f  them cou ld  be used in
g
each r e g r e s s i o n .  Some had m is s in g  data f o r  c e r t a i n  t ime p er io d s .
Others had to  be e l im in a te d  i f  p re ferred  s to c k  were p res en t  in t h e i r  
f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s  s i n c e  p re fer red  s tock  was not incorporated  in
^Edwin J .  Elton and Martin J.  Gruber, "Homogeneous Groups and the  
T est in g  o f  Economic Hypotheses," Journal o f  Financia l  and Q u a n t i ta t iv e  
A n a l y s i s , 4: 5 82 -5 ,  January,  1970.
8Bank Compustat (New York: I n v e s to r s  Management S c i e n c e s ,  I n c . ) ,  
1979 f i l e s  and PDE Compustat (New York: I n v e s t o r s  Management S c i e n c e s ,  
I n c . ) ,  1978 and 1979 f i l e s .
Q
The time p er iods  examined w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r .
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the model. ^  A few o t h e r s  were j e t t i s o n e d  i f  they  reported  n e g a t iv e  
earnings  per share over  th e  t ime period examined.  This screen ing  
f a c t o r  was des igned  to  e l i m i n a t e  banks th a t  were exp e r i e n c in g  f i n a n c i a l  
problems which might prec lu de  t h e i r  being a b le  to  command any borrowing 
advantage in the  c r e d i t  markets.
The data s cree n in g  process  c o n s id e r a b ly  reduced the number o f  
a v a i l a b l e  banks.  Appearing in the r e g r e s s i o n s  were from 70 to  100 
with around 90 being the  average .  A l i s t i n g  o f  the complete sample o f  
banking f irms i s  p resented  in Appendix C.
I t  was assumed t h a t  the  bank sample was homogeneous with r e s p e c t  
to b u s in e ss  r i s k .  The assumption i s  q u i t e  important and c e r t a i n l y  
s u b j e c t  to  some c r i t i c i s m ;  however,  t h e s e  136 banking o r g a n iz a t i o n s  
are  the l a r g e s t  in the country  and o p e r a te  under a very s i m i l a r  s e t  
o f  r i s k y  c o n d i t i o n s .  Their  re tu rns  are  s u b j e c t  to  s i m i l a r  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  
with  r e s p e c t  to  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and general  economic c o n d i t i o n s .  On the  
c o n tr a r y ,  however,  c e r t a i n  banks have g r e a t e r  exposure in th e  more 
u ncerta in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  arena.
The homogeneity o f  banking i n s t i t u t i o n s  would be a t im e ly  study  
o f  some i n t e r e s t .  No need e x i s t s  f o r  undertaking t h a t  here .
E a r l i e r  in t h i s  rep ort  i t  was noted th a t  the  model a p p l i e s  on ly  to  
l a r g e  banks.  I t  would be na ive  to extend e i t h e r  the  theory  or the  
assumption o f  e q u i v a l e n t  b u s in e ss  r i s k  to  many more than one hundred 
or so banks,  but with a warning o f  c a u t i o n ,  t h i s  research  w i l l  proceed
^ P r e f e r r e d  s tock  could have been b u i l t  i n t o  the model but would 
have u n n e c e s s a r i ly  com pl ica ted  i t  and would have y i e l d e d  no important  
r e s u l t s .
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with the  assumption t h a t  t h i s  s e t  o f  l a r g e  banks with  p u b l i c l y  traded  
s tock  comprise an ap propria te  sample with reason ab le  homogeneity.
The Firm Samples
The samples o f  c o rp o ra te  f irms were more d i f f i c u l t  to  o b ta in .
COMPUSTAT's In d u s tr ia l  and P r ice -D iv id e n d s -E a rn in g s  f i l e s  were the
11primary data s o u r c e s .  Firms with p re fer red  s to c k  were e l im in a te d  
as were f irms with f i s c a l  y ea rs  not ending in  December. The l a t t e r  
requirement c o n s id e r a b ly  s i m p l i f i e d  data c o l l e c t i o n  and computer 
programming. N a tu r a l ly  some f irms had m iss ing  d a ta .  From approximately  
2 ,2 0 0  o r i g i n a l  f irms in the data f i l e s ,  the a v a i l a b l e  s e t  was reduced  
to  257 f irm s .
As d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r  the homogeneity o f  b u s in e ss  r i s k  assumption  
had to  be s a t i s f i e d .  In Chapter 2 the co n tr o v e r sy  over i n d u s t r i e s
being rep re se n ted  by SIC codes  was mentioned.  Given th e  ev idence
a g a i n s t  SIC grouping as  an app ropr ia te  proxy f o r  a r i s k  c l a s s ,  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  procedure was pursued.
S ince  the  concept  o f  a r i s k  c l a s s  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in the  unlevered
b e ta ,  an attempt was made t o  e s t im a te  unlevered b e tas  f o r  the  257 f irm s .
12Hamada der ived  a formula which t h e o r e t i c a l l y  converted  e m p i r i c a l l y  
observed l e v e r e d  s tock  market re turns  in to  un levered  r e t u r n s .  Assuming 
the tax ad ju sted  v e r s io n  o f  the  MM theory were c o r r e c t ,  the  unlevered
return s  are g iven  by the  f o l l o w i n g  equat ion:
^ I n d u s tr ia l  Compustat (New York: I n v e s to r s  Management S c i e n c e s ,  
I n c . ) ,  1979 f i l e s  and PDE Compustat (New York: I n v e s to r s  Management 
S c i e n c e s ,  I n c . ) ,  1978 and 1979 f i l e s .
1 r%
^Hamada, l o c .  c i t .
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R, dt  + cg t  + pt  + V 1 ' (4-12)Ut (V -  T D ) t . j
where Ryt  i s  the un levered  return  in time t ,  d^,  cg^,  p^,  and I t  r e p r e s e n t  
common s tock  cash d i v i d e n d s ,  c a p i t a l  g a i n s ,  p re fer red  s to c k  cash d i v i ­
dends,  and i n t e r e s t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  in t ime period  t ,  t i s  the  ta x  r a t e ,
V and D are the market v a lu e s  o f  the  f irm and d e b t ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  in  
p er iod  t - 1 . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the above equat ion  i s  th a t  p re fer red  
d iv id en d s  (which w i l l  from here on be dropped from t h i s  s tudy)  and the  
tax  a d ju s te d  i n t e r e s t  payments are returned  to  the  s t o c k h o l d e r s .  These  
amounts are con s idered  to  be cash payments t h a t  would accrue  to  the  
owners in the absence  o f  l e v e r a g e .  The f a c t o r  (V -  tD) j i s  th e  va lue  
o f  the  e q u i t y  i f  the  f irm were un levered  and e a s i l y  f o l l o w s  from th e  MM 
e q u a t io n ,  = Vy + rD where Vy i s  the  un levered  e q u i t y  v a l u e .  C le a r l y ,  
Equation (4 -1 2 )  i s  o n ly  a rough approximation o f  the  un levered  e q u i t y  
re tu rn .  I t  assumes t h a t  the investment  and f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n s  are  
u n re la ted  so t h a t  the presen ce  o f  l e v e r a g e  has no e f f e c t  on the typ es  
o f  in ves tm ent  p r o j e c t s  the f irm undertakes .  This assumption might  
not  be a p p rop r ia te  a t  a l l  and i s  a t  l e a s t  v i o l a t e d  to  a minor degree  
by th e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t a x e s  which c r e a t e s  a form o f  n o n -se p a r a t io n  o f  
inves tm ent  and f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n s .  In s p i t e  o f  i t s  w eak nesses ,  the  
approach appears to  be the  on ly  s u i t a b l e  s o l u t i o n  to  the  problem and 
c e r t a i n l y  o f f e r s  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  fu r th e r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  in f in a n c e .
Equation (4 -12 )  can be converted  to  i t s  cou nterp art  in the bank 
f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  model and i s  g iven  as
R,
dt  + c g t  + M 1 ~ (4 -13 )
Ut
( !  -  x ) t
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Each term in (4 -13 )  e x c e p t  the  bracketed  term can be e a s i l y  measured.
For c o r p o r a t io n s  would r e p r e s e n t  the  va lue  o f  the  f i r m ' s  trade  c r e d i t  
or o th er  n o n - i n t e r e s t  bearing debt .  I f  t h i s  t h e o r y ' s  main h y p o th e s i s  
i s  t r u e ,  then f o r  f irms = E(RZ) and the  bracketed  term becomes simply  
t ,  r e f l e c t i n g  the  tax  subs idy  o f  debt  f i n a n c i n g .  S ince  the  o b j e c t i v e  
o f  th e  re sea r ch  i s  to  show t h a t  f o r  f irms R̂  = E(RZ) ,  i t  would not  be 
a p p rop r ia te  to  assume t h a t  the  two v a lu e s  are eq u a l .  I n s t e a d ,  i t  
w i l l  be assumed t h a t  the  r a t i o  o f  R̂  t o  E(RZ) i s  . 5 .  This assumption  
i n j e c t s  a b ia s  in to  the  Ry^'s u n le s s  .5 i s  the  actual  r a t i o ,  but the  
b ia s  i s  a p p l ied  to  a l l  f irm s  in the sample ,  not j u s t  a s e l e c t e d  few.
The Ryt ' s  and By's may be b iased  but should be s a t i s f a c t o r y  when used 
in the  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  to  each o th e r .  S in ce  i t  w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  
be the  r e l a t i v e  rankings  o f  the  By1s t h a t  w i l l  be the  items o f  i n t e r e s t ,  
t h e i r  p r e c i s e  v a lu e s  are o f  a somewhat l e s s o r  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  
i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  to  a t  l e a s t  acknowledge t h a t  the  b ia s  might have a s l i g h t  
e f f e c t  on the r e l a t i v e  rankings  o f  f irms due to  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  degrees  
o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e .
Given the 48 p ercent  co rpora te  ta x  r a t e ,  the  un levered  return  
e s t im a t e s  can be d e r iv e d .  Then a market model r e g r e s s i o n  o f  the form
= 06 i + BUi*W + £ i t  (4 -14)
may be completed.  This r e g r e s s i o n  was run f o r  each f irm i ( i  = 1,  . . . ,  
257) u s in g  q u a r t e r ly  data o ver  the period IQ/1971 through 4Q/1978 fo r
1 O
a t o t a l  o f  32 q u a r t e r ly  o b s e r v a t io n s .  The q u a r t e r ly  re turn  on the
1 O
The use o f  un levered  betas  from the above r e g r e s s i o n  was a l s o  
con s id ered  as a p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  improving th e  homogeneity o f  the bank 
sample but data a v a i l a b i l i t y  and co m p a ra b i l i ty  problems between the  
severa l  data sources  precluded t h i s  o p t io n .
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Standard and Poor 's  500 Stock Index was used as the measure o f  market 
wide re tu rn .  The e s t im a t in g  p rocess  i s  again  s u b j e c t  to  some c r i t i c i s m .  
The small number o f  o b s e r v a t io n s  l i m i t e d  the accuracy o f  the  parameter  
e s t i m a t e s  somewhat, but more o b s e r v a t io n s  would in c r e a s e  th e  l i k e l i h o o d  
o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  the f i r m ' s  b u s in e ss  r i s k  through t im e .  Although the  
b u s in e s s  r i s k  p r o f i l e  o f  a f irm changes on ly  very s l o w l y ,  over  a lo nger  
period  s i g n i f i c a n t  s h i f t s  are sometimes observed .  Some compromise o f  
t h e s e  f a c t o r s  a long with the  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  data a v a i l a b i l i t y  had to  be 
made.
Table 1 p r e s e n t s  some summary s t a t i s t i c s  from the  e s t i m a t e s  o f
both l e v e r e d  and unlevered  be tas  f o r  the sample o f  257 f i r m s .  The most
s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t  i s  the expected  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between the l e v e r e d  and
unlevered  be tas  w ith  the  l e v e r e d  b e tas  n a t u r a l l y  being the l a r g e r .  I t
i s  apparent ,  however,  th a t  th e  le v e r e d  b etas  were not  n e c e s s a r i l y
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  the e n t i r e  market s i n c e  the  average  l e v e r e d  beta
should have been much c l o s e r  to  one.  A p o s s i b l e  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  t h i s
occurrence  might l i e  with the data s cree n in g  procedures  which prevented
the sample from being pure ly  random. I t  i s  not  p o s s i b l e  to t e s t  t h i s
h y p o t h e s i s ,  but a more l i k e l y  e x p la n a t io n  l i e s  in the  use o f  o n ly  32
14q u a r te r ly  o b s e r v a t io n s  in the  r e g r e s s i o n .  Smith has shown t h a t  the  
l e n g th  o f  the in t e r v a l  has a d e f i n i t e  e f f e c t  on beta  e s t i m a t e s  with  
q u a r t e r ly  data producing la r g e r  e s t i m a t e s  than monthly data .  His r e s u l t s ,  
however,  are based on c o n s id e r a b ly  more o b s e r v a t io n s  than used here;  and 
i t  i s  not  c l e a r  what a combination o f  small number o f  o b s e r v a t io n s  and
14Keith V. Smith, "The E f f e c t  o f  I n te r v a l i n g  on Est im ating  
Parameters o f  the  Capital  A sse t  P r ic in g  Model," Journal o f  F inancia l  
and Q u a n t i t a t iv e  A n a l y s i s , 13: 313-32 ,  June,  1978.
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Table 1
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the Sample D i s t r i b u t i o n s  
o f  Levered and Unlevered Betas  
f o r  257 Firms
Levered Unlevered
Mean 1.346 1 .060
Standard D evia t ion .587 .434
Standard Error o f  the Mean .037 .027
Skewness .817 .712
Kurtos is .465 .592
Maximum 3.371 2 .619
Minimum .168 .107
P e r c e n t i l e s





1s t .259 .192
Average Standard Error o f  e .366 .300
q u a r te r ly  data have on the  parameter e s t i m a t e s .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h a t  
i s s u e  i s  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  c u r i o s i t y ,  but probably o f  l i t t l e  importance  
here g iven  th a t  the l e v e r e d  b e tas  were s t i l l  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l a r g e r  than 
the unlevered b e ta s .
The sample o f  257 unlevered betas  were then ranked by s i z e .  I t  
was decided t h a t  two samples would be s e l e c t e d  so th a t  the f i n a l  r e s u l t s
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could  not e a s i l y  be a t t r i b u t e d  to sample s e n s i t i v i t y .  I d e a l l y  each  
sample would c o n s i s t  o f  f irms with the  same unlevered  beta e s t i m a t e s ,  
but t h i s  d e s i r a b l e  property  would be im p o ss ib le  to  ob ta in  g iven  the need 
f o r  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  sample s i z e .  Rather i t  was decided t h a t  a s p e c i f i e d  
range o f  unlevered  b e ta s  would provide  reasonable  homogeneity.  Obviously  
the sm al le r  the range,  th e  more homogeneous the sample,  but the  sm al ler  
the  sample s i z e .  The f i n a l  s e l e c t i o n  became a t r a d e - o f f  between sample 
s i z e  and homogeneity.
Table 2 p r e s e n ts  a l i s t i n g  o f  the number o f  f irms f a l l i n g  in 
s e l e c t e d  ranges o f  un levered  b e t a s .  A c h o ic e  was made to  in c lu d e  a l l  
f irms in the range o f  . 7 0 - . 9 0  in one sample,  h e r e a f t e r  c a l l e d  Sample 1,  
and a l l  f irms in the  range o f  . 9 5 - 1 . 1 5  in the  o th er  sample,  h e r e a f t e r  
c a l l e d  Sample 2 .  A v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  some data n e c e s s a r y  to  a l a t e r  a n a l y s i s  
s e t  the f i n a l  sample s i z e s  a t  61 fo r  Sample 1 and 57 f o r  Sample 2.  
Appendixes D and E provide  l i s t i n g s  o f  th e  f irms in the  two samples.  
Appendix F prov ides  more d e t a i l e d  s t a t i s t i c s  on the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
unlevered be tas  and returns  f o r  Samples 1 and 2.  The d a ta ,  w h i le  
i n t e r e s t i n g ,  have l i t t l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  the s tudy .  I t  should be noted  
th a t  the mean unlevered  beta  f o r  Sample 1 was .81 and f o r  Sample 2 was 
1 . 0 5 .  Though the  two samples ,  th u s ,  appear to  be heterogeneous  with  
r e s p e c t  to  each o t h e r ,  t h i s  f a c t  i s  o f  no s i g n i f i c a n c e  s i n c e  the o b j e c t i v e  
o f  having two samples was simply  to  avoid sample s e n s i t i v e  r e s u l t s .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  c e r t a i n  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  th e s e  t e s t s  can e a s i l y  be 
l e v i e d .  To avoid  some ra th er  obvious  o n e s ,  however,  the fo l l o w i n g  
s e c t i o n s  w i l l  deal  s p e c i f i c a l l y  with problems and s p e c ia l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
in herent  in the t e s t s .
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Table 2
Number o f  Firms in O rig ina l  Sample 
o f  257 F a l l in g  in S e l e c t e d  Ranges 
o f  Unlevered Betas*
Range o f  .20  # Range o f  .15 # Range o f  .10  #
. 7 1 -  .90 69 . 7 1 -  .85 44 . 7 1 -  .80 33
.7 6 -  .95 60 . 7 6 -  .90 48 .7 6 -  .85 30
. 8 1 - 1 . 0 0 56 . 8 1 -  .95 41 . 8 1 -  .90 29
. 8 6 - 1 . 0 5 58 . 86 - 1 .00 45 . 86 -  .95 30
. 9 1 - 1 . 1 0 52 . 9 1 - 1 . 0 5 40 . 9 1 - 1 . 0 0 27
. 9 6 - 1 . 1 5 54 . 9 6 - 1 . 1 0 40 . 9 6 - 1 . 0 5 28
1 . 01- 1 .20 47 1 . 0 1 - 1 . 1 5 39 1 . 01- 1 .10 25
1 . 0 6 - 1 . 2 5 44 1 . 0 6 - 1 . 1 5 26
1 . 11- 1 .20 22
1 . 1 5 - 1 . 2 5 18
*Several  o th er  ranges  were examined.  The above examples were s e l e c t e d  
as being r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
Circumvention o f  F inancia l  In term edia t ion  
A c r i t i c a l  assumption under ly ing  the theory  concerns  the  e f f i c a n c y  
o f  the bank to  hold a natural  monopoly in the f i n a n c i a l  in term e d ia t io n  
p r o c e s s .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  m u l t i p l e  banks i s  p o s s i b l e ,  but no f irm or  
in d iv id u a l  i s  a l lowed t o  circumvent the  f i n a n c i a l  in term e d ia t io n  p r o c e s s .  
Obviously  some r e a l i s m  i s  being s a c r i f i c e d .  The occurrence  o f  p er iods  
o f  f i n a n c i a l  d i s in t e r m e d i a t i o n  i s  c e r t a i n l y  ev idence  that  f irms and 
even i n d i v i d u a l s  can and o f t e n  do bypass the in term ediary .  Financia l  
d i s i n t e r m e d i a t i o n  to  any g r e a t  e x t e n t  tends  to  occur during per iods  
o f  very high i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and r e s u l t s  from c e i l i n g s  on t ime and sav ings  
d e p o s i t  r a t e s .  A more common phenomenon i s  the a b i l i t y  o f  many la r g e  
co rp o ra t io n s  to  borrow in the commercial paper market,  o f t e n t im e s  through 
c a p t iv e  f in a n c e  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  In f a c t  th e s e  f in a n c e  companies such as  
General Motors Acceptance  Corporation might even be con s idered  i n t e r ­
m ediar ies  th em se lves .  The presence  o f  t h i s  f a c t o r  w i l l  make i t  even
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more d i f f i c u l t  to  d e t e c t  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  between f i n a n c i a l  
r i s k  premiums f o r  banks and f irm s .  The samples were examined f o r  the
15presence  o f  f irms i s s u i n g  commercial paper.  Using Mood.y's Bond Record 
which provides  r a t i n g s  o f  commercial paper,  i t  was noted t h a t  n in e teen  
f irms in Sample 1 and n in e  in Sample 2 had commercial paper rated as  
o f  January,  1978. I t  would be h e lp fu l  to simply  r e j e c t  th ose  f irms  
but the sample s i z e s  would become much too s m a l l .  I t  was,  t h u s ,  f e l t  
th a t  t h i s  f a c t o r  could  not  be c o n t r o l l e d ,  b u t ,  i f  a n y th in g ,  would 
r e s u l t  in a downward, c o n s e r v a t i v e  b ia s .
Time Per iods
The dependent v a r i a b l e  i s  the e s t im a t e  o f  the  company's ( l e v e r e d )  
beta obta ined  from a t ime s e r i e s  r e g r e s s i o n  o f  the observed s tock  market  
return  on the  observed  return  on the Standard and Poor 's  500 Stock  
Index,  the  su rroga te  f o r  the  market re tu r n .  Note t h a t  the  independent  
v a r i a b l e  i s  the  d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o ,  a measure observed  a t  a g iven  p o in t  
in t ime.  T h e o r e t i c a l l y  a s p e c i f i c  beta va lue  e x i s t s  a t  a p o in t  in t ime  
and i s  in f lu e n c e d  by the  d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o  a t  the same p o in t  in t ime.  
Since  beta must be e s t im ated  a c r o s s  t im e ,  the dependent and independent  
v a r i a b l e s  are not t i m e - c o n s i s t e n t .  The q u es t ion  then becomes one o f  
measuring the  d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o  a t  e i t h e r  the  beg in n in g ,  midd le ,  or 
end o f  the t ime period over  which beta i s  e s t im a te d .  No c l e a r  ev idence  
e x i s t s  f o r  favor in g  a s p e c i f i c  p o in t  in t ime a t  which to  measure the  
d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o .  Consequently ,  i t  seemed ap prop r ia te  to  examine 
var ious  t ime p o i n t s .
^ Mood.y's Bond Record. New York: Moody's I n v e s to r  S e r v i c e s ,  I n c . ,
January,  1978.
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Beta e s t i m a t e s  were d er ived  us ing monthly data over  t h r e e ,  fo u r ,  
and f i v e  y e a r  p e r i o d s .  The e a r l i e s t  month inc luded  was June,  1979.  The 
f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  data were measured as  o f  year  end 1975,  1976,  1977 
and 1978.  Table 3 l i s t s  the time p er iod s  invo lved  in what came to  a 
t o t a l  o f  twenty r e g r e s s i o n s .  I t  i s  important to note t h a t  th e  twenty  
r e g r e s s i o n s  are c l e a r l y  not  independent and the  r e s u l t s  should not be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  as though th ey  were.  They sh ou ld ,  however,  be s u f f i c i e n t  
f o r  d e t e c t i n g  any ev id e n c e  o f  the  hypothes ized  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
Quest ions  are f r e q u e n t l y  r a i s e d  about the s t a b i l i t y  o f  b e tas  through  
t ime.  This s tudy s u f f e r s  from no s e r i o u s  drawbacks not  a lr e a d y  p resent  
in o th er  s t u d i e s  with r e s p e c t  to  beta  i n s t a b i l i t y .  One p o t e n t i a l  problem 
with  the bank sample,  however,  had to  be addressed .
The con vers ion  o f  many banks to  ho ld ing  companies was a phenomenon
1 ft
o f  freq u en t  occurrence  in  the  e a r l y  y ea rs  o f  the 1970-79 decade.
S ince  some banking o r g a n i z a t i o n s  in the  sample were,  e r g o ,  "banks" a t  
the  beginning o f  the  period and "holding companies" a t  the  end,  a 
s t r u c tu r a l  s h i f t  in beta  might have occurred when the  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  
form was changed. This s h i f t  i f  i t  took p la c e  could  b ia s  th e  r e s u l t s  
o f  the  t e s t s .  Findings  from a s tudy by Brewer and D ukes^  proved to  
be o f  some a id  in examining t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y .
In t h e i r  paper,  Brewer and Dukes examined 41 banking o r g a n iz a t i o n s  
f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  in s l o p e s  and i n t e r c e p t s  ( g ' s  and a ' s )  from r e g r e s s i o n s
1 fi
In Chapter 3 a d i s c u s s i o n  was p resented  on the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
o f  the model to  e i t h e r  the bank or ho ld ing  company form o f  o r g a n iz a t i o n .
^ V i r g i l  L. Brewer and Will iam P. Dukes, "Empirical Evidence on 
the Risk-Return R e la t io n s h ip  Between Banks and Related Bank Holding 
Companies," Review o f  Bus iness  and Economic R esearch , 11: 5 6 -65 ,
Spring ,  1976.
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Table 3
Time Per iods  Involved  in the  
Twenty R egress ions
Debt/Equity  Ratio  
( Independent  V ar iab le )  
Measured a t  Year-End:
Beta (Dependent V ar iab le )  
Estimated Over 
Time Per iod:
No. o f  
Time S e r i e s  
Months
P o s i t i o n  o f  
D/E Ratio in  
Time S e r i e s
1978 12 /75  -  12/78 36 End
12/74  -  12/78 48 End
12/73  -  12/78 60 End
1977 6 /76  -  6 /7 9 36 Centered
12/72 -  12/77 60 End
12/73  -  12/77 48 End
12 /74  -  12 /77 36 End
1976 6/75  -  6 /7 8 36 Centered
12/74  -  12 /78 48 Centered
6 /7 4  -  6 /79 60 Centered
12/71 -  12 /76 60 End
12/72  -  12 /76 48 End
12/73  -  12 /76 36 End
1975 12/70  -  12 /75 60 End
12/71 -  12 /75 48 End
12/72 -  12 /75 36 End
12/73  -  12 /77 48 Centered
6 /7 4  -  6 /77 36 Centered
6 /73  - 6 /78 60 Centered
12/75  -  12 /78 36 Beginning
o f  s e c u r i t y  re turn  on a market index f o r  the t ime period p r io r  to  and 
a f t e r  con vers ion  to  the  ho ld ing  company form o f  o r g a n iz a t i o n .  They 
found t h a t  in e i g h t  c a s e s  beta s h i f t e d  upward a f t e r  con vers ion  to  the  
hold ing  company and in two c a s e s  beta  s h i f t e d  downward. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to  determine whether t h e s e  r e s u l t s  should  be cause f o r  alarm in the  
p res en t  study.  F o r tu n a te ly ,  Brewer and Dukes publ ished  the be fore  and 
a f t e r  beta  e s t im a t e s  f o r  each o f  the  41 banking f irms in t h e i r  paper 
making i t  p o s s i b l e  to  fu r t h e r  analyze  t h e i r  r e s u l t s .  A Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks t e s t  was performed on the Brewer and Dukes
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data to  determine whether the s h i f t s  in beta  were a more general  pheno­
menon or were simply  p res en t  f o r  a few banks.  Ranking the a b s o lu te  
v a lu es  o f  the d i f f e r e n c e s  in the  b e fore  and a f t e r  be tas  and us ing  the  
l a r g e  sample (N>25) approximation o f  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the Wilcoxon 
T - s t a t i s t i c  reve a led  t h a t  th e r e  was no s t r u c t u r a l  s h i f t  in the b e ta s .
The null  h y p o th e s i s  th a t  the b e fore  and a f t e r  b e tas  were equal could  
not  be r e j e c t e d  a t  a reason ab le  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  as the p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  a Type I e rr o r  was .1 9 .  Although c l e a r l y  some s h i f t s  in be tas  o ccu r ,  
i t  can reasonably  be concluded t h a t  such s h i f t s  are few in  number or 
are  a r e s u l t  o f  sampling e r r o r  or e x t e r n a l ,  random, f a c t o r s .
The Returns Generat ion Process  
Modeling th e  re tu rn s  g en era t io n  p r o c e s s  i s  a s u b j e c t  r e c e i v i n g  
c o n s id e r a b le  a t t e n t i o n  in the f in a n c e  l i t e r a t u r e .  R ecent ly  the most
popular approach has been v ia  the  s t o c h a s t i c  c a l c u l u s  in corpora t in g
18
the  f a m i l i a r  Geometric Brownian motion "random walk" p r o c e s s .  This  
methodology has c o n s id e r a b le  t h e o r e t i c a l  a p p e a l ,  but i s  not  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
p r a c t i c a l  f o r  em pir ica l  purposes .  The market model remains the most 
v i a b l e  procedure fo r  modeling the re tu rn s  g en era t io n  p r o c e s s .
The q u es t ion  may a r i s e  as to  whether the  market model i s  appro­
p r i a t e  fo r  d e s c r ib i n g  the  re turn s  ge n e r a t io n  p rocess  where the  Black  
z e r o -b e ta  model i s  the e q u i l ib r iu m  model.  I t  turns  out  t h a t  the model 
i s  s u i t a b l e  a lthough i t  does not  p r e c i s e l y  s p e c i f y  th e  re turns  
generat ion  p r o c e s s .
lO
The approach i s  o u t l i n e d  in Charles W. Haley and Lawrence D. 
S c h a l l ,  The Theory o f  F inan c ia l  D e c i s io n s  (2d. e d . ,  New York: McGraw-
Hi l l  Book C o.,  I n c . ,  1 9 7 9 ) ,  pp. 263-73 .
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19Fama has d i s c u s s e d  t h i s  i s s u e  in h i s  book and some o f  the  
materia l  which f o l l o w s  i s  e x t r a c te d  t h e r e o f  a lthough i t  i s  somewhat 
well  known anyway. Given the z e r o -b e ta  model
E(R.j) = E(RZ) + [E(Rm) -  E(RZ)] g . ,  (4 -15)
i f  i t  i s  assumed th a t  the  re turns  on the  s e c u r i t y ,  the market,  and the  
z e r o - b e ta  p o r t f o l i o  are t r i v a r i a t e  normally d i s t r i b u t e d ,  the  p rocess  
may be modeled as
Ri t  “ “ i + Bi z Rz t  + s imRmt + e i t  ( 4 ‘ 16)
where th ere  are now two "beta" f a c t o r s  in a d d i t io n  to  an "alpha." I t
i s  known th a t
- E(Rn ) - 61zE(Rn ) - BimE(Rm t ), (4-17)
cov (R . ,R  ) cov (R . ,R  )
6 j 7 =  a and e jm => — -  ] m ■ (4-18)
, z  n  ( R z )  " "  a  ( R m )
An e q u iv a le n t  v e r s io n  o f  (4 -1 5 )  uses  the f a c t  th a t  g.  = 1 -  g ^  so 
t h a t
Ri t  '  a i + 11 •  6 im)Rz t  + e imRmt + e i t  ( 4 ' 19)
or
Ri t  '  “ i + Rz t  + Bim(Rmt • Rzt> + Ei f  (4 ' 20)
I f  the market i s  e f f i c i e n t ,  then = 0 . 0  and the  model i s  g iven  as
Rn  ■ Rz t  + -  Rzt> + ; i r  ( 4 - 21)
which d i f f e r s  s l i g h t l y  from the  b a s i c  market model.  The most n otab le
d i f f e r e n c e  i s  seen  in ( 4 - 1 9 ) .  I f  R ^  i s  r eg r essed  on R ^ ,  as in the
market model,  and (4 -1 9 )  i s  the  c o r r e c t  p r o c e s s ,  then the  r e g r e s s i o n
has an "omitted" v a r i a b l e ,  R t .
19Eugene F. Fama, Foundations o f  Finance (New York: Basic  Books.
1 976 ) ,  pp. 371-5 .
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The s t a t i s t i c a l  consequences  o f  an omit ted  v a r i a b l e  are  d i s c u s s e d
20  ~  in Kmenta. I t  i s  co n v en ie n t  th a t  Rz t  and R  ̂ are  independent because
t h i s  f a c t  guarantees  unbiasedness  in th e  e s t i m a t e .  Unless  Rz t  = 0 . 0 ,
2  A
a i s  b i a s e d ,  and in any case  a ( 3 ^ )  i s  upwardly b ia s e d .  These problems,
A
however,  are  o f  no i n t e r e s t  here s i n c e  a .  w i l l  not be used a t  a l l ,  and
A
3 imwi 11 not  need to be t e s t e d  fo r  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Other v a r i a b l e s  might  
be er r o n e o u s ly  omit ted  a lthough th e r e  i s  no reason to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  they  
are;  but o t h e r w is e ,  the s i n g l e  f a c t o r  market model i s  q u i t e  s u i t a b l e  
f o r  th e  purposes o f  t h i s  s tudy.
Errors in Measurement o f  g 
A freq u en t  concern in econometric  t e s t s  o f  the  c a p i t a l  a s s e t  p r ic in g  
model has been the  e r r o r  p res en t  in the measurement o f  b e ta .  S ince  
beta  e s t im a te d  from a t ime s e r i e s  r e g r e s s i o n  o b v io u s ly  c o n ta in s  e r r o r ,  
i t s  in c o r p o r a t io n  as an independent v a r i a b l e  in c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  
r e g r e s s i o n s  o f  the average s e c u r i t y  return on beta  r e s u l t s  in i n c o n s i s t e n t
ordinary  l e a s t  squares  e s t im a to r s  and a s lo p e  e s t i m a t e  which underes t im ates
21the  true  parameter.  In the  t e s t s  performed h ere ,  however,  th e  measure­
ment e rr o r  i s  in  the  dependent v a r i a b l e .  The consequences  o f  measurement  
e rror  in the dependent v a r i a b l e  are somewhat t r i v i a l .  I f  the measurement 
error  meets th e  same assumptions  as th ose  o f  the re s id u a l  d i s tu rb a n c e  
term and the  err o r  and re s id u a l  are u n c o r r e l a t e d ,  then the ordinary  
l e a s t  squares  e s t im a t o r s  are  unbiased and c o n s i s t e n t .  One l e s s  than
on
Jan Kmenta, Elements o f  Econometrics (New York: Macmillan
Pu b l i sh in g  C o.,  I n c . ,  1 9 7 1 ) ,  pp. 392-5 .
^ G .  S. Maddala, Econometrics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1977) ,  pp. 158-9 and 292-4 .
94
d e s i r a b l e  p rop erty ,  however,  i s  th a t  the  va r ia n c e  o f  the r e s i d u a l s  w i l l  
be i n f l a t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  the  measurement e rr o r  in the  dependent v a r i a b l e  
f a l l i n g  in to  th e  r e s i d u a l s .  A search through severa l  econometrics  t e x t s  
turned up no formal proofs  o f  t h e s e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  so proofs  were der ived  
and are  presented  in Appendix G.
The im p l i c a t io n  o f  i n f l a t e d  r e s id u a l  va r ia n c e  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  minor.  
The la r g e r  re s id u a l  var ianc e  r e s u l t s  in l a r g e r  standard er r o r s  o f
/*. /V
Yg and Yj. The standard e r r o r s  o f  the  e s t im a t o r s  are  c e r t a i n l y  important  
in s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  but the i n f l a t e d  error  var iance  
i n j e c t s  a c o n s e r v a t iv e  downward b ia s  in the t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  which 
renders i t  somewhat more d i f f i c u l t  to r e j e c t  nu ll  hypotheses  in 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  t e s t s .  I f  the  null  h y p o th e s i s  can be r e j e c t e d ,  c o n c lu s io n s  
drawn can,  t h u s ,  be supported with more c o n f id e n c e  than u su a l .
Omitted V ar iab le s  
The problem o f  omit ted  v a r i a b l e s  was d i s c u s s e d  with r e s p e c t  to  
th e  e x c l u s i o n  o f  an R t  f a c t o r  in the  market model r e g r e s s i o n s .  In the  
r e g r e s s i o n  o f  beta on l e v e r a g e ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  th a t  o th e r  v a r i a b l e s  
should be inc luded  in the model.  I f  the  omit ted  v a r i a b l e ( s )  are
c o r r e l a t e d  with  the  inc luded  v a r i a b l e ,  both s l o p e  and i n t e r c e p t  e s t im a t e s
22are  b iased  and i n c o n s i s t e n t .  Previous  s t u d i e s  have attempted to  
p r e d ic t  beta  from account ing  data and have g e n e r a l l y  employed m u l t i p l e
23r e g r e s s i o n  with a t  l e a s t  two v a r i a b l e s  being s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .
22 Kmenta, l o c .  c i t .
23 No l e s s  than seven s t u d i e s  were lo c a t e d  in l e a d in g  f in an ce  
j o u r n a l s .  A few o f  the  more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  ones are Will iam J .  Breen 
and Eugene M. Lerner,  "Corporate F inancia l  P o l i c i e s  and Market Measures 
o f  Risk and Return," Journal o f  F inan ce , 28: 339 -52 ,  May, 1973; Barr
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I t  i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  t ru e  t h a t  th e s e  models are more a p p r o p r ia te ly  
s p e c i f i e d .  More than l i k e l y  they  are not  s i n c e  th ey  are not supported  
by any economic th eory .  They are to  be more p r e c i s e ,  ad hoc models  
which simply  use any and a l l  f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s  to  p r e d ic t  b e ta .  I t  i s  
f e l t  th a t  the model developed in Chapter 3 captures  the  e f f e c t  o f  o ther  
v a r i a b l e s  in the i n t e r c e p t  term, g y .  S in ce  t o t a l  r i s k  c o n s i s t s  on ly  
o f  b u s in e ss  and f i n a n c i a l  r i s k ,  the v a r i a b l e s  inc luded  in m u l t i p l e  
r e g r e s s i o n  models must be s u rro g a te s  f o r  t h e s e  two forms o f  r i s k .
The captur ing  o f  gy and the d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o  should be a more 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  approach and should preclude  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  o ther  
v a r i a b l e s .
One p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  an om it ted  v a r i a b l e ,  however,  r e s u l t s  from 
the  measurement o f  the d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o  which in c l u d e s  a l l  i n t e r e s t  
bearing  debt .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  i t  was n e c e s s a r y  to  comingle  a l l  forms 
o f  debt  to  avoid having a much more complicated  model and one which 
i s  u n es t im atab le  due i t s  r e q u ir in g  severa l  i m p l i c i t  v a r i a b l e s .  For 
example,  i f  the f irm had r i s k - f r e e  short - term  debt and r i s k y  long  
term d e b t ,  i t  would be n e c e s s a r y  to  measure the v a lu e  o f  the  e q u i t y  with
Rosenberg and Walt McKibben, "The P r e d ic t io n  o f  Sys tem at ic  and S p e c i f i c  
Risk in  Common S tocks ,"  Journal o f  F inancia l  and Q u a n t i t a t iv e  A n a l y s i s ,
8: 317 -33 ,  March, 1973; and Donald J .  Thompson, "Sources o f  Sys te m at ic
Risk in Common S tocks ,"  Journal o f  B u s i n e s s , 47: 173-88 ,  A p r i l ,  1974.
Also in Barr Rosenberg and P h i l l i p  R. Perry ,  "The Fundamental D eter­
minants o f  Risk in Banking," Proceedings  From a Conference on Bank 
S tru c tu re  and Competit ion (Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank o f  Chicago,
1978) ,  pp. 402 -7 7 ,  m u l t i p l e  r e g r e s s i o n  was ap p l ied  to the  p r e d ic t i o n  
o f  bank b e t a s .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  g e n e r a l l y  confirm the  
h yp othes i s  th a t  l e v e r a g e  i s  r e l a t e d  to  beta  but th ere  was c o n s id e r a b le  
i n c o n s i s t e n c y  from t e s t  to  t e s t .  In Uri Ben-Zion and Sol S h a l i t ,
" S iz e ,  Leverage,  and Dividend Record as Determinants o f  Equity Risk,"  
Journal o f  F inance , 30: 1015-26 ,  September,  1975,  r e g r e s s i o n  o f  beta  
on l e v e r a g e  was performed on about 1 ,000  f irm s .  The r e s u l t s  showed a 
p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  but revea l  no i n s i g h t s  on the q u es t io n  a t  hand 
s i n c e  no at tempt was made to  contro l  b u s ine ss  r i s k .
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the e f f e c t s  o f  long and s h o r t  term debt removed, the  v a lu e  o f  the  
e q u i t y  i f  the  f irm had o n l y  s h o r t  term d e b t ,  and the bond beta .
Obviously  c o n s id e r a b le  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  was n e c e s s a r y ,  and i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
t rue  t h a t  some problems w i l l  no doubt be a r e s u l t  o f  the comingl ing  o f  
debt and incomple te  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  what may w e l l  be a f a r  more complex 
p r o c e s s .
E f f e c t s  o f  the  T r a d i t io n a l  Theory o f  Finance
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between beta  and le v e r a g e  f o r  the  f irms has been 
assumed to  be d es c r ib e d  by th e  MM theory .  As in d i c a t e d  in Chapter 2 ,  
th e  MM theory  has not  been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  t e s t e d .  Any r e l i a n c e  on the  
v a l i d i t y  o f  the  MM theory  must be held  with guarded c a u t io n .  The 
a l t e r n a t i v e  argument,  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  th eory  o f  co rpora te  f i n a n c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e ,  could  e a s i l y  have an e f f e c t  on the  r e s u l t s .
Under the  t r a d i t i o n a l  theory  and with  no t a x e s ,  as debt i s  added 
the  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  premium required  by s to c k h o ld e r s  does  not i n c r e a s e  
by a l a r g e  enough amount to  c o m p le te ly  o f f s e t  the  in c r e a s e  in the  
exp ected  e q u i t y  re turn  r e s u l t i n g  from the use  o f  l e v e r a g e .  No economic  
r a t i o n a l e  e x i s t s  t o  e x p la i n  t h i s  argument. I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  assumed 
th a t  i n v e s t o r s  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  l e v e r a g e  i s  b e n e f i c i a l  up to  a c e r t a i n  
degree .  I f  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  argument i s  v a l i d ,  t h e s l o p e s o f  both the  
bank and f irm r e g r e s s i o n s  are lower than g iven  by Equations ( 4 - 9 )  and 
( 4 - 1 0 ) .  Some m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  f a c t o r  which i s  between zero  and one would 
i m p l i c i t l y  appear in th e  model and produce a lower s l o p e .  While r e c o g ­
n i t i o n  o f  the t r a d i t i o n a l  theory  co m p l i c a te s  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  somewhat,  
i t  prov ides  a p o s s i b l e  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  a lower than hypothes ized  s lo p e
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e s t im a t e  and does  not  a f f e c t  the  major im p l i c a t io n  o f  banks' f i n a n c i a l  
r i s k  premiums being sm a l le r  than th ose  o f  f i rm s .
Book or Market Value Data 
The theory  i s  s p e c i f i e d  in terms o f  market va lu e  d a ta .  The book 
va lu e  o f  the  banks' and f irm s'  debt in a d d i t io n  to  the  market v a lu e s  
w i l l ,  however,  be used in order  t o  avo id  the data c o l l e c t i o n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
o f  o b ta in in g  market p r i c e s  fo r  the d ebt .  S ince  much o f  the debt  i s  
non-marketable ,  the  concept  o f  a market va lu e  may well  be m ean in g le ss  
in  many c a s e s .  For the e q u i t y ,  however,  market va lue  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
m ea n in g fu l .
C onsiderable  debate  has ensued over  the  use o f  book or market
24v a lu e s  in t e s t s  such as t h e s e .  Market va lue  measures may d i s t o r t  t e s t  
r e s u l t s .  I f  the  s to c k  market had a major movement on the  day o f  
measurement o f  the d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o ,  the  r a t i o  may not a c c u r a t e l y  r e f l e c t  
th e  normal,  r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  le v e r a g e  o f  th e  company. Book va lue  
measures may provide  b e t t e r  e s t i m a t e s  o f  the  l e v e r a g e ,  and t h u s ,  have 
some m er i t  in t h e m s e lv e s .  In the t e s t s  conducted here and reported  in  
Chapter 5 both book and market va lu e  measures w i l l  be used in the hope 
t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one w i l l  prove to  be a s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r .
Ex Post  Versus Ex Ante Data 
V i r t u a l l y  any economic theory  in v o lv in g  u n c e r t a in t y  r e q u ir e s  the  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  ex ante  v a r i a b l e s .  As i s  the usual c a s e ,  o n ly  ex pos t  
data are a v a i l a b l e .  No s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  to  t h i s  problem has 
ever  appeared in the  f in a n c e  and economics l i t e r a t u r e .  G enera l ly
2 4 The debate has appeared in severa l  o f  the s t u d i e s  reviewed in 
Chapter 2 e s p e c i a l l y  th o s e  o f  Barges ,  Wippern, and Brigham and Gordon.
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assumed i s  t h a t  in the  long run,  e x p e c t a t i o n s  are r e a l i z e d  so th a t  no 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y  between ex ante  and ex p o s t  data e x i s t s .  S ince  t h i s  
study i s  no d i f f e r e n t  from any other  with r e s p e c t  to  t h i s  problem,  
th e r e  i s  l i t t l e  t h a t  can or need be done about i t .
The b a s ic  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  t e s t i n g  procedure has now been o u t l i n e d .  
Chapter 5 p r e s e n ts  a more d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the d a t a ,  the  
s p e c i f i c  t e s t s  employed,  and the r e s u l t s .
Chapter 5
EMPIRICAL TESTS
In t h i s  ch ap ter  the  r e s u l t s  o f  the  empir ica l  t e s t s  which were 
performed on the bank and f irm samples w i l l  be p resen ted .  I n i t i a l l y  
th e  bank r e s u l t s  w i l l  be reported  and d i s c u s s e d  with  emphasis  placed  
on the  e x t e n t  to  which the data agree  or  d i s a g r e e  with the model.  Next,  
the  f irm r e s u l t s  w i l l  be p res en ted .  While i n t e r e s t i n g  in th e m s e lv e s ,  
the  f irm r e s u l t s  become on ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  when they  are viewed in 
comparison with  the bank r e s u l t s .  I t  w i l l  be shown th a t  the s t a t i s t i c a l  
im p l i c a t i o n s  are  a t  l e a s t  c o n s i s t e n t  with  a world in which banks 
command an advantage over f irms in  t h e i r  f in a n c in g  o p e r a t i o n s .  The 
r e s u l t s  w i l l ,  th u s ,  prove to  be su pp or t ive  o f  the  th eory  but should  
be regarded as p re l im in ary  in nature .
The Bank T e s t s
As i t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d ,  the  complete bank sample c o n s i s t e d  o f  136 
banking f i r m s .  Not a l l  o f  the f irms appeared in each r e g r e s s i o n .  The 
sample s t a t i s t i c s  which w i l l  i n i t i a l l y  be reviewed are based on the  
f u l l  sample.
Table 4 p r e s e n t s  s t a t i s t i c s  from the  t ime s e r i e s  e s t i m a t e s  o f  the  
bank b e tas  based on monthly data and over  th e  p er iods  d i s c u s s e d  in  
Chapter 4.  The average beta  d id  not vary much from one per iod to the  
n ext;  but s i n c e  some o f  the  t ime p er iods  over lap ped ,  the r e s u l t  i s  not  
s u r p r i s i n g .  The average bank beta  appeared to  be about . 9 0 .  This  




Sample S t a t i s t i c s  from Estimated  
Bank Beta C o e f f i c i e n t s
(N = 136)
Estimated Over I a Skewness* Kurtos is*
12/70 - 12/75 .94 .33 .42 .50
12/71 - 12/75 .94 .37 .42 .52
12/71 -  12/76 .97 .33 .29 .35
12/72 - 12/75 .94 .38 .49 .67
12/72 -  12/76 .99 .34 .32 .41
12/72 - 12/77 .95 .33 .31 .24
12/73 -  12 /76 .98 .38 .44 .59
12/73 -  12/77 .93 .36 .46 .38
6 /74 - 6 /77 .90 .37 .52 .50
12/74 -  12/77 1 .01 .41 .06 .03
6 /73 - 6 /78 .92 .34 .28 .14
12/73 - 12 /78 .91 .35 .42 .23
6/74 - 6 /79 .87 .34 .43 .27
6/75 - 6 /78 .76 .37 .11 - . 3 0
12/74 - 12/78 .95 .37 .08 .00
12/75 - 12/78 .85 .37 .39 1.63
6/76 - 6 /79 .79 .41 .78 3.01
*Both Skewness and Kurtos is  s t a t i s t i c s  should equal zero  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .
for■ a normal
Rosenberg and Guy'*' who obta ined  an average bank beta  o f  . 81
2
and Chance
whose average bank beta was .7 2 .  The d i f f e r e n c e  r e f l e c t s a d i f f e r e n t
i
Barr Rosenberg and James Guy, " P red ic t ion  o f  Beta From Investment  
Fundamentals," F inancia l  A n alys ts  J o u r n a l , 32: 6 2 - 7 0 ,  Ju ly /A u g u s t ,  1976.
2
Don M. Chance, "Comment: A Test  o f  S t o n e ' s  Two-Index Model o f  
Returns," Journal o f  F inancia l  and Q u a n t i t a t iv e  A n a l y s i s , 14: 6 41 -4 ,  
September,  1979.
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t ime per iod invo lved  but in rea l  terms may i n d i c a t e  an upward s h i f t  
o f  bank b u s in e ss  and/or f i n a n c i a l  r i s k .
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov t e s t  was performed on each c r o s s - s e c t i o n  
sample o f  beta  e s t i m a t e s .  In each o f  the 17 c a s e s  the  null  h yp oth e s i s  
t h a t  the sample was drawn from a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  could not  be 
r e j e c t e d  a t  a f i v e  p ercen t  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Visual  examination  
o f  h is tograms f u r th e r  r ev e a led  t h a t  the  sample d i s t r i b u t i o n s  were 
reasonably  approximated by the  normal d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Although normali ty  
i s  not  a c r i t i c a l  assumption and ev idence  a g a i n s t  i t  would not n e c e s s a r i l y  
be grounds f o r  abandoning the t e s t s ,  i t  does provide a small degree o f  
comfort to any r e s e a r c h e r .
In Table 5 sample s t a t i s t i c s  from c a l c u l a t e d  d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o s  
o f  the  banks are p r e s e n te d .  Examining f i r s t  the book va lue  r a t i o s ,  
i t  i s  noted t h a t  l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  e x i s t s  between the mean r a t i o s  o f  
th e  banks over the  fou r  y e a r s .  Of n o t e ,  however,  i s  the f a c t  th a t  the  
average r a t i o  does i n c r e a s e  s l i g h t l y  each year  from 1975 through 1978.
The r e s u l t  i s  a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  the  d e c l i n i n g  c a p i t a l  r a t i o s  o f  banks,  
a f a c t  th a t  has so alarmed r e g u l a t o r s .  Looking a t  market va lue  r a t i o s ,  
however,  r e v e a l s  t h a t  th e r e  was a c t u a l l y  no s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  in 
the  r a t i o  o f  debt to  e q u i t y .  In f a c t  th ere  was an e a r l y  d ecre ase  fo l low ed  
by a s l i g h t  i n c r e a s e  r e s u l t i n g  in a 1978 r a t i o  t h a t  was o n ly  s l i g h t l y  
below the 1975 r a t i o .  Note th a t  the standard d e v ia t i o n  o f  the market 
v a lu e  r a t i o s  was more than one and o n e - h a l f  t imes  the standard d e v ia t i o n  
o f  the  book va lu e  r a t i o s  r e f l e c t i n g  the more v a r i a b l e  market v a lu e s .
Also i t  should be noted th a t  the market v a lu e  r a t i o s  exceeded the book 
va lue  r a t i o s  s i n c e  most bank s to c k s  s e l l  f o r  l e s s  than book v a lu e .
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Table 5
Sample S t a t i s t i c s  From 
Debt /Equity  R at ios  o f  Banks
(N = 136)
Year Mean a Skewness Kurtos is
Book Value
1978 11.59 3 .1 2 .88 1 .69
1977 11.00 3 .2 6 1.05 1 .74
1976 10 .87 3 .4 4 .89 .95
1975 10.21 3 .3 7 .98 1 .50
Market Value
1978 15 .74 5 .4 5 .46 - . 5 0
1977 14 .62 5.27 .50 - . 3 3
1976 13 .75 5 .82 1 .04 1 .19
1975 15 .89 6 .72 .89 .51
F i n a l l y ,  the Kolmogorov-Smirnov t e s t s  f a i l e d  to  r e j e c t  the h yp oth e s i s  
o f  norm al i ty  in both book and market v a lu e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  and f o r  each o f  
the fou r  y e a r s .
The R egress ion  R esu l t s  
The twenty bank r e g r e s s i o n s  were e s t im a ted  and th e  r e s u l t s  are  
p resented  in Table  6.  O n e - t a i l e d  t e s t s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  were used
because both s lo p e  and i n t e r c e p t  should be n o n -n e g a t iv e .  Recall  th a t
the dependent v a r i a b l e  i s  the  t ime s e r i e s  beta  e s t im a ted  over  the  
p er iods  in d ic a t e d  and the  independent  v a r i a b l e  i s  the  d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o  
measured a t  e i t h e r  1 2 /7 5 ,  1 2 /7 6 ,  1 2 /7 7 ,  or 12 /78 .  The book va lue
r e s u l t s  w i l l  f i r s t  be d i s c u s s e d .
Table 6
Bank Regress ions
Book Value Market Value







1978 12/75 - 12/78 92 ,513**
( .1 2 7 )
.028**
( .0 1 1 )
.073 92 .850**
( .1 0 5 )
- . 0 0 1
( .0 0 6 )
.000
12/74 - 12 /78 92 .581**
( .1 3 7 )
.030**
( .0 1 1 )
.073 92 .923**
( .1 1 4 )
.001
( .0 0 7 )
.000
12/73 - 12/78 91 .486**
( .1 3 3 )
.038**
( . o n )
.114 91 .857**
( .1 1 4 )
.004
( .0 0 7 )
.004
1977 6/76 - 6 /79 94 .470**
( .1 3 5 )
.028**
( .0 1 2 )
.059 94 .695**
( ,1 1 7 )
.006
( .0 0 8
.007
12/72 - 12/77 92 .701**
( .1 1 9 )
.022**
( .0 1 0 )
.049 92 .986**  
( .1 0 4 )
- . 0 0 3
( .0 0 7 )
.002
12/73 -  12/77 96 .611**
( .1 2 8 )
.028**
( .0 1 1 )
.062 96 .910**
( .1 1 2 )
.001
( .0 0 7 )
.000
12/74 -  12/77 97 .759**
( .1 3 9 )
.017*
( .0 1 2 )
.021 97 1.023**
( .1 1 8 )
- .0 0 5
( .0 0 7 )
.005
1976 6/75 -  6 /78 99 .532**
( .1 2 3 )
.021**
( .0 1 1 )
.036 99 .836**
( .0 1 0 )
- .0 0 6
( .0 0 6 )
.008
12/74 -  12/78 99 .672**
( .1 2 0 )
.022**
( .0 1 0 )
.045 99 .922**
( .0 9 4 )
- . 0 0 0
( .0 0 6 )
.000
6 /74 - 6 /79 98 .543**
( .1 1 0 )
.029**
( .0 1 0 )
.089 98 .863**
( .0 8 9 )
.000
( .0 0 6 )
.000
Table 6 (continued)
Book Value Market Value









12/71 -  12 /76 93 .625**
( . 112 )
.031**
( . 0 10 )
.100 93 .956**
( .0 8 9 )
.001
( .0 0 6 )
.000
12/72 -  12/76 96 .717**
( .1 1 3 )
.023**
( . 010 )
.058 96 1.013**
( .0 9 0 )
- . 0 0 3
( .0 0 6 )
.002
12/73  -  12/76 100 .622**
( . 122)
.031**
( . 011 )
.079 100 .952**
( .0 9 9 )
.001
( .0 0 7 )
.000
1975 12/70 -  12/75 79 .588**
( . 120 )
.032**
( . 011 )
.100 79 .947**
( .0 9 8 )
- .0 0 2
( .0 0 6 )
.001
12/71 -  12/75 93 .527**
( .1 1 8 )
.039**




( .0 0 6 )
.003
12/72 -  12/75 96 .580**
( . 121 )
.034**
( . 011 )
.089 96 .924**
( .1 0 3 )
.000
( .0 0 6 )
.000
12/73 -  12/77 100 .544**
( . 111)
.036**
( . 010 )
.108 100 .879**
( .0 9 5 )
.002
( .0 0 5 )
.001
6 /74  -  6 /77 101 .537**
( .1 1 3 )
.033**  
( . 0 11 )
.093 : 101 .873**
( .0 9 6 )
.000
( . 0 0 6 )
.000
6 /73  -  6 /78 98 .589**
( .1 0 5 )
.031**
( . 010 )
.094 98 .880**
( .0 8 8 )
.002
( .0 0 5 )
.001
* * S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t
12/75 -  12/78
.05 l e v e l .
.1 0  l e v e l .
99 .593**
( ,1 0 7 )
.023**
( . 0 1 0 )
.051 99 .772**
( .0 8 8 )
.003




The R ' s  were ra th e r  low,  but t h i s  r e s u l t  was expected  g iven  th a t  
the dependent v a r i a b l e  i s  measured with  e r r o r .  This problem, as  
d i s c u s s e d  in the prev ious  chap ter  and in Appendix F, a l s o  tended to  
hold down the s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the e s t i m a t e s .  N o n e th e le s s ,  a l l  o f  
the  i n t e r c e p t s  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the .05 l e v e l ,  and a l l  but one 
s lo p e  was s i g n f i c a n t  a t  the .05 l e v e l  and the remaining one was 
s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the .1 0  l e v e l .
The market va lue  r e s u l t s  were somewhat d i s a p p o i n t i n g .  None o f  
the s l o p e s  were s i g n i f i c a n t .  Some o f  the  r e g r e s s i o n s  had n e g a t i v e ,  
though i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  s l o p e s .  C l e a r l y ,  market v a l u e - d e b t / e q u i t y ,  
w h i le  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  sound, i s  not  a s u i t a b l e  proxy fo r  l e v e r a g e .  This  
co n c lu s io n  could  not be upheld were i t  not f o r  the  s u p p o r t iv e  r e s u l t s  
found us ing  book v a lu e .  Book v a lu e ,  th u s ,  as i t  has been argued
3
e l se w h e r e ,  does have some v a l i d i t y ,  w h i le  le nd in g  a measure o f  
s t a b i l i t y  to  e s t im a t e s  o f  the  banks' l e v e r a g e .
In any r e g r e s s i o n  i t  i s  important to c o n s id e r  the  e f f e c t  o f  
o u t l i e r s .  The sampling d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o s ,  though  
approximately  normally d i s t r i b u t e d ,  was found t o  c o n ta in  some o u t l y i n g  
o b s e r v a t io n s  which cou ld  have d i s t o r t e d  the r e s u l t s .  S in ce  the d e b t /  
e q u i t y  r a t i o  i s  bounded from below by zero  but has no upper l i m i t ,  the  
banks with  high d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o s  could  e a s i l y  pull  th e  l i n e  o f  b e s t  
f i t  up i f  t h e i r  beta  e s t i m a t e s  were very high or down i f  t h e i r  e s t im a t e s  
were very low. In a l a t e r  s e c t i o n  i t  w i l l  be shown t h a t  the o u t l i e r  
problem was more pronounced f o r  the  f irm sample than f o r  th e  bank
Will iam Beranek,  "The Weighted Average Cost o f  Capital  and 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization," Journal o f  F inancia l  and Q u a n t i t a t iv e  
A n a l y s i s , 12: 17 -31 ,  March, 1977.
106
sample.  I t  was,  t h u s ,  n e c e s s a r y  to  e s t im a te  the bank r e g r e s s i o n s  with  a 
reduced sample so t h a t  they  would be placed on a more comparat ive  b a s i s  
with  the f irm s .
The treatm ent  o f  o u t l i e r  o b s e r v a t io n s  i s  a complex s t a t i s t i c a l  
c o n tr o v e r sy .  For the  purposes here i t  seemed b e s t  not  to  i n j e c t  a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  amount o f  t h i s  s e l f - i n d u c e d  b i a s ,  but ra th er  to  remove 
on ly  a few o b s e r v a t i o n s .  As a rough approxim ation ,  o b s e r v a t io n s  which 
were more than 1 .645  standard d e v i a t i o n s  to  the r i g h t  o f  the mean were 
d e l e t e d .  In a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  t h i s  maneuver would e l i m i n a t e  the  
l a r g e s t  f i v e  p ercen t  o f  the  i tem s .
The r e s u l t s  o f  the  reduced sample r e g r e s s i o n s  are p resented  in  
Table 7.  Anywhere from f i v e  to  e i g h t  fewer o b s e r v a t io n s  were used in  
th e  r e g r e s s i o n s .  The r e s u l t s ,  however,  were not a p p r e c ia b ly  d i f f e r e n t .  
Two o f  the book va lue  r e g r e s s i o n s  which were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  .05  
l e v e l  b e fo re  were here s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  .10  l e v e l ,  but o t h e r w i s e ,  
th e  r e s u l t s  were e s s e n t i a l l y  th e  same. A l s o ,  the market va lu e  r e g r e s ­
s io n s  were b a s i c a l l y  u n a f f e c t e d .
Comparison With Est im ates  o f  the R.p/E(RZ) Ratio
From Equations ( 4 - 9 )  and ( 4 - 1 1 ) ,  i t  i s  apparent t h a t  the s lo p e
A ~  A
c o e f f i c i e n t ,  Y ^ ,  should  be equal t o  6y(Rf /E(Rz ) ) ( 1  -  t ) .  S ince  y q should  
equal 8y,  then should be e q u iv a l e n t  to  Yg(Rf / E(Rz ) ) (1  " T)* Given 
an independent e s t im a t e  o f  the  R^/E(RZ) r a t i o ,  and the f a c t  th a t  
x = . 4 8 ,  an implied  s lo p e  can be computed and compared to  the  actual  
s l o p e .
The E(RZ) e s t i m a t e s  as  in d ic a t e d  e a r l i e r  were obta ined  from 
P r o f e s s o r  Richard Roll o f  the Graduate School o f  Management o f  UCLA.
Bank R egress ions  
(Reduced Sample)
Book Value Market Value




Y1 R2 Obs. Y0
A
Y1 R2
1978 12/75 -  12 /78 87 .612**
( .1 5 9 )
.019*
( .0 1 4 )
.020 88 .786**
( .1 1 6 )
.004
( .0 0 7 )
.004
12/74 - 12 /78 87 .624**
( .1 7 4 )
.026**
( .0 1 5 )
.033 88 .881**
( .1 2 4 )
.004
( .0 0 8 )
.003
12/73 - 12 /78 86 .503**
( .1 6 7 )
.036**
( .0 1 5 )
.066 87 .798**
( .1 2 5 )
.009
( .0 0 8 )
.014
1977 6 /76 - 6 /79 88 .418**
( .1 6 7 )
.034**




( .0 0 9 )
.002
12/72 -  12/77 86 .629**
( .1 5 3 )
.029**
( .0 1 4 )
.049 85 _ 949**
( ! l 2 0 )
.000
( .0 0 8 )
.000
12/73 - 12 /77 90 .553**  
( .1 6 5 )
.034**  
( .0 1 5 )
.052 89 .878**
( .1 2 8 )
.003
( .0 0 9 )
.002
12/74 -  12/77 91 .701**
( .1 7 8 )
.023*
( .0 1 7 )
.021 90 1.034**
( .1 3 7 )
- . 0 0 6
( .0 0 9 )
.004
1976 6 /75 -  6 /78 92 .532**
( .1 4 7 )
. 021*
( .0 1 4 )
.024 92 .830**
( .1 1 8 )
- . 0 0 5
( .0 0 9 )
.003
12/74 -  12/78 92 .612**
( .1 4 5 )
.028**
( .0 1 4 )
.046 92 .915**
( .1 1 6 )
.000
( .0 0 9 )
.000
6/74 - 6 /79 91 .419**
( .1 3 6 )
.042**
( .0 1 3 )
.110 91 .806**
( .1 1 3 )
.005
( .0 0 8 )
.004
Table 7 (continued)
Book Value Market Value





12/71 -  12/76 87 .525**
( .1 3 8 )
.042**  
( .0 1 3 )
.109 87 .903**
( . 112 )
.005
( .0 0 8 )
.005
12/72 -  12 /76 89 .586**
( .1 4 1 )
.037**
( .0 1 3 )
.084 89 .948**
( .1 1 4 )
.003
( .0 0 9 )
.001
12/73 -  12/76 93 .480**
( .1 5 3 )
.046**
( .0 1 4 )
.100 93 .905**
( .1 2 5 )
.005
( .0 0 9 )
.003
1975 12/70 -  12/75 72 .510**
( .1 6 2 )
.040**
( .0 1 6 )
.081 71 1.003**
( .1 2 8 )
- .0 0 6
( . 0 0 8 )
.007
12/71 - 12/75 86 .467**
( .1 5 5 )
.046**  
( . 0 1 6 )
.092 85 .906**
( .1 2 8 )
.001
( . 0 0 8 )
.000
12/72 -  12/75 88 .539**
( .1 5 9 )
.039**  
( .0 1 6 )
.063 88 .976**
( .1 3 0 )
- . 0 0 4
( .0 0 8 )
.002
12/73  -  12/77 92 .532**
(■142)
.037**
( .0 1 4 )
.068 92 .941**
( .1 1 8 )
- . 0 0 3
( .0 0 8 )
.002
6 /7 4  -  6 /77 93 .524**
( .1 4 6 )
.035**
( .0 1 5 )
.058 93 .920**
( .1 1 9 )
- . 0 0 3
( .0 0 8 )
.002
6 /73  -  6 /78 90 .559**
( .1 3 3 )
.034**
( .0 1 3 )
.068 90 .922**
( . 111)
- .0 0 2
( .0 0 7 )
.001
* * S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t
12/75 -  12 /78
.05 1e v e l .
.1 0  l e v e l .
91 .584**
( .1 2 5 )
.023**
( .0 1 3 )
.038 91 .810**
( .1 0 7 )
.000
( .0 0 7 )
.000
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The fe d e r a l  funds r a t e  was used as the  r i s k - f r e e  r a te  s i n c e  i t  probably  
b e s t  approximates  th e  r a t e  a t  which banks borrow and i s  c e r t a i n l y  one 
o f  the lo w e s t  money market r a t e s .  The e s t i m a t e s  rep resented  monthly 
r a t e s  over th e  period  from January,  1970 through December, 1978 f o r  a 
t o t a l  o f  108 o b s e r v a t io n s .  S in ce  th e  E(RZ) e s t im a t e s  were on ly  crude  
approx im at ions ,  i t  was f e l t  b e s t  to  average the r a t i o  over the e n t i r e  
108 month period r a th er  than at tempt to  break down the n ine  y ear  per iod  
in t o  a number o f  s m a l le r  p e r i o d s .  The average o f  the monthly e s t i m a t e s  
o f  the  r a t i o  was .044 .
Table 8 compares the implied  s l o p e  e s t i m a t e s  us ing  (Rf /E(RZ) )  = .044  
with  the  actual  s lo p e  e s t i m a t e s  from the  twenty  reduced sample r e g r e s s i o n s .  
Only the  book va lu e  r e g r e s s i o n s  are  r e p o r te d .  The r e s u l t s  seem to  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  the  ac tu a l  s l o p e  i s  even sm a l le r  than would be p r e d ic te d  
by the  model.  The d i f f e r e n c e s ,  however,  are  in many i n s t a n c e s  s m a l l ,  
and the  r e s u l t s  are encouraging in t h a t  they  imply t h a t  th e  model i s  a 
reason ab ly  good approximation o f  th e  l e v e r a g e - b e t a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  fo r  
banks.  The d i f f e r e n c e s ,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  would be s u p p o r t iv e  o f  a m u l t i ­
p l i c a t i v e  f a c t o r  between zero  and one in the  s l o p e .  I f  such a f a c t o r  
e x i s t s ,  i t  should a l s o  be seen in th e  f irm r e g r e s s i o n s  and w i l l  be 
kept in mind when th o se  r e s u l t s  are r ep o r te d .
Unti l  now the  model has performed reasonab ly  w e l l .  Although fu r th e r  
s c r u t in y  o f  the bank data w i l l  be done,  the r e s u l t s  so f a r  are  e n l i g h t e n i n g  
as they  imply t h a t  Equation ( 4 - 9 )  and not (4 -1 0 )  i s  a b e t t e r  in d ic a t o r  
o f  the  t ru e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l e v e r a g e  and beta f o r  banks.  The next  
l o g i c a l  s t ep  i s  to  proceed to  the f irm t e s t s  to  determine how well  
the model f i t s  the  data from Samples 1 and 2.
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Table 8
Implied and Actual Slope EstimatesFrom Bank Regressions
Regress ion  
D ebt /E quity  At: Beta Over: Implied* Reduced Sample Actual
1978 12/75 . 12 /78 .014 .019
12/74 - 12/78 .014 .026
12/73 - 12/78 .012 .036
1977 6 /76 _ 6 /79 .010 .034
12/72 - 12/77 .014 .029
12/73 - 12/77 .013 .034
12 /74 - 12/77 .016 .023
1976 6 /7 5 _ 6 /78 .012 .021
12/74 - 12/78 .014 .028
6 /7 4 - 6 /79 .010 .042
12/71 - 12/76 .012 .042
12/72 - 12/76 .013 .037
12 /73 - 12/76 .011 .046
1975 12 /70 12/75 .012 .040
12/71 - 12/75 .011 .046
12/72 - 12/75 .012 .039
12 /73 - 12/77 .012 .037
6 /7 4 - 6 /77 .012 .035
6 /73 - 6 /7 8 .013 .034
12/75 - 12/78 .013 .023
*Estimated as Yq( . 0 4 4 ) ( 1 - . 4 8 ) .
The Firm T e s t s
S t a t i s t i c s  from the  t ime s e r i e s  e s t i m a t e s  o f  the f irm b etas  are  
presen ted  in Table  9.  L i t t l e  v a r i a t i o n  e x i s t e d  fo r  the  betas  over  
the  t ime p e r i o d s .  Sample 1 b e ta s  averaged about .94  w h i le  Sample 2 
b e ta s  averaged about 1 . 2 4 .  Kolmogorov-Smirnov t e s t s  f o r  normali ty  o f  
th e  sample d i s t r i b u t i o n s  r ev e a led  t h a t  the  null  h y p o th e s i s  t h a t  beta  
was normally d i s t r i b u t e d  a c r o s s  f irm s  could  not  be r e j e c t e d  a t  the
Table 9
Sample S t a t i s t i c s  From Estimated  
Firm Beta C o e f f i c i e n t s
Sample 1 (N = 61)______________   Sample 2 (N = 57)
Estimated Over 3 a Skewness* Kurtos is* 3 a Skewness* Kurtosi
12/70 - 12/75 1 .0 0 .27 .28 .32 1.28 .34 .56 .49
12/71 - 12/75 .95 .27 .29 .17 1 .24 .35 .57 .56
12/71 - 12/76 .97 .25 .44 .13 1 .28 .35 .82 1.81
12/72 - 12/75 .94 .28 .45 .34 1 .25 .36 .68 .60
12/72 - 12/76 .96 .24 .60 .17 1 .29 .36 1 .00 2 .23
12/72 - 12/77 .95 .23 .56 .13 1.28 .36 .81 1.41
12/73 - 12/76 .92 .30 .43 - . 0 9 1 .19 .40 1.07 1 .38
12/73 - 12/77 .90 .27 .35 - . 3 6 1 .17 .38 .98 .85
6 /74 - 6/77 .88 .30 .32 - . 4 3 1 .15 .39 1 .04 1 .02
12/74 - 12/77 .88 .41 1 .11 3 .3 0 1 .3 8 .52 .68 1 .60
6/73 - 6/78 .92 .23 .16 - . 2 4 1 .23 .36 .63 .69
12/73 - 12 /78 .94 .24 .27 - . 0 6 1 .2 0 .35 .81 .74
6 /74 - 6/79 .96 .25 .47 .8 6 1 .21 .36 .87 .67
6/75 - 6/78 .95 .33 .82 1 .99 1.37 .45 .60 .63
12/74 - 12/78 .80 .40 - . 5 6 .34 1 .02 .48 .21 - . 4 6
12/75 - 12/78 1.03 .39 - . 2 3 .87 1 .30 .56 .43 - . 0 4
6 /76 - 6/79 1 .1 0 .44 .46 .99 1.29 .57 .19 - . 1 5
*Both Skewness and Kurtos is  s t a t i s t i c s  should equal zero  f o r  a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n .
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.05 l e v e l  f o r  e i t h e r  sample in any o f  th e  17 t ime p er iods  co n s id ered .
The d a ta ,  th u s ,  appeared to  be reasonably  "c lean ,"  a comfort ing  f a c t o r .
Table 10 p r e s e n t s  sample s t a t i s t i c s  o f  the d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o s  o f  
th e  two samples o f  f i r m s .  The mean book va lue  r a t i o s  v a r i e d  l i t t l e  
from one y ear  to  th e  n e x t .  The market va lue  r a t i o s  v a r i e d  somewhat 
more over  t im e ,  tend ing  to  d ecre a se  c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y .  As e x p e c te d ,  the  
standard d e v ia t i o n  o f  the  market va lu e  r a t i o s  was c o n s id e r a b ly  h igher  
than t h a t  o f  the  book v a lu e  r a t i o s .  Kolmogorov-Smirnov t e s t s  were not  
as encouraging as in the  o th e r  data d i s t r i b u t i o n s .  The n u l l  h yp oth e s i s  
t h a t  th e  d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o s  were normal ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  was r e j e c t e d  a t  
the  .05 l e v e l  f o r  the  Sample 1 market va lue  r a t i o s  o f  1975 and 1976 
and f o r  a l l  o f  the Sample 2 r e s u l t s ,  book and market v a lu e s  and f o r  each
y e a r .  Although i t  i s  not  as co n v en ie n t  to  be working w ith  some non­
normal l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  d a t a ,  th e  assumption i s  not as important f o r  the  
independent  v a r i a b l e  as f o r  th e  dependent v a r i a b l e .  I t  may a l s o  prove  
u s e fu l  in e x p la i n i n g  some o f  the  l a t e r  r e s u l t s .
A f i n a l  p o in t  about the  data should be noted .  Sample 1 f irms had 
lower  b u s in e ss  r i s k ,  as measured by th e  un levered  b e ta ,  than Sample 2 
f i r m s .  From Table 10 Sample 1 f irms had lower  d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o s  than 
Sample 2 f i r m s .  According t o  th e o r y ,  Sample 1 f irms shou ld ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
have lower beta  c o e f f i c i e n t s  than Sample 2 f i r m s .  This  h y p o th e s i s  i s  
confirmed in Table 9.  Although t h i s  o b s e r v a t io n  does not prove or
d isp ro v e  a n y th in g ,  i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  encouraging to  note t h a t  the data used
here have the  i n i t i a l  appearance o f  being c o n s i s t e n t  with a normal p o s i t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l e v e r a g e  and b eta .  Were they  not  c o n s i s t e n t ,  
fu r t h e r  examination would be p o i n t l e s s .
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Table 10
Sample S t a t i s t i c s  From 
Debt /Equity  Ratios  o f  Firms
Sample 1 (N = 61)
Book Value Mean a Skewness Kurtos is
1978 .45 .35 1 .03  .80
1977 .42 .29  .36 - . 5 7
1976 .41 .28 .56  .13
1975 .42 .35 1 .43  2 .60
Market Value
1978 .61 .59 1 .65  3 .54
1977 .55 .51 1 .29  1 .46
1976 .49  .48  1.41 1.81
1975 .65 .79  2 .12  4 .82
Sample 2 (N = 57)
Book Value
1978 .62 .55 1 .74  3 .77
1977 .62 .6 8  3 .4 5  15.90
1976 .64  .69  2 .9 2  10 .34
1975 .6 8  .64 2 .8 9  12.71
Market Value
1978 .83 .87 1 .69  2 .1 3
1977 .81 .93 2 .57  8 .0 4
1976 .82 .96 2 .4 3  6 .39
1975 1 .19  1 .45  2 .2 7  5 .5 6
The twenty r e g r e s s i o n s  f o r  Samples 1 and 2 were e s t im ated  and the  
r e s u l t s  f o r  th e  f u l l  samples are p resented  in Tables 11 and 12.  The 
Sample 1 r e s u l t s  were somewhat s u r p r i s i n g .  The book va lue  r e g r e s s i o n s  
were not very s a t i s f a c t o r y .  Only in two c a s e s  were the  s l o p e s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
a t  the .05 l e v e l ;  th r e e  t im es  they  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  .10 l e v e l .
The market va lu e  r e g r e s s i o n s ,  however,  were much b e t t e r  than both the  
book va lue  r e g r e s s i o n s  and the bank market va lue  r e g r e s s i o n s .  Eleven
Table 11
Sample 1 Regressions
Book Value Market Value
Debt/Equity  At: Beta Over: Obs. Y0 Y1 R2 Obs. Y0 Y1 R2
1978 12/75 -  12/78 61 .943**
( .0 8 1 )
.191*
( .1 4 1 )
.030 61 .937**
( .0 6 9 )
.154**
( .0 8 2 )
.056
12/74 -  12/78 61 .891**
( .0 6 9 )
.133
( . 121 )
.020 61 .855**
( .0 5 8 )
.158**
( .0 6 9 )
.083
12/73 -  12/78 61 .965**
( .0 5 2 )
- . 0 5 6
( .0 9 0 )
.007 61 .960**  
( . 0 4 5 )
- .0 3 3
( .0 5 3 )
.007
1977 6 /76 -  6 /79 61 .996**  
( .0 2 5 )
.241
( .1 9 6 )
.025 61 1 . 011**




12/72 - 12/77 61 .905** 




( .0 4 2 )
.117**
( .0 5 6 )
.069
12/73 - 12/77 61 .864**
( .0 6 1 )
.075
( .1 1 9 )
.007 61 .849**
( .0 5 0 )
.085
( .0 6 6 )
.027
12/74 -  12/77 61 .759**
( .0 9 2 )
.277*
( .1 8 1 )
.038 61 .622**
( .0 6 3 )
.463**
( .0 8 5 )
.335
1976 6 /75 -  6 /78 61 .639**
( .0 8 7 )
.389**
( .1 7 7 )
.075 61 .690**
( .0 7 1 )
.227**
( .1 0 7 )
.070
12/74 -  12/78 61 .854**
( .0 7 3 )
.240*
( .1 4 9 )
.042 61 .771**
( .0 5 0 )
.383**
( .0 7 7 )
.296
6 /74 - 6 /79 61 .917**
( .0 5 7 )
.095
( .1 1 7 )
.011 61 .897**
( .0 4 5 )
.124**
( .0 6 7 )
.052
Table 11 (continued)
Book Value Market Value
Debt/Equity  At: Beta Over: Obs.
A





12/71 -  12 /76 61 .910**
( .0 5 5 )
.146
( .1 1 3 )
.028 61 .884**
( .0 4 3 )
.179**
( .0 6 5 )
.114
12/72 -  12/76 61 .923**
( .0 5 5 )
.101
( . 112 )
.014 61 .880**
( .0 4 2 )
.178**
( .0 6 4 )
.115
12/73 -  12/76 61 .898**
( .0 6 8 )
.048
( .1 3 4 )
.002 61 .857**
( .0 5 4 )
.127*
( .0 8 2 )
.039
1975 12/70 -  12 /75 61 .961**




( .0 4 3 )
.103**
( .0 4 2 )
.090





( .0 4 4 )
.064*
( .0 4 3 )
.036
12/72 -  12/75 61 .939**  
( . 0 5 7 )
.006
( .1 0 6 )
.000 61 .906**
( .0 4 6 )
.056
( .0 4 5 )
.025
12/73 -  12/77 61 .865**




( .0 4 4 )
.059*
( .0 4 3 )
.030
6 /74  -  6 /77 61 .877**
( .0 6 2 )
. 0 1 1
( .1 1 4 )
.000 61 .853**
( .0 5 0 )
.044
( .0 4 9 )
.013
6 /73  -  6 /78 61 .891**
( .0 4 8 )
.079
( .0 8 7 )
.014 61 .881**
( .0 3 9 )
.067**
( .0 3 7 )
.051
* * S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t
12/75 -  12/78
.05  l e v e l .
.1 0  l e v e l .
61 .930**  
( .0 7 7 )
.237**
( .1 4 2 )
.045 61 .969**
( .0 6 3 )
.094*
( .0 6 2 )
.038
Sample 2 Regressions
Book Value Market Value
Debt/Equity  At: Beta Over: Obs. Y0 Y1 R2 Obs.
a
Y0 Y1 R2
1978 12/75 -  12 /78 57 1.053**
( .1 0 6 )
.382**
( .1 2 9 )
.139 57 1 . 010**
( .0 9 7 )
.230**
( .0 8 1 )
.127
12/74 -  12/78 57 1.128**
( .0 8 0 )
.365**
( .0 9 7 )
.203 57 1.175**
( .0 7 5 )
.216**
( .0 6 2 )
.179
12/73 -  12/78 57 . 997** 
( . 0 6 1 )
.315**
( .0 7 4 )
.248 57 1.092**




1977 6/76 - 6 /79 57 1.117**
( .0 9 8 )
.265**
( .1 0 6 )
.101 57 1.105**
( .0 9 5 )
.216**
( .0 7 7 )
.125
12/72 -  12/77 57 1.128**
( .0 5 8 )
.238**
( .0 6 3 )
.207 57 1.154**
( .0 5 9 )
.151**
( .0 4 8 )
.153
12/73 -  12/77 57 1 . 022**
( .0 6 3 )
.243**
( .0 6 8 )
.187 57 1.071**
( .0 6 5 )
.126**
( .0 5 3 )
.093
12/74 -  12/77 57 1.203**
( .0 8 7 )
.277**
( .0 9 5 )
.134 57 1 . 202**
( .0 8 5 )
.213**
( .0 7 0 )
.146
1976 6 /75 - 6 /78 57 .870**
( .0 8 3 )
.217**
( .0 8 9 )
.098 57 .878**
( .0 8 0 )
.161**
( .0 6 4 )
.103
12/74 - 12/78 57 1.160**
( .0 7 1 )
.304**
( .0 7 6 )
.226 57 1.160**
( .0 6 7 )
.239**
( .0 5 3 )
.267
6 /74 - 6 /79 57 1.039**
( .0 5 6 )
.246**
( .0 6 0 )
.233 57 1.063**
( .0 5 6 )
.164**
( .0 4 4 )
.198
Table 12 (continued)
Book Value Market Value
Debt/Equity  At: Beta Over: Obs.
A







12/71 -  12/76 57 1.138**  
( . 0 5 8 )
.225**
( .0 6 2 )
.193 57 1.156**
( .0 5 7 )
.155**
( .0 4 5 )
.175
12/72  -  12/76 57 1.139**
( .0 5 9 )
.233**
( .0 6 2 )
.203 57 1.159**
( .0 5 7 )
.159**
( .0 4 6 )
.180
12/73 -  12/76 57 1.046**
( .0 6 7 )
.229**
( .0 7 1 )
.159 57 1.080**
( .0 6 7 )
.137**
( .0 5 3 )
.110
1975 12/70  -  12/75 57 1 . 112**
( .0 5 8 )
pap**
( ’.063)
.212 56 1.160**  
( .0 5 2 )
.104**  
( .0 2 8 )
.204
12/71 -  12/75 57 1.069**
( .0 6 1 )
.252**
( .0 6 5 )
.210 56 1.124**
( .0 5 5 )
.105**
( .0 3 0 )
.188
12/72 -  12/75 57 1.072**
( .0 6 2 )
.260**
( .0 6 7 )
.214 56 1.126**
( .0 5 6 )
. 110**
( .0 3 0 )
.197
12/73 -  12/77 57 .956**
( .0 6 4 )
.321**
( .0 6 9 )
.284 56 1.026**
( .0 6 0 )
.125**
( .0 3 2 )
.218
6 /7 4  -  6 /77 57 .941**
( .0 6 6 )
.313**
( .0 7 1 )
.260 56 1.005**
( .0 6 1 )
.127** 
( .0 3 3 )
.218
6 /73  -  6 /78 57 1.031**
( .0 6 0 )
.277**
( .0 6 4 )
.252 56 1.080**
( .0 5 4 )
.119**
( .0 2 9 )
.236
* * S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t
12/75 -  12 /78
.05 l e v e l .
.1 0  l e v e l .
57 1 . 001**
( .0 9 5 )
.429**
( .1 0 3 )
.240 56 1 . 020**
( .0 8 0 )
.215**
( .0 4 3 )
.319
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s lo p e s  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the .05 l e v e l  and f i v e  more were s i g n i f i c a n t  
a t  the .10 l e v e l .  The Sample 2 r e g r e s s i o n s  were c o n s id e r a b ly  b e t t e r  fo r  
both the  book and market va lu e  t e s t s .  All twenty r e g r e s s i o n s  in both 
c a s e s  produced s l o p e s  t h a t  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  .05 l e v e l .
Because o f  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  o u t l i e r s  might be d i s t o r t i n g  
the r e s u l t s ,  the  r e g r e s s i o n s  were re e s t im a te d  without  the f irms which 
had the  h i g h e s t  f i v e  p erce n t  o f  the d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o s .  Recall  th a t  
t h i s  procedure was e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s e d .  The argument f o r  doing so r e l a t e s  
to  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a few extremely  high d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o  f irms  
might have had extrem ely  high or low b e t a s .  Visual  examination  o f  the  
data r a i s e d  t h i s  s u s p i c i o n .  This  phenomenon would tend to  pull  the  
s lo p e  e s t im a t e  c o n s id e r a b ly  upwards or downwards. S ince  the  d e b t / e q u i t y  
r a t i o  i s  bounded on th e  lower  end by z e r o ,  no rea l  o u t l i e r s  e x i s t  a t  
t h a t  end.  With the  o u t l i e r s  r e j e c t e d ,  the  r e g r e s s i o n s  were re e s t im a te d  
and r e s u l t s  are p resen ted  in Tables 13 and 14.
Overall  i t  appears as i f  the  o u t l i e r s  had the  su sp ec te d  e f f e c t .
The Sample 1 r e g r e s s i o n s  were improved and the  Sample 2 r e g r e s s i o n s  were 
s l i g h t l y  impaired.  The Sample 1 book va lue  r e g r e s s i o n s  now produced 
tw e lve  c a s e s  t h a t  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the .05 l e v e l  and one a t  the  .10  
l e v e l  w hi le  th e  market va lue  r e g r e s s i o n s  r e s u l t e d  in seven being s i g n i ­
f i c a n t  a t  the .05 l e v e l .  The Sample 2 r e s u l t s  had a l l  twenty o f  the  
book va lue  s lo p e s  being s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  .05 l e v e l  and tw e lv e  market  
va lue  s l o p e s  being s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the .05 l e v e l .  The r e s u l t s  from the  
two samples now appear to  be q u i t e  s i m i l a r  and, t h u s ,  provid a s a t i s ­
f a c t o r y  base from which to  launch fu r t h e r  t e s t s .  Although one may always  
be accused o f  manipulat ing  the data when d i s c a r d in g  o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  the
Table 13
Sample 1 R egress ions  
(Reduced Sample)
Book Value Market Value
Debt/Equity  At: Beta Over: Obs.
A.





1978 12/75 -  12/78 55 .834**
( .0 9 2 )
.561**
( . 210 )
.119 57 .916**
( .0 7 7 )
.205**  
( . 1 1 7 )
.052
12/74 - 12 /78 55 .805**
( .0 7 8 )
.428**
( .1 7 8 )
.099 57 .815**
( .0 6 4 )
.251**
( .0 9 8 )
.106
12/73 -  12/78 55 .916**
( .0 5 7 )
.114
( .1 3 0 )
.014 57 .964**
( .0 4 6 )
- .0 5 1
( .0 7 1 )
.009
1977 6 /76 -  6 /79 56 .931**
( .1 0 6 )
.476**
( .2 3 9 )
.068 56 .953**
( .0 8 5 )
.300**
( .1 5 4 )
.066
12/72 - 12/77 56 .854**
( .0 5 5 )
.278**
( .1 2 4 )
.085 56 .918**
( .0 4 4 )
. 0 1 1
( .0 7 8 )
.000
12/73 -  12/77 56 .812**
( .0 6 5 )
.265**
( .1 4 6 )
.057 56 .906**
( .0 5 2 )
- . 0 7 8
( .0 9 4 )
.012
12/74 - 12/77 56 .665**
( .0 9 6 )
.614**
( .2 1 6 )
.130 56 .682**




1976 6/75 - 6 /78 57 .583**
( .0 9 6 )
.580**  
( . 2 2 5 )
.108 56 .667**
( .0 8 3 )
.300**
( .1 7 3 )
.053
12/74 - 12/78 57 .780**  
( . 0 7 9 )
.499**
( .1 8 4 )
.118 56 .790**
( .0 5 4 )
.319**
( .1 1 3 )
.128
6/74 -  6 /79 57 .850**
( .0 6 0 )
.330**
( .1 4 0 )
.092 56 .935**
( .0 4 9 )
.002
( , 1 01 )
.000
Table 13 (continued)
Book Value Market Value
Debt/Equity At: Beta Over: Obs.
A






(con t ) 12/71 -  12/76 57 .849**
( .0 5 9 )
.363**
( .1 3 8 )
.112 56 .925**
( .0 4 6 )
.054
( .0 9 6 )
.006
12/72 -  12/76 57 .863**
( .0 5 9 )
.313**
( .1 3 8 )
.086 56 .929**
( .0 4 5 )
.024
( .0 9 3 )
.001
12/73 -  12 /76 57 .851**
( .0 7 5 )
.213
( .1 7 4 )
.026 56 .939**
( .0 5 6 )
- .1 3 7
( .1 1 7 )
.025
1975 12/70  -  12/75 55 .961**
( .0 6 4 )
.067
( .1 6 0 )
.003 56 .974**
( .0 4 8 )
- .0 0 6
( .0 7 3 )
.000
12/71 -  12/75 55 .934**
( .0 6 4 )
.008
( .1 5 9 )
.000 56 .957**
( .0 4 7 )
- .0 7 1
( .0 7 2 )
.018
12/72 -  12/75 55 .936**
( .0 6 5 )
- . 0 0 6
( .1 6 3 )
.000 56 .953**
( .0 4 8 )
- . 0 7 2
( .0 7 4 )
.017
12/73 -  12/77 55 .845**
( .0 6 3 )
.130
( .1 5 7 )
.013 56 .901**
( .0 4 5 )
- . 0 6 5
( .0 6 9 )
.016
6 /74  -  6 /77 55 .848**
( .0 7 3 )
.090
( .1 8 2 )
.004 56 .897**
( .0 5 2 )
- .0 8 2
( .0 7 9 )
.019
6 /73  -  6 /78 55 .853**
( .0 5 5 )
.194*
( .1 3 8 )
.036 56 .895**
( .0 4 1 )
.018
( .0 6 3 )
.001
12/75 -  12 /78 55 .815**
( .0 9 4 )
.641**
( .2 3 5 )
.123 56 .909**
( .0 6 8 )
.227**
( .1 0 4 )
.082
* * S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t
.05 l e v e l . 
.10  l e v e l .
Sample 2 R egress ions  
(Reduced Sample)
Book Value Market Value







1978 12/75 - 12/78 54 1.018**
( .1 2 3 )
.469**
( .1 8 5 )
.110 51 1.031**
( . 1 2 2 )
.367**
( .1 6 5 )
.092
12/74 - 12/78 54 1.061**
( .0 9 1 )
.520**
( .1 3 7 )
.216 51 1.053**
( .0 8 9 )
.462**
( . 121 )
.229
12/73 -  12 /78 54 .993**
( .0 6 8 )
.334**
( .1 0 3 )
.169 51 1.030**
( .0 6 9 )
.247**
( .0 9 4 )
.123
1977 6/76 -  6 /79 53 .963**
( .1 2 8 )
.606**






12/72 -  12/77 53 1 . 100**
( .0 7 7 )
.325**
( .1 3 2 )
.106 55 1.159**
( .0 6 6 )
.145**  
( .0 7 3 )
.070
12/73 -  12/77 53 .996**
( .0 8 4 )
.329**
( .1 4 4 )
.093 55 1.103**
( .0 7 3 )
.074
( .0 8 0 )
.016
12/74 -  12/77 53 1 . 100**
( .1 1 8 )
.517**
( . 2 02 )
.114 55 1.135**
( .0 9 8 )
.329** 
( .1 0 8 )
.148
1976 6 /75 - 6 /78 53 .783**
( . 110 )
.438**
( .1 8 7 )
.097 53 .844**
( .0 9 8 )
.230**
( ,1 2 8 )
.059
12/74 - 12/78 53 1.042**
( ,0 9 7 )
.573**
( .1 6 4 )
.193 53 1.066**
( .0 8 3 )
.415**
( .1 0 8 )
.225
6 /74 -  6 /79 53 .941**
( .0 7 3 )
.478**
( .1 2 4 )
.225 53 1.043**
( .0 6 8 )
.206**
( .0 8 9 )
.095
Table 14 (continued)
Book Value Market Value




Y1 R2 Obs. Y0 Y1 R2
1976
(con t )
12/71 -  12 /76 53 1.073**
( .0 7 3 )
.386**  
( . 1 2 3 )
.161 53 1.148**  
( . 0 6 7 )
.180**
( .0 8 7 )
.077
12/72 -  12/76 53 1.068**
( .0 7 4 )
.409**  
( .1 2 5 )
.173 53 1.152**
( .0 6 8 )
.183**
( .0 8 8 )
.077
12/73 -  12/76 53 .994**
( .0 8 5 )
.358**
( .1 4 3 )
.108 53 1 . 112**
( .0 7 8 )
.088
( . 102 )
.014
1975 12/70 -  12/75 54 1.126**
( .0 6 9 )
.223**
( . 100 )
.087 52 1.233**
( .0 6 0 )
.006
( .0 5 2 )
.000
12/71 -  12/75 54 1.079**
( .0 7 2 )
.240**
( .1 0 5 )
.091 52 1 . 212**
( .0 6 2 )
- .0 0 1
( .0 5 4 )
.001
12/72 -  12/75 54 1.088**
( .0 7 3 )
.234**
( .1 0 7 )
.085 52 1 .224**
( .0 6 3 )
- . 0 1 9
( .0 5 5 )
.002
12/73 -  12/77 54 .985**
( .0 7 7 )
.262**
( . 112 )
.095 52 1 . 122**
( .0 6 8 )
.000
( .0 5 9 )
.000
6 /7 4  -  6 /77 54 .980**
( .0 7 8 )
.235**
( .1 1 4 )
.076 52 1.118**
( .0 6 8 )
- .0 2 1
( . 0 5 9 )
.002
6 /73  -  6 /78 54 1.048**
( .0 7 3 )
.244**
( .1 0 5 )
.093 52 1.142**
( .0 6 3 )
.040
( .0 5 5 )
.010
* * S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t
12/75 -  12/78
.05 l e v e l .






( .0 9 4 )
.366**
( .0 8 2 )
.286
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apparent conf irm at ion  o f  the i n i t i a l  s u s p i c i o n s  about the  p o s s i b l e  
e x i s t e n c e  and e f f e c t s  o f  o u t l i e r s  would seem to  be s u f f i c i e n t  e v id e n c e  
in support o f  us ing  the  reduced samples.
An i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t  was the f a c t  t h a t  the  average  i n t e r c e p t  o f  
the twenty book v a lu e  r e g r e s s i o n s  was .839  f o r  Sample 1 and 1 .020  f o r  
Sample 2.  The i n t e r c e p t  should  be an e s t im a t e  o f  the  un levered  b e ta .
The average un levered  beta  from th e  32 quarter  e s t im a t io n  procedure  
was a s u r p r i s i n g l y  c l o s e  .806 f o r  Sample 1 and 1 .049  f o r  Sample 2.
These r e s u l t s  provide  c o n s i d e r a b l e  support  f o r  us ing  t h e s e  s t a t i s t i c a l  
procedures f o r  d e r i v in g  un levered  beta  e s t i m a t e s .
I t  was not exp ec te d  th a t  book and market va lu e  r e s u l t s  would be 
approxim ately  e q u a l .  The r e s u l t s  were,  however,  q u i t e  encouraging in 
both samples.  I t  would appear,  n o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h a t  the  book va lue  measure 
o f  d e b t / e q u i t y  i s  a b e t t e r  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  l e v e r a g e  when us in g  t h i s  
model.  For comparison with  the  bank sample r e s u l t s ,  i t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  seems 
e s p e c i a l l y  ap p rop r ia te  to  c o n s id e r  o n ly  the  book va lue  r e s u l t s  s i n c e  
the  bank market va lue  r e g r e s s i o n s  were u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .  For th o se  reasons  
no fu r t h e r  a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  be d i r e c t e d  to  the  market va lu e  r e g r e s s i o n s .
The i m p l i c a t io n  i s  not  t h a t  market va lu e  i s  an in c o r r e c t  method o f  
measuring l e v e r a g e  but th a t  i t  s imply  s e r v e s  no p ro d u ct iv e  purpose in 
th e  remaining t e s t s  which i n v o lv e  a comparison o f  bank and f irm r e g r e s s i o n  
r e s u l t s .
Comparison o f  Bank and Firm R esu l t s
In Chapter 4 Equation ( 4 - 9 )  was g iven  as  the c o r r e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between l e v e r a g e  and beta  f o r  banks w h i l e  Equation (4 -1 0 )  was presumed 
to  s p e c i f y  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between l e v e r a g e  and beta  f o r  f irm s .  The
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d i f f e r e n c e  between ( 4 - 9 )  and (4 -1 0 )  i s  a t t r i b u t e d  to  the  R^/E(RZ) 
f a c t o r ,  a parameter which as p r e v i o u s l y  d i s c u s s e d  l i e s  in the zero  
to  one range.  The s l o p e  o f  ( 4 -9 )  must be lower  than the  s lo p e  o f  ( 4 - 1 0 ) .  
E m p ir i c a l l y ,  t h i s  h y p o th e s i s  would imply t h a t  y^ f o r  banks should be 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  lower  than y^ f o r  f i r m s .  A t - t e s t  f o r  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  
could  be performed and in f a c t  was performed. The r e s u l t s  supported  
th e  h y p o th e s i s  th a t  y^ was lower  f o r  banks than fo r  f i r m s ,  but the  
r e s u l t s  are  not unbiased.  The s l o p e ,  y^,  i s  l i n e a r l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  
i n t e r c e p t ,  y g ,  by v i r t u r e  o f  the  f a c t  t h a t  the s l o p e ,  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
eu (Rf /E(Rz ) ) ( l  -  x ) ,  c o n t a in s  the  i n t e r c e p t  By. The average bank 
i n t e r c e p t  was .545 which as compared t o  average f irm i n t e r c e p t s  o f  .839  
f o r  Sample 1 and 1 .020  f o r  Sample 2 im p l i e s  th a t  the b u s in e ss  r i s k  
(un levered  b e ta )  f o r  banks was somewhat lower than f o r  f i r m s .  A lower  
b u s in e s s  r i s k  and r e g r e s s i o n  i n t e r c e p t  would tend to  suppress  the s lo p e  
o f  the bank r e g r e s s i o n s .
R egard less  o f  whether ( 4 -9 )  or (4 -10 )  were c o r r e c t ,  the  s i z e  o f  
th e  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  premium i s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  b u s in e ss  r i s k  o f  
th e  company. I f  th e  company beg in s  with low b u s in e ss  r i s k ,  i n v e s t o r s  
r e q u ir e  o n ly  small premiums f o r  increments  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e .  I f  
i t  b eg in s  w ith  high b u s i n e s s  r i s k ,  then a d d i t io n a l  u n i t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
l e v e r a g e  req u ire  much h igh er  r i s k  premiums. Banks may have s m a l le r  
f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  premiums than some groups o f  f irms such as t h e s e  because  
t h e i r  b u s in e ss  r i s k  i s  low er .  Their  a s s e t  p o r t f o l i o s  are more l i q u i d  
and t h e i r  cash f low s  may be l e s s  uncerta in  than th ose  o f  many f i r m s .
I t  would not be p o s s i b l e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to  simply  compare s lo p e  e s t i m a t e s .  
Some adjustment must be made to  r e f l e c t  the d i f f e r e n t  degrees  o f  b u s in e ss  
r i s k  o f  the  bank and f irm samples.
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Combining ( 4 - 9 ) ,  ( 4 - 1 0 ) ,  and ( 4 - 1 1 ) ,  the  s lo p e  parameter can 
be w r i t t e n  as
Y  ̂ = ByK(l -  t )  ( 5 - 1 )
f  Rf  f o r  banks
where K = s
l l  f o r  f irms
Noting t h a t  y Q should  be equal t o  By and 1 - t should equal . 52  and 
s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e s e  i d e n t i t i e s  r e v e a l s  th a t
Y ̂  = .52yqK.  ( 5 - 2 )
Now form the  r a t i o  o f  s l o p e  to  i n t e r c e p t ,
Yj / yq = *52K, (5 -3 )
where y^/ yq = - 52(R^/E( R ))  f o r  banks and Yj / yq = -52 f o r  f irm s .
Div id ing  by Yg i s tantamount to  a d j u s t i n g  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  degrees  o f  
b u s in e ss  r i s k ,  a procedure somewhat akin to  normaliz ing  v a r i a b l e s  
measured in d i f f e r e n t  u n i t s  by d i v i d i n g  by t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  standard  
d e v i a t i o n s .  The r a t i o s  should hold r e g a r d l e s s  o f  any d i f f e r e n c e s  in 
i n t e r c e p t s .  I f  yq i s  c o n s id e r a b ly  sm al ler  f o r  banks than f o r  f i r m s ,  y  ̂
must be more than p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  sm a l le r  f o r  banks than f irms f o r  the  
o v e r a l l  r a t i o  y ^/Yq f ° r banks to  be lower than y^/yq f ° r f i rm s .  I f  the  
lower i n t e r c e p t  i s  the o n ly  reason f o r  the  bank s lo p e  being lower than 
the  f irm s l o p e ,  then th e  r a t i o s  Yj / yq f o r  banks and f irms would be eq ua l .
The y- /̂Yq r a t i o s  can be e a s i l y  e s t im a te d .  The bank r a t i o s  should
be t e s t e d  a g a i n s t  the  n u l l  h y p o th e s i s  t h a t  they  are s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l e s s
than . 5 2 ,  being brought down by the  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  the
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~ 4Rf /E(RZ) f a c t o r .  The f irm r a t i o s  should be t e s t e d  a g a i n s t  the  hypo­
t h e s i s  t h a t  th ey  are equal to  .52 .  The t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  i s  a "t" and 
i s  der ived  in Appendix H. Note th a t  f o r  the  t e s t  to  be v a l i d  y Q roust 
be non-zero  but s i n c e  t h i s  p o in t  was p r e v i o u s ly  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  t e s t e d ,  no 
problems should a r i s e .
The r e s u l t s  o f  the  t e s t s  are p resented  in Table 15. The null
A
h y p o th e s i s  th a t  y -j/ yq = *52 would be r e j e c t e d  in c a s e s  where i s  
c o n s id e r a b ly  sm a l le r  than -52yq. A o n e - t a i l e d  t e s t  was used to  r e f l e c t  
the f a c t  t h a t  the  r a t i o  o f  R  ̂ to  E(RZ) f o r  f irms should be no la r g e r  
than u n i t y .  N a tu r a l ly  s t a t i s t i c a l  phenomena o c c a s i o n a l l y  r e s u l t  in 
c a s e s  where R^/E(RZ) f o r  f irms was g r e a t e r  than one.  These i n s t a n c e s  
showed up as p o s i t i v e  t - s t a t i s t i c s  but they  were n e i t h e r  l a r g e  nor 
fr e q u e n t  enough to  cause  alarm.
C le a r ly  the  bank r a t i o s  were s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l e s s  than .52 and the  
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  Equation (4 -1 0 )  to banks i s  r e j e c t e d .  Equation (4 -9 )  
appears to  be a much more s u i t a b l e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between l e v e r a g e  and beta  f o r  banks.  The r e s u l t s  f o r  f i r m s ,  were 
somewhat mixed.  Except ing  the  1975 r e g r e s s i o n s ,  the  r e s u l t s  showed 
l i t t l e  support  a g a i n s t  the  h y p o th e s i s  th a t  R^/E( Rz ) = 1 f o r  f irm s .
In o n ly  a couple  o f  c a s e s  was the  null  r e j e c t e d .  The 1975 r e s u l t s ,  
however,  showed almost  complete  support f o r  the  h y p o th e s i s  t h a t  
y1/ y0<.52 and thus Rf /E(RZ)<1 f o r  f i r m s .  Several  p o s s i b l e  e x p la n a t io n s  
can be c o n s id e r e d .
„4The assumption i s  and has always been made t h a t  the  r a t i o  o f  Rf  
to  E(R ) i s  small enough to  cause  a s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in  the  banx 
and f i fm  s l o p e s .  This assumption i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  assuming th a t  
Rf /E(R ) i s  l e s s  than one in a s t a t i s t i c a l  s e n s e ,  a seemingly  p l a u s i b l e  
h y p o t h i s i s .
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Table 15
T e s t s  o f  the  Ratio y -]/yq 
f o r  Banks and Firms
(Reduced Samples -  Book Value)
Debt/Equity: Beta Over:
Banks Sample 1 Sample 2
n /T o t 1
A A
n / r o t 1 Tl /T 0 t 1
1978 12/75 - 12 /78 .031 - 3 .1 1 * * .673 0 .54 .461 - 0 .2 5
12/74 -  12/78 .042 - 2 .8 3 * * .532 0 .05 .490 - 0 . 1 8
12/73 -  12 /78 .072 - 2 . 22** .124 -2 .4 9 * * .336 - 1 .3 7 *
1977 6 /76 - 6 /79 .081 -1 .8 0 * * .511 - 0 . 0 3 .629 0 .3 8
12/72 -  12 /77 .046 - 3 .2 0 * * .326 - 1 .12 .295 - 1 .4 8 *
12/73 - 12 /77 .061 - 2 .5 2 * * .326 - 0 . 9 0 .330 - 1 . 0 4
12/74 - 12 /77 .033 - 3 .1 3 * * .923 1 .03 .470 - 0 .2 2
1976 6 /75 - 6 /78 .039 - 2 .8 0 * * .995 1.03 .559 0 .1 3
12/74 -  12 /78 .046 - 3 .2 7 * * .640 0 .42 .550 0 .15
6 /7 4 - 6 /79 .100 - 2 . 12** .389 - 0 .6 7 .508 - 0 .0 7
12/71 -  12/76 .080 -2 .7 4 * * .428 - 0 . 4 8 .360 - 1 .1 0
12/72 - 12 /76 .063 -3 l l l* * .363 - 0 . 8 3 .383 - 0 .9 3
12/73 - 12 /76 .096 - 2 .1 7 * * .250 - 1 .1 0 .360 - 0 .8 7
1975 12/70 -  12/75 .078 - 2 .2 3 * * .070 - 2 .2 9 * * .198 - 2 .7 5 * *
12/71 -  12 /75 .099 - 2 .0 5 * * .009 - 2 .5 4 * * .222 - 2 .3 3 * *
12/72 - 12/75 .072 - 2 .4 5 * * - . 0 0 6 - 2 .5 7 * * .215 - 2 .3 7 * *
12 /73 - 12/77 .070 - 2 .7 5 * * .154 - 1 .6 1 * .266 - 1 .7 0 * *
6 /7 4 -  6 /77 .067 - 2 .6 2 * * .106 - 1 .6 3 * .240 - 1 .8 4 * *
6 /73 - 6 /78 .061 - 3 .1 1 * * .227 - 1 .5 2 * .233 - 2 . 01**







11 .52  vs . / yq<.52
Rejec t  Hq i f t < - 1 . 2 9 a t  a = . 1 0 , t<'- 1 .6 6  a t a -  . 0 5 .
* * S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  .05 l e v e l .
* S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  .10 l e v e l .
N a t u r a l l y ,  some a b n o r m a l i t i e s  could  have e x i s t e d  in the  1975 
d e b t / e q u i t y  data .  From Table 10 fo r  Sample 1 the  1975 data  had 
c o n s id e r a b ly  g r e a t e r  skewness and k u r t o s i s  than the 1976-78 data .  While 
t h i s  p o in t  could  e x p la i n  the r e s u l t s  f o r  Sample 1 ,  i t  would not be a
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f a c t o r  in the Sample 2 r e s u l t s  which would appear t o  be u n e x p la in a b le .  
Note ,  however,  th a t  the r e g r e s s i o n  o f  the  1 2 /7 5  -  12 /78  beta on th e  
1975 l e v e r a g e  produced s i m i l a r  and t h e o r e t i c a l l y  c o r r e c t  r e s u l t s  f o r  
both samples.  Quite p o s s i b l y  i t  would be more ap p rop r ia te  to  p la c e  the  
d e b t / e q u i t y  r a t i o  a t  th e  beginning o f  th e  t ime per iod  than a t  the end 
although t h i s  d id  not appear to  be a problem with  the  bank r e s u l t s  or  
over  the  o th er  t ime p e r io d s .
Equation ( 4 -9 )  seems l i k e l y  to  be a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
o f  the bank r e l a t i o n s h i p  w h i le  Equation (4 -1 0 )  i s  somewhat s a t i s f a c t o r y  
f o r  f irms but c e r t a i n l y  c o n t a in s  an e lement  o f  doubt.  What may be 
occu rr ing  i s  t h a t  th ere  may be another  m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  f a c t o r  r e f l e c t i n g  
some u nexp la in ab le  reason why marginal u n i t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  do 
not i n c r e a s e  beta  on th e  order  o f  gyCl -  t ) .  The ev id e n c e  in fa v o r  o f  
t h i s  unknown f a c t o r  would support  a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t ' s  view o f  corp orate  
f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Although t h i s  re sea r ch  does not  purport to  provide  
a d i r e c t  t e s t  o f  the MM versus  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  the  r e s u l t s
do seem to  favor  the  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s .  I t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  when
d i s c u s s i n g  the  bank r e s u l t s ,  ev idence  o f  an unknown m u l t i p l i c a t i v e  f a c t o r  
was uncovered.  The ev idence  has resu r faced  in the  f irm r e g r e s s i o n s .
A f i n a l  g lan ce  a t  the  data s t i l l  seem to  support  the  t h e o r e t i c a l
model o f  bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Although a d i r e c t  t e s t  o f  the  r a t i o
Y i / y 0 f o r  banks a g a i n s t  f irms i s  not a v a i l a b l e ,  casual examination o f  
the  r a t i o s  fo r  banks compared to  f irm s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  the  bank r a t i o s  seem 
to  be c o n s id e r a b ly  s m a l le r  than the  f irm r a t i o s .  Some e x c e p t i o n s  are
5
Such a t e s t  would req u ire  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  n o n - l i n e a r  f u n c t io n s  
o f  random v a r i a b l e s  and a t  t h i s  t ime seems im p o s s ib le  to  deve lop .
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in the 1975 r e s u l t s .  O v e r a l l ,  however,  the bank r a t i o s  are c l u s t e r e d
A  A
in the  range o f  .03 -  . 1 0 .  Of the  twenty bank Y ] / y 0 r a t l 0 s ’ th e  average  
i s  .064 with  a median o f  .065 .  For Sample 1 the  average i s  .381 with  
a median o f  .360  and f o r  Sample 2 the  average i s  .391 with  a median o f  
. 345 .  I f  the 1975 r e s u l t s  are d e l e t e d ,  the r e s u l t s  appear even b e t t e r .
For banks the average  mean and median are  n ea r ly  t h e  same as b e fo re  with  
both equal to .061 .  For Sample 1 the mean i s  .441 and the median i s  
.461 w h i le  f o r  Sample 2 ,  the  mean i s  .498 and t h e  median i s  . 511 .
Although t h e s e  o b s e r v a t io n s  are  merely  i n t u i t i v e  and not  s t a t i s t i c a l ,  
they  appear to  stand out q u i t e  n o t i c e a b l y .
R e c a p i tu la t io n
The empir ica l  re sea r ch  on the  bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  model i s  
now complete .  The e v id e n c e  r e v e a l s  t h a t  the  model i s  somewhat wel l  
supported and does seem to  be p roper ly  s p e c i f i e d .  Banks would appear to  
command a borrowing advantage over f i r m s .  The advantage shows up as  
a s m a l le r  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  premium f o r  banks than f o r  f i r m s .  Even though 
banks undoubtedly have r e l a t i v e l y  low b u s in e ss  r i s k ,  even a f t e r  a d j u s t ­
ing f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  in b u s in e ss  r i s k ,  the  advantage s t i l l  remains .
U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  i t  i s  not p o s s i b l e  to  t e s t  a l t e r n a t i v e  v e r s i o n s  o f  
th e  model.  I f  t h a t  were p o s s i b l e ,  th e  r e s u l t s  would indeed be i n t e r e s t i n g .  
Such t e s t s ,  however,  would req u ir e  measurement o f  f a c t o r s  such as c o s t s
/T
and s e r v i c e  charges  o f  d e p o s i t s .  No doubt th e s e  parameters have t h e i r  
in d iv id u a l  and j o i n t  e f f e c t s .  Like many o th er  im p er fe c t io n s  they  must  
o f t e n  be d isregarded  in  model b u i ld in g  and t e s t i n g .
£
A t e s t  o f  the  s i n g l e - p e r i o d  v e r s io n  o f  the  model would r e q u ir e  an 
e s t im a t io n  o f  the  va lu e  o f  the bank's  e q u i ty  i f  i t  had o n ly  d e p o s i t s  and,  
morever,  would be a much more complex e s t im a t in g  eq u a t io n .
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The model i s  not  an at tempt to  p r e d i c t  bank b e ta s .  Indeed any 
attempt to  p r e d i c t  b e tas  t h a t  ig n o r e s  the  "regress ion"  tendency '7 would 
s u r e ly  provide  poor e s t i m a t e s .  The model i s  s imply  a method o f  "drawing 
some numbers out  o f  the  bo*" and determining whether they  are c o n s i s t e n t  
with  the  m od e l ' s  i m p l i c a t i o n s .
Most im p o r ta n t ly ,  th e  ev ide n c e  here should o n ly  be co n s id ered  a 
modest dose o f  p re l im in a ry  f i n d i n g s .  Recall  th a t  the  twenty r e g r e s s i o n s  
were not independent o f  each o th er  and should not  be viewed as a d d i t i v e  
ev id e n c e .  Numerous o th e r  c r i t i c i s m s ,  d i s c u s s e d  in Chapter 4 ,  can a l s o  
be e a s i l y  l e v i e d .  I t  i s  probably  t r u e  th a t  the  theory  l i k e  many o th e r s  
cannot r e a l l y  be " t e s t e d , "  but one should not i n f e r  t h a t  resear ch  which 
purports  to  provide  some e v id e n c e  i s  not w orthwhil e .  H op efu l ly  fu r t h e r  
resear ch  w i l l  revea l  new i n s i g h t s  i n t o  both th e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and em pir ica l  
a s p e c t  o f  bank f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  d e c i s i o n s .
M a r s h a l l  E. Blume, "Betas and Their R egress ion  Tendencies ,"  Journal  
o f  F inance ,  30: 7 8 5 -9 6 ,  June,  1975.
Chapter 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
The e f f e c t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  on v a lu a t io n  and sh areh o ld er  
wealth  o f  the  banking f irm was examined both t h e o r e t i c a l l y  and e m p i r i c a l l y .  
I t  was assumed t h a t  market im p e r fe c t io n s  made p o s s i b l e  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  
a bank which would op era te  in c a p i t a l ,  l o a n ,  and d e p o s i t  markets .  The 
v a lu a t io n  o f  e q u i t y  shares  was assumed to be d e s cr ib ed  by B la c k ' s  z e r o -  
beta  v e r s io n  o f  the  Capita l  A ss e t  P r ic in g  Model. Although th e  Black  
model i s  a p e r f e c t  market model,  i t  served  as a framework w i th in  which 
im p e r fe c t io n s  cou ld  be in troduced .
A firm o p e r a t in g  in a market w ithout  an in term ediary  was converted  
to  a bank, charged with  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  prov id ing  banking s e r v i c e s ,  
and a llowed to  i s s u e  demand d e p o s i t s .  The d e p o s i t s  were o f  the  form o f  
an i n i t i a l  in f lo w  f o l lo w e d  by ou t f lo w s  which equal in f lo w s  so t h a t  a 
c o n s ta n t  l e v e l  o f  d e p o s i t  f in a n c in g  was mainta ined .  A p e r p e t u i t y  model 
was assumed in the t e x t  a lthough a s i n g l e - p e r i o d  v e r s io n  was presented  
in an appendix .  No t a x e s  were assumed. D ep o s i t s  were i n i t i a l l y  cons id ered  
to  be c o s t l e s s ,  r i s k l e s s ,  n o n - i n t e r e s t  b ear in g ,  and req u ir in g  no r e s e r v e s .  
I t  was shown t h a t  the  va lu e  o f  the bank and the  wealth  o f  i t s  sh areh o ld ers  
would be in cr ease d  by us ing  d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e .  I t  was l a t e r  v e r i f i e d  
t h a t  the  presen ce  o f  c o s t l y  d e p o s i t s ,  i n t e r e s t  on d e p o s i t s ,  and r e s e r v e  
requirements  would reduce the b e n e f i t s  o f f e r r e d  by d e p o s i t  l e v e r a g e  but  
would not l i k e l y  e l i m i n a t e  them. Required r a t e  o f  return and c o s t  o f  
c a p i t a l  formulas were der ived  and r e f l e c t e d  the advantage o f  d e p o s i t s  as  
a source  o f  f i n a n c i n g .
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A second form o f  f in a n c in g  was in trod uced .  Banks were al lowed to  
i s s u e  r i s k  f r e e  i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  l i a b i l i t i e s .  I t  was proven th a t  the use  
o f  t h i s  form o f  l e v e r a g e  was a l s o  advantageous to  banks and t h e i r  owners 
but l e s s  so than were d e p o s i t s .  An i n c e n t i v e  f o r  banks to  maximize t h e i r  
use o f  such f in a n c in g  was shown to  e x i s t .  Required r a te  o f  re turn  and 
c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  formulas under t h i s  form o f  f in a n c in g  were presented  and 
th ey  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  th e  advantage o f  t h i s  sou rce  o f  f i n a n c i n g .
Empirical t e s t s  examined the e f f e c t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  on the  
s y s t e m a t i c  r i s k  o f  banks.  I t  was proven t h a t  i f  banks p o s s e s s  an advantage 
over  non-banks ( f irm s)  in t h e i r  f in a n c in g  a c t i v i t i e s ,  then t h a t  advantage  
would be r e f l e c t e d  in s m a l le r  i n c r e a s e s  in s y s t e m a t i c  r i s k  as u n i t s  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  are added. Data from samples o f  banks'and f irms were 
t e s t e d  f o r  ev idence  o f  t h i s  phenomenon. A number o f  d i f f e r e n t  t ime p er iods  
were examined and the  m a jo r i ty  o f  the t e s t s  supported the  th eory .  Given 
t h a t  t h i s  ev id e n c e  i s  p re l im in ary  in n a tu re ,  and fu r t h e r  t e s t i n g  i s  
needed,  the  theory  was t e n t a t i v e l y  acce p te d .
I f  banks do p o s s e s s  an advantage in t h e i r  use o f  l e v e r a g e ,  i t  i s  no 
s u r p r i s e  then t h a t  th ey  appear to  maximize th e  use o f  debt  f in a n c i n g .
S ince  such an advantage i s  a r e s u l t  o f  the im p e r fe c t io n s  o f  th e  marketp lace  
and the  need f o r  the s e r v i c e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ,  the b e n e f i t s  
to  t h e i r  sh areh o ld ers  r e p r e s e n t  the  i n c e n t i v e s  n e c e s s a r y  to  induce r i s k -  
tak ers  to  become in t e r m e d i a r i e s .
I t  i s  o f t e n  argued t h a t  banks are too h e a v i l y  l e v e r a g e d .  While t h i s  
s ta tem ent  may have some tr u th  to  i t ,  the  f a c t  i s  t h a t  l e v e r a g in g  i s  an 
e s s e n t i a l  fu n c t io n  o f  an in term ediary  and must be done in order  f o r  a f irm  
to  operate  as an in term ediary .  S ince  s o c i e t y  e x p e c t s  banks to  l e v e r  
them selves  more h e a v i l y  than non-banks and the im perfec t  nature  o f  the
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market p rov ides  an i n c e n t i v e  f o r  them to  do s o ,  i t  makes l i t t l e  s en se  
to  complain t h a t  banks use  too  much l e v e r a g e .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  the  model 
does p o in t  out th a t  a weal th  t r a n s f e r  from d e p o s i t o r s  to  bank sh are ­
holders  o c c u r s .  Like a form o f  w in d fa l l  g a i n ,  s o c i e t y  should re c o g n iz e  
th a t  any attempt to  reduce t h i s  gain  whether by t a x a t i o n  or by r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on bank l e v e r a g e  w i l l  r e s u l t  in a much lower l e v e l  o f  in te r m e d ia t io n  
s e r v i c e s .  Take away th e  i n c e n t i v e  to be an in term ediary  and you reduce  
the  l e v e l  o f  s a v in gs  in the  economy. Reduce the  l e v e l  o f  s a v in g s  and 
you reduce the  l e v e l  o f  inves tm ent  and economic growth.  This f a c t  can 
be e a s i l y  seen by c o n s id e r i n g  the  e f f e c t  o f  the bank's  f in a n c in g  advantage  
on i t s  requ ired  r a t e  o f  return on p r o j e c t s .
I t  was shown in Chapter 3 t h a t  the  advantage o f  d e p o s i t  and c r e d i t  
market f in a n c in g  served  to  reduce the bank's  requ ired  r a t e  o f  return  on 
p r o j e c t s  ( l o a n s ) .  The bank w i l l  not lend u n le s s  i t  can earn i t s  required  
r a te  o f  re turn .  Thus,  by keeping th e  requ ired  r a t e  o f  return as low as  
p o s s i b l e ,  an i n c e n t i v e  e x i s t s  f o r  banks to  lend  because  more p r o j e c t s  
w i l l  have p o s i t i v e  n e t  p r e s e n t  v a lu e s  than i f  the requ ired  r a t e  o f  return  
were h igher .  This l e n d i n g ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  d e s i r a b l e  in a growing economy.
Even during p er io d s  o f  high i n f l a t i o n  when such len d in g  may not be d e s i r e d ,  
th ere  are  temporary means such as r e d u c t io n s  in the  money supply  o f  
reducing bank le n d in g  t h a t  do not  permanently e r a d i c a t e  the  i n c e n t i v e  to  l e n d .
Given t h a t  an i n c e n t i v e  e x i s t s  f o r  banks to  borrow and l e n d ,  the  
wealth  t r a n s f e r  p r e v i o u s l y  mentioned i s  converted  in to  a g r e a t e r  l e v e l  o f  
economic growth which,  o f  c o u r s e ,  b e n e f i t s  s o c i e t y .  Thus,  even though 
banks would appear to  b e n e f i t  g r e a t l y  a t  t h e  expense  o f  the  p u b l i c ,  they
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should not be r e s t r i c t e d  from doing s o .  Here the  " i n v i s i b l e  hand" 
paradigm o f  Adam Smith^ a p p l i e s .  We a l l  b e n e f i t .
The model was deve loped  under the  assumption th a t  the bank's shares  
were p u b l i c l y  traded in an e f f i c i e n t  market.  Obviously  such a r e s t r i c t i o n  
e l i m i n a t e s  many o f  the  14 ,000  banks in t h i s  country .  For th ose  to  which 
i t  does app ly ,  however,  the  c o r r e c t  a s se ssem en t  by i n v e s t o r s  o f  the  
b u s in e ss  and f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  o f  the bank s e r v e s  as a d e t e r r e n t  to  the  
use o f  e x c e s s i v e  l e v e r a g e  or o th e r w is e  engaging in extremely  high r i s k  
p r o j e c t s .  Thus,  th e  c a p i t a l  markets should be capable  o f  r e g u l a t i n g  
th o se  banks w ith out  government i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Given the ev idence  provided  
here which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the  market i s  app aren t ly  capable  o f  re c o g n iz in g  
the  e f f e c t  o f  l e v e r a g e  on e q u i t y  r i s k ,  i t  i s  s t r o n g l y  argued t h a t  c a p i t a l  
adequacy c o n t r o l s  on th o se  banks be dropped.
For th ose  banks which do not have shares  p u b l i c l y  traded in an 
e f f i c i e n t  market,  t h i s  model prov ides  no g u i d e l i n e s .  I t  i s  somewhat 
d i s a p p o in t in g  to  be compelled  to  conc lud e  t h a t  r e g u l a to r s  can serve  a 
u se fu l  fu n c t io n  here; but u n t i l  a p r a c t i c a l  model o f  small bank e q u i t y  
r i s k  comes a long and s u g g e s t s  o t h e r w i s e ,  p u b l ic  r e g u l a t i o n  would appear  
to  be the  o n ly  c h o i c e .
A f i n a l  word i s  in  order  about th e  banking p r a c t i c e  c a l l e d  "spread  
management." In Chapter 1 i t  was noted th a t  "spread management banking" 
seems to  be i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  the MM theory  o f  f i n a n c e .  Bank hurdle  
r a t e s  appear to  be somewhat l e s s  than a simple  weighted average c o s t  o f  
c a p i t a l  and are probably t i e d  to  th e  c o s t  o f  debt .  According to  the
*Adam Smith,  The Wealth o f  N a t i o n s , Cannan ed.  (New York: The
Modern Library,  1 9 7 3 ) ,  p. 423.
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theory  presen ted  h e r e ,  the  weighted average c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  as i t  i s  
u s u a l l y  d er ived  f o r  f irm s  i s  not s t r i c t l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to banks.  I t  should  
in co r p o r a te  the  advantage th a t  banks p o s s e s s  in t h e i r  f in a n c in g  o p e r a t io n s .  
This advantage i s  b u i l t  in to  the  required r a t e  o f  return formulas o f  
Chapter 3 and s u g g e s t s  th a t  the t h e o r e t i c a l  hurdle  r a t e s  on banks may 
be very c l o s e  to  th e  hurdle  r a t e s  determined in p r a c t i c e .  Thus, "spread  
management" bankers may have a lr ead y  been c o n s id e r in g  the  r e l a t i v e  
advantage o f  debt f in a n c in g  when e s t im a t in g  hurdle  r a t e s .  Non-separat ion  
o f  in vestment  and f in a n c in g  d e c i s i o n s  f o r  banks may hold both t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
and in th e  rea l  world.
Much work remains to  be done b e fore  t h e  i s s u e s  in bank f i n a n c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  th eory  are  c l e a r l y  r e s o l v e d .  More s o p h i s t i c a t e d  models under 
re laxed  assumptions  and complete  models o f  market eq u i l ib r iu m  with  
f i n a n c i a l  in t e r m e d ia t io n  would be d e s i r a b l e  g o a l s  f o r  f u r t h e r  re s e a r c h .  
L ik ew ise ,  f u r t h e r  empir ica l  ev id e n c e  on the e f f e c t s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  l e v e r a g e  
on r i s k  f o r  both banks and firms i s  needed.  Attempts to  provide  such 
ev idence  w i l l  p r e s e n t  formidable  c h a l l e n g e s  g iven  s t a t i s t i c a l  and data  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  problems.  The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e s s ,  however,  i s  not  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  small to  d e t e r  fu tu r e  e f f o r t s .
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APPENDIX A
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUATION, SHAREHOLDER 
WEALTH, AMD EQUITY PRICE
Theorem A . l :  Any change in the  va lue  o f  th e  f irm i s  accompanied by
an equal change in the same d i r e c t i o n  o f  shareholder  
wealth .
Proof:  D ef ine  shareho lder  w eal th  o f  the  le v e r e d  and unlevered f irms
as SHWy and SHWy, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  By d e f i n i t i o n  SHWy = S y ,  the va lue  
o f  t h e i r  e q u i t y  in the  unlevered f irm .  I f  Dy o f  debt  i s  i s s u e d  and 
the  proceeds are  used to  repurchase s h a r e s ,  then sh areh o ld er  wealth  
o f  the  le v e r e d  f irm w i l l  equal the  cash r e c e iv e d  from the  s a l e  o f  the  
shares  which eq u a ls  Dy p lu s  the  r e s u l t i n g  va lue  o f  t h e i r  s h a r e s ,  or
SHWy = Sy  + Dy.
I t  i s  now apparent t h a t  s i n c e  Vy = S y ,  SHWy = Vy*, and because  
Vy = Sy  + Dy , SHWy = V y . C l e a r l y ,  any in c r e a s e  or  d ecre a se  in the  
va lue  o f  the  f irm r e s u l t s  in  an e q u iv a l e n t  in c r e a s e  or d ecre ase  in  
shareh o ld er  w ea l th .
Q.E.D.
Theorem A .2: Any change in the va lue  o f  the f i r m ,  and t h e r e f o r e ,
shareho lder  w e a l th ,  r e s u l t s  in a change in the  same 
d i r e c t i o n  in the e q u i t y  p r i c e .
Proof:  The p r i c e  o f  the  l e v e r e d  f i r m ' s  e q u i t y  i s  g iven  as
Pl = Sy/Ny where Sy i s  the  market va lu e  o f  the l e v e r e d  f i r m ' s  e q u i t y
as b e fore  and Ny i s  th e  number o f  s h a res .  The p r i c e ,  P y ,  can a l s o
be w r i t t e n  as
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V, -  D.
p L -  w - i )
s i n c e  -  Dy. The va lue  o f  the  l e v e r e d  f irm w i l l  equal the
va lu e  o f  the un levered  f irm p lus  any change in the  va lue  o f  the unlevered  
f i r m ,  or Vy = Vy + dVy; t h e r e f o r e ,  by s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  
i n t o  ( A - l ) ,  Py i s  g iven  as
V.. + dV„ -  D.
PL - "  - - N-   k - (A—2)
The change in s to c k  p r i c e  i s  g iven  as
dP = P L -  P y .  ( A - 3 )
The va lue  o f  the  un levered  f irm i s  d e f in e d  as Vy = NyPy or the number 
o f  shares  t imes  the p r i c e  per sh are .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  f o r  
Vy in ( A - 2 ) ,  then s u b s t i t u t i n g  (A-2) i n t o  (A -3 ) ,  and p u t t in g  terms 
over the same denominator g iv e s
dP = Hu?U +- d\ - ° -L ^  . (A-4)
The number o f  l e v e r e d  shares  i s  g iv e n  as Ny = Ny -  D y / P y .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  
t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  f o r  Ny in the  numerator l e a v e s
dp = NUPU + dVU ~ PL " pu ( Nu ~ dl/ pu} (A_5 ^
nl
which s i m p l i f i e s  to
dV,.
dP = ^  . ( A - 6 )
Obvious ly ,  dP — 0 as  dVy — 0 and v i c e  v e r s a .  So,  p r i c e ,  v a l u e ,  and
shareho lder  wealth  a l l  vary d i r e c t l y .  Note t h a t  no assumptions have 
been made about th e  typ e  o f  v a lu a t io n  p rocess  so t h e s e  s ta tem ents  apply  
to  the bank model presented  in the t e x t ,  the MM model,  or any o ther  model.
Q. E. D
APPENDIX B 
THE MODEL IN A SINGLE-PERIOD WORLD
D epos i t  Financing
S ince  the  l e v e r e d  f irm must repay Dj one per iod  l a t e r ,  l e t  the  
return to  the  un levered  and l e v e r e d  f irm s '  shareh o lders  be g iven  as
E ( R u )  =  ~  1 =  E C R Z ) +  x c o v C R y - R ^ )  ( B - l )
*****
E(Rl ) = E .( .N P U — ~ Dd _ 2. B E(̂ Rz ) + xcovCRl , ^ , ) .  (B-2)
Rewrite ( B - l )  and (B-2)  to  i s o l a t e  E(N0I) and equate t h e s e  r e s u l t s .  
Proceeding as  in the  t e x t  produces the  v a l u a t io n  equat ion




The l a s t  term in b rackets  i s  p o s i t i v e  and equal to  1 -  1 / ( 1  + E(RZ))  
r e f l e c t i n g  the  f a c t  t h a t  the  i n c r e a s e  in the  va lue  o f  th e  bank o f  D̂
( the  p e r p e t u i t y  c a s e )  i s  reduced by the  p r e s e n t  va lu e  o f  the  repayment
-k ~
o f  p r i n c i p l e .  Note t h a t  the  a p p rop r ia te  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  i s  E(RZ) ,  the  
r i s k l e s s  r a t e ,  because  the  d e p o s i t s  are  co n s id ered  to  be r i s k l e s s .
The required  e q u i t y  re turn  d e r i v a t i o n  f o l l o w s  e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same 
procedure as in the  t e x t  where th e  requ ired  e q u i ty  return  f o r  the case  
o f  c r e d i t  market f in a n c in g  was d e r iv e d .  A lgeb ra ic  d e t a i l s  are  omit ted
k
In the p e r p e t u i t y  c a s e  t h e  v a lu e  o f  the  le v e r e d  f irm did  in c lud e  
the p resen t  va lu e  o f  the  p r i n c i p l e  repayment d iscou n ted  a t  the r i s k l e s s  
r a t e ,  E(.ftz ) ,and  could  have been g iven  as VE = Vy + D̂  -  Dd/(1 + E(RZ))°° 
but the  l a s t  term i s  zero  so th e  p r i n c i p l e  repayment has no p resen t  
v a lu e .
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but the f i n a l  equat ion  i s  g iven  as
E ( R l ) = E C R y )  +  CECRy) -  E ( R z ) ] ^ r  1
1 + e ( r z )j
(B-4)
The l a s t  (bracketed)  term i s  p o s i t i v e  but l e s s  than one and dampens 
th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  in c r e a s e  in l e v e r a g e .
C red it  Market Financing
Let the  l e v e r e d  f irm i s s u e  o f  i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  debt a t  an i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  o f  R  ̂ promising to  repay the  debt one period l a t e r .  The expected  
re tu rn s  o f  th e  f irm l e v e r e d  with  d e p o s i t s ,  E(RL) ,  and the  f irm le v e r e d  
w ith  d e p o s i t s  and i n t e r e s t  bear ing d e b t ,  E(R^') ,  are  g iven  as
E(Rl ) = E(N0I-) s ~ - ° ft- -  1 = E(RZ) + xcov(RL,Rm) (B-5)
E(Rl ' ) = E ..JjcL .- ,.D U l .j U f r l  _ i  = E(Rz ) + x c o v ( r l ' ,Rm) .
L (B-6 )
Fol lowing the  same procedure as be fore  i t  i s  found t h a t
V  ■ V L +  D i
E ( ^ )  -  Rf
.1 + E(RZ)
(B-7)
Again ,  c r e d i t  market l e v e r a g e  i n c r e a s e s  the va lu e  o f  the  f irm as long as  
E(RZ) exceeds  R^, a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t io n  o f  the  Black model.  Compare t h i s  
r e s u l t  to  Equation (3 -2 5 )  o f  the  t e x t .  The bracketed term in (3 -2 5 )  
i s  equal to  (E(RZ) -  Rf )/E(RZ) which i s  g r e a t e r  than the bracketed  term 
in ( B -7 ) .  When not in g  t h a t  th e  second term in (B-7) can be w r i t t e n  as 
-  D.j(l + R f ) / ( 1  + E(RZ) ) ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  red u ct ion  in the i n c r e a s e  
in bank va lu e  i s  in an amount equal to  the  p r e s e n t  va lu e  o f  the  repayment  
o f  the  p r i n c i p l e .  For example,  th e  second term in (B-7) can be compared 
to  the second term in (3 -2 5 )  or D. -  D1-R^/E(,RZ) . The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  
o b v io u s ly  th e  p res en t  v a lu e  o f  the  p r i n c i p l e  repayment . taking in to  account  
the d i f f e r e n t  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r s  in the  two c a s e s .
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The requ ired  e q u i t y  return  i s  e a s i l y  d er ived  and i s  g iven  as
e (Rl ' )  = e ( rl ) + [ECRl ) -  ECRz ) ] f V
1 + Rf
1 + e ( r z )j
(B—8 )
The d i f f e r e n c e  between the  s i n g l e - p e r i o d  and p e r p e t u i t y  c a s e s  i s  t h a t  
here the  l a s t  term in (B-8 ) i s  l a r g e r  a l b e i t  not l a r g e  enough t o  co m p le te ly  
o f f s e t  the  advantage  brought about by borrowing in  t h e  c r e d i t  markets .
In both c a s e s  th e  a d d i t io n a l  r i s k  premium r e s u l t i n g  from the  in c r e a s e  
in  l e v e r a g e  i s  dampened by the advantage t h a t  banks p o s s e s s  in the  
c r e d i t  markets .
APPENDIX C
LISTING OF BANK SAMPLE
Bank o f  New York C o . ,  Inc .
Bankers Trust  New York Corp. 
Charter New York Corp.
Chase Manhattan Corp.
Chemical New York Corp.
C i t i c o r p
Manufacturers Hanover Corp.
J.  P. Morgan & Co.
U. S. Trust Co.
Continenta l  I l l i n o i s  Corp.
F i r s t  Chicago Corp.
F i r s t  Nat ional Boston Corp.
Harris  Bankcorp Inc.
Mellon National Corp.
Northern Trust  Corp.
Shawmut Corp.
S t a t e  S t r e e t  Boston Corp.
Baybanks Inc.
CBT Corp.
Continenta l  Bank-Norris town, N.J.  
Fidel  cor
F i d e l i t y  Union Bancorp
F i r s t  Commercial Bank Holding Co.
F i r s t  Empire S t a t e  Corp.
F i r s t  Nat ional S t a t e  Bancorp 
F i r s t  Pennsylvania  Corp.
Girard Co.
Greater J e r s e y  Bancorp 
Hartford National Corp.
Heri tage  Bancorp 
Hospita l  Trust  Corp.
I n d u s tr ia l  Nat ional Corp. 
I n d u s tr ia l  V a l l e y  Bank & Trust  
Lincoln  F i r s t  Banks 
Marine Midland Banks 
M idlant ic  Banks Inc.
Nat ional  Central F inancia l  Corp. 
New England Merchants Inc .  
P h i la d e lp h ia  National Corp. 
Provident  National Corp.
Republic New York Corp.
United Bank Corp. o f  New York 
United J e r s e y  Banks 
Alabama Bancorporation
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico 
Bank o f  V ir g i n i a  Co.
Barnett  Banks o f  F lor id a
C i t i z e n s  & Southern National Bank
Dominion Bankshares
Financia l  General Bankshares
F i r s t  & Merchants
F i r s t  Alabama Bancshares
F i r s t  F lor id a  Banks Inc .
F i r s t  Kentucky National  
F i r s t  Maryland Bancorp.
F i r s t  National Holding Corp.
F i r s t  Tennessee  Nat ional  Corp. 
F i r s t  Union Corp.
F i r s t  V ir g i n i a  Bankshares  
Flagsh ip  Banks 
Flor ida  Nat ional Banks 
Maryland National Corp.
NCNB Corp.
Northwestern F inanc ia l  Corp.
Riggs Nat ional Bank
South Caro lina  National Corp.
Southeast  Banking Corp.
Sun Banks o f  F lor ida  
Tennessee  V a l l e y  Bancorp.
Third National  Corp.
Trust  Company o f  Georgia 
Union P la n te r s  Corp.
United V ir g i n i a  Bankshares  
V ir g i n i a  National Bankshares  
Wachovia Corp.
American F l e t c h e r  Corp.
Bancohio Corp.
Bank o f  Commonwealth 
Central Bancorporat ion Inc .  
Centran Corp.
C le v e t r u s t  Corp.
Commerce Bancshares  
Detro itbank Corp.
Equimark Corp.
F i r s t  Banc Group o f  Ohio 
F i r s t  Bank System Inc.
F i r s t  Nat ional Charter Corp.
F i r s t  Nat ional C in c in n at i  Corp.
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General Bancshares  
Huntington Bancshares  
Indiana National Corp. 
Manufacturers National  Corp. 
Marine Corp.
Marshall & I l s l e y  Corp. 
M er can t i le  Bancorporation  
Michigan National Corp. 
Nat ional C ity  Corp.
Nat ional D e t r o i t  Corp.
Northern S t a t e s  Bancorporat ion  
Northwest Bancorporation  
Old Kent F inancia l  Corp. 
P i t t sb u rg h  Nat ional Corp. 
S o c i e t y  Corp.
Union Commerce Corp.
Union National  Bank 
Arizona Bank
Colorado Nat ional Bankshares  
F i r s t  C i ty  Bancorp.
F i r s t  In te r n a t io n a l  Bancshares  
F i r s t  Nat ional Bancorporat ion  
American S e c u r i ty  Corp. 
A t l a n t i c  Bancorp.
F i r s t  S e c u r i t y  Corp.
F i r s t  United Bancorp.  
L ib er ty  Nat ional Corp. 
M er can t i le  Texas Corp. 
Republic o f  Texas Corp. 
Southwest Bancshares  
Texas American Bancshares  
Texas Commerce Bancshares  
United Banks o f  Colorado  
V a l le y  National  Bank 
Bancal T r i - S t a t e  Corp. 
Bankamerica Corp.
Crocker Nat ional Corp. 
F i r s t  Hawaiian Inc .
Hawaii Bancorp Inc.
Rain ier  Bancorp.
S e a f i r s t  Corp.
S e c u r i t y  P a c i f i c  Corp. 
Union Bancorp Inc.
U. S. Bancorp.
Wel ls  Fargo & Co.
Western Bancorporat ion  
F i r s t  Union Bancorporat ion  
F i r s t  Wisconsin Corp.
APPENDIX D
LISTING OF FIRM SAMPLE 1
Name o f  Firm




Alpha Port land Inds.  
H al l ib u rton  Co. 
Morrison-Knudsen  
Per in i  Corp.
Pullman Inc.
Kraft  Inc.
Heileman (G.)  Brewing Inc .  
Stange Co.
A!ba-Waldensian Inc.  
Munsingwear Inc .
Wilson Brothers  
Kimberly-Clark Corp.
American Cyanamid Co.
Hercules  Inc .
S t e r l i n g  Drug Inc .
Union Carbide Corp.
L i l l y  ( E l i )  & Co.
P f i z e r  Inc.
S m ithk l ine  Corp.
Nestle-Lemur Co.





P h i l l i p s  Petroleum Co.
Sh e l l  Oil Co.
Standard Oil Co. ( C a l i f . )  
C a r l i s l e  Corp.
Goodyear Corp.
U. S. Rubber Reclaiming Co. 
Rogers Corp.
L o u i s v i l l e  Cement 
Bethlehem S te e l  Corp. 
Copperweld Corp.
Preston  Mines Ltd.
U. S. S te e l  Corp.
Eastern Co.
Robertson (H. H.) Co.
SIC Industry  Name 
Metal Mining
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
D r i l l i n g  Oil & Gas Wel ls  
C onstruct ion-N ot  Bldg.  Constr.  
C onstruct ion-N ot  Bldg.  Constr.  
C onstru ct ion-N ot  Bldg.  Constr.  
C onstruct ion-N ot  Bldg.  Constr.  
C onstruct ion-N ot  Bldg.  Constr.  
Dairy Products  
Malt Beverages  
Food Preparat ion  N E C  
T e x t i l e  Mill  Products  
Apparel & Other F in i sh ed  Products  
Apparel & Other F in ished  Products  
Paper & A l l i e d  Products  
Chemical & A l l i e d  Products  
Chemical & A l l i e d  Products  
Chemical & A l l i e d  Products  




Perfumes Cosmetics T o i l e t r i e s
Petroleum Refin ing
Petroleum R ef in in g
Petroleum R ef in ing
Petroleum R ef in ing
Petroleum Ref in ing
Petroleum Ref in ing
Petroleum Ref in ing
Petroleum R ef in ing
Rubber & Misc.  P l a s t i c s  Products
Rubber & Misc.  P l a s t i c s  Products
Rubber a Misc.  P l a s t i c s  Products
Misc.  P l a s t i c  Products
Cement Hydraulics
B la s t  Furnaces & S tee l  Works
B la s t  Furnaces & S tee l  Works
B la s t  Furnaces & S tee l  Works
B l a s t  Furnaces & S te e l  Works
Misc.  Metal Works
Misc.  Metal Works
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SPS T ech n o log ie s  Inc.
Raymond I n d u s t r i e s  
Barnes Group Inc.
CMI Corp.
Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co. 
Mesta Machine Co.
Torin Corp.
I n te r n a t io n a l  B u s in ess  Machines  
Health-Mor Inc.
M art in-M arie tta  Corp.
Sm ith 's  Transfer  
Overseas Shiphold ing  Group 
PSA Inc.
P ioneer  Corp.
W il sh ir e  Oil o f  Texas  
Nashua Corp.
Safeway S to r e s  Inc .
Fairmount Chemical C o . ,  Inc .
B o l t s -N u ts -S crew s-R ive ts -W ash ers  
Ordnance & A c c e s s o r i e s  
Fabricated  Metal Products  N E C  
Construct ion  Machinery & Equipment 
Metalworking Machinery & Equipment 
General I n d u s tr ia l  Machinery & Equip.  
General I n d u s tr ia l  Machinery & Equip.  
O f f i c e  Computing & Accounting Mchs. 
Household Appl iances  
Guided M i s s i l e s  & Space V e h ic l e s  
Trucking-Local  & Long D is tance  
Water Transporta t ion  
Air T r a n s p o r t a t i o n - C e r t i f i e d  
Natural Gas T r a n s m is s io n -D i s t r .
W h o!esa le -E lec .  Parts  & Equip.  
Wholesale-Machinery & Equipment 
R eta i l -G r o c e r y  S tores  
Misc.  Chemical Products
APPENDIX E
LISTING OF FIRM SAMPLE 2
Name o f  Firm




Hime Oil Co-Cl A 
Louis iana  Land & E xplorat ion  
Nabisco Inc .
Dellwood Foods 
Wrigley (Wm.) J r .  Co.
Olympia Brewing 
Pepcom I n d u s t r i e s  
U. S. Tobacco Co.
National Spinning Co.
I rv in  I n d u s t r i e s  Inc .
T r ia n g le  P a c i f i c  Corp.
Technical  Tape Inc .
Houghton-Miff1 in Co.
B l a i r  (John) & Co.
Standard R e g i s t e r  Co.
Dow Chemical 
01 in Corp.
Rohm & Haas Co.
Warner-Lambert Co.
G i l l e t t e  Co.
I n te r n a t io n a l  Flavors  & Frags.
La Maur Inc.
Kin-Ark Corp.
Clark Oil & R ef in in g  Corp.
United Ref in ing  
Kleer-Vu I n d u s t r i e s  Inc.
Barry (R. G.)
General Portland Inc.
Lukens S te e l  Co.
Harsco Corp.
Crown Cork & Seal C o . ,  Inc .  
C i t a t i o n  Companies 
C a t e r p i l l a r  Tractor  Co.
Texas I n te r n a t io n a l  Co.
Bethlehem Corp.
Xerox Corp.
C la r o s t a t  Manufacturing C o . ,  Inc.  
Edo Corp.
S e a l e c t r o  Corp.
SIC Industry  Name
Bituminous Coal & L i g n i t e  Mining 
Bituminous Coal & L i g n i t e  Mining 
Bituminous Coal & L i g n i t e  Mining 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
Food & kindred Products  
Dairy Products  
Candy & Other C o nfec t ion ery  
Malt Beverages  
Bott led-Canned S o f t  Drinks  
Cigars
T e x t i l e  Mil l  Products
Apparel & Other F in ish ed  Products
Lumber & Wood Products
Convert Paper-Paperboard Products
Books P u b l i sh in g  P r in t in g
Commercial P r in t in g
Manifold B u s in ess  Forms
Chemicals & A l l i e d  Products
Chemcials & A l l i e d  Products
Chemicals  & A l l i e d  Products
Drugs
Perfumes Cosmetics  T o i l e t r i e s
Perfumes Cosmetics T o i l e t r i e s
Perfumes Cosmetics  T o i l e t r i e s
Misc.  Chemical Products
Petroleum Ref in ing
Petroleum R ef in ing
Misc.  P l a s t i c  Products
Footwear Except Rubber
Cement Hydraulic
B l a s t  Furnaces & S tee l  Works
Second S m e l t in g -R e f in in g  Nonferrous
Metal Cans & Shipping Containers
Heating Equipment & Plumbing F ix tu r e s
C onstruct ion  Machinery & Equipment
Oil F i e ld  Machinery & Equipment
S pec ia l  Industry  Machinery
O f f i c e  Computing & Accounting Mchs.
I n d u s tr ia l  Controls
Radio-TV Transmit t ing  Equipment
E le c t r o n ic  Components N E C
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Champion Spark Plug  
Smith (A. 0 . )  Corp.
American S t e r i l i z e r  Co.
Branch I n d u s t r i e s  
Yellow F re igh t  System 
Seaboard World A i r l i n e s  
LSB I n d u s t r i e s  Inc.
P i t t s t o n  Co.
Franks Nursery S a le s  
United F inancia l  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  
P u l t e  Home Corp.
Webb (Del E. )  Corp.
S e r v i s c o
U. S. Leas ing I n te r n a t io n a l  Inc.
E l e c t r i c a l  Machinery & Equipment 
Motor V e h ic l e  P a r t s - A c c e s s o r i e s  
Surg ica l  & Medical Instruments  
Trucking-Local  & Long D is tan c e  
Trucking-Local  & Long D is tance  
Air  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n - C e r t i f i e d  
Wholesale-Machinery & Equipment 
Wholesale-Nondurable Goods N E C  
R e t a i l - S t o r e s  N E C  
Savings  & Loan A s s o c i a t i o n s  
S u b d iv is io n  Development  
Hote l -M ote ls  
S e rv ice -L in en  Supply 
Service-Equipment Rental & Leas ing
APPENDIX F
SAMPLE STATISTICS FROM DISTRIBUTIONS 
OF UNLEVERED BETAS AND RETURNS 
Samples 1 and 2






s i s *
Mean .806 .266 .034 .152 .269 2 .101 .372 .534
Standard d e v ia t i o n .056 .091 .017 .040 .118 .374 .532 1.474
Std .  Error o f  Mean .007 .012 .002 .005 .015 .047 .068 .187
Skewness - 0 .0 7 5 .776 .404 .891 .597 - 0 .2 1 3 .556 1.553
Kurtos is - 1 .2 4 7 .196 .054 .336 - 0 .4 1 8 - 0 .4 8 5 .445 2 .482
Maximum .900 .510 .080 .260 .540 2 .840 1.930 5 .820
Minimum
P e r c e n t i l e s :
.710 .140 .000 .100 .080 1 .200 - 0 .7 2 0 - 1 .0 9 0
99th .894 .504 .074 .260 .534 2 .834 1.676 5 .206
95th .880 .410 .060 .220 .499 2 .644 1.302 3 .244
90th .870 .380 .050 .200 .436 2 .534 1.048 2 .634
10th .730 .150 .010 .110 .130 1 .622 - 0 .3 0 4 - 0 .8 5 4
5th .711 .141 .010 .100 .103 1.393 -0 .4 1 2 - 0 .9 9 7
1s t .710 .140 .000 .100 .080 1 .200 - 0 .7 2 0 - 1 .0 9 0
Sample 2 (N = 57)
Mean 1.049 .304  .032 .180 .318 2 .045 .630 .994
Standard d e v ia t i o n .061 .091 .021 .038 .137 .417 .708 2.037
Std.  Error o f  Mean .008 .012 .003 .005 .018 .055 .094 .270
Skewness - 0 .0 5 3 . 1 0 3 -0 .4 2 4 .304 1.017 - 0 .6 2 7 .423 2 .894
Kurtos is - 1 .3 6 7 - -0 .479 .242 .510 .430 1 .918 .792 10.377
Maximum 1.150 .500  .070 .270 .670 3 .0 4 2 .760 10.980
Minimum
P e r c e n t i l e s :
.950 . 1 4 0 -0 .0 3 0 .120 .120 0 .72 - 0 .9 4 0 - 0 .9 7 0
99th 1 .144 .500 .070 .264 .659 2 .937 2 .395 7 .982
95th 1 .315 .446 .061 .243 .608 2 .596 1.926 5 .400
90th 1 .1 3 0 .409 .052 .223 .507 2 .445 1.366 2 .262
10th .960 .177 .000 .130 .170 1.607 - 0 .2 6 0 - 0 .4 6 8
5th .960 . 1 4 0 -0 .0 0 2 .120 .140 1.257 - 0 .5 4 3 - 0 .5 7 7
1s t .950 . 1 4 0 -0 .0 3 0 .120 .120 .720 - 0 .9 4 0 - 0 .9 7 0
*Both Skewness and K urtos is  should equal zero  in a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n
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APPENDIX G
ECONOMETRIC IMPLICATIONS OF 
MEASUREMENT ERROR IN THE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The t r u e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between Y.. and X.. i s  g iven  as
Y.. = a  + BX. + e. j .
The assumptions  are
E(£ i ) = 0 E U a e . )  = 0 , i t  j
a 2 ( e . j ) = a 2 £ c o v C X . ^ }  = 0
B = c o v ( W  a = E(Yi ) -  BE(Xi ) .
a2 (Xi )
Assume t h a t  the  dependent v a r i a b l e ,  Y^, i s  measured with  e r r o r ,  
so th a t
V  = Yi + v
I t  i s  assumed th a t
E(v.j) = 0 cov(v.j ,£.. ) = 0
cov(v^ ,Y ^) = 0 E(vi v j )  = 0 ,  i f  j
covCv^ ,Xn. ) = 0 a2 ( v i ) = ct2v .
The model being e s t im a te d  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,
Y..* = a* + e*X. + ai.
w ith  assumptions
a
E(u|) = 0 E U i oij) = 0, i f  j
2 (a) , )  = a 2 cov(X . , u  . )  = 0
■ 1  CO I I
c o v ( Y , * , X . )
3* = ------ T------1_  a* = E(Y .*)  -  B*E(X. ) .
a 2 ^ )  1 1
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S u b s t i t u t i n g  (G-2) f o r  Y^* in the  above d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  a *  and g* 
r e v e a l s  t h a t
cov(.Y • +  v - , X * )  cov(Y. , X . )
g* = ------------T l _ _ L _  = —  T J -  = e (G_4)
a t X . )  cx2 CXi )
a *  = ECY- + v . )  -  6 * E ( . X . )  = E(Yi ) -  6 E ( X i )  = a .  (G-5)  
S in ce  a *  and g* are  equal to  a  and g,  t h e i r  e s t im a t o r s  r e t a i n  th e  small  
sample and asym ptot ic  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  b e s t  l i n e a r  unbiased e s t i m a t o r s .
■k
Kmenta d i s c u s s e s  t h i s  r e s u l t  in th e  g e n e r a l i z e d  e r r o r s - i n - e q u a t i o n  model.
Examination o f  the Variances  o f  the  Residual and OLS Est im ators
The v a r ia nc e  o f  th e  r e s i d u a l s  from the  r e g r e s s i o n  c o n ta in in g  
measurement e rr o r  in th e  dependent v a r i a b l e  o v e r s t a t e s  th e  t r u e  v ar iance  
in th e  c o r r e c t l y  measured r e g r e s s i o n .
Proof:
S u b s t i t u t e  (G-2) in to  (G-3):
Y.j + = a *  + g*X| + uj . j . (G-6 )
Noting t h a t  a* = a  and g* = gand g iv e n  th a t  = Y. + v-  -  a* -  g*X^,
2 •a i s  g iven  asto
a 2  =  a 2 ( Y.) +  a 2 ( v , )  +  S 2 a 2 ( X . )  -  2 g c o v ( Y , , X . ) .  (G-7)
OJ I I I I I
2 2
The term -2gcov (Y 1- j X ^ )  may be w r i t t e n  as -2g a  ( X ^ )  and , t h e r e f o r e ,
(G-7) may be w r i t t e n  as
a 2  = a 2 ( Y4 ) + a 2 C v . - )  -  $ 2 cr2 ( X . ) .  (G-8 )
t o i i I
2
Now examine a  g iven  t h a t  e .  =  Y .  -  a  -  & X . .e 1 1  1
a 2 £  =  a 2 ( Y • )  +  6 2 a 2 QCi )  -  2gcov(Yi , X . ) .  (G-9)
*
Kmenta, op.  c i t . ,  p. 3 1 4 -5 .
2 2
Note t h a t  the  l a s t  term may be w r i t t e n  as -2g a (X.)*  
t h i s  r e s u l t  l e a v e s
a 2 £  =  a 2 ( Y . )  -
Comparing (G-10) to  (G-8 ) r e v e a l s  th a t
2 . 2a > o w e
Given t h a t  the  va r ia n c e  o f  the  r e s i d u a l s  i s  o v e r s t a t e d .
o f  th e  OLS e s t im a t o r s  w i l l  be s i m i l a r l y  a f f e c t e d .  I t  i s
2 2
S u b s t i t u t i n g
(G-10)
( G - l l )  
the var ianc e  
e a s i l y  seen t h a t
APPENDIX H
DERIVATION OF TEST OF 
RATIO OF SLOPE TO INTERCEPT
The t e s t  i s  d er ived  f o r  the  f o l l o w i n g  hypotheses :
Hq: y-l/ yq = -52 Hi : V Y0 < -52
which can be more c o n v e n ie n t l y  w r i t t e n  as
Hq: yx “ .52y0 = 0 Hy y1 - .52yg < 0.
The e x p r e s s io n  y^ -  .52yg i s  a l i n e a r  combination o f  normally d i s ­
t r i b u t e d  random v a r i a b l e s  and i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  normally d i s t r i b u t e d  
and given as
y^ -  . 52yq - N(yj -  .52 yq , VarCyj -  . 5 2 y g ) ) ,
where
Var(y2 -  . 52yQ) = V a r ^ )  + ( . 5 2 ) 2Var(yg) -  2(.52)Cov(y1,y0).
/S /V
The v ar ian c es  and co v a r ia n c e s  o f  Yj and Yq are g iven  as
V a r ( ^ )  = a2 ( l / z X 2 )
Var(yg) = a2 ( l / n  + X2 /eX2 )
C o v ( y 15 y q ) = a 2 (-X/i;X2 )
2
where a = th e  p op ula t ion  va r ia n c e  o f  the  r e s id u a l
n
EX = th e  sum o f  squares ( i n  d e v ia t i o n  form) o f  the  independent  
v a r i a b l e  X 
n = the  number o f  o b s e r v a t io n s  
X" = the  mean o f  the sample o b s e r v a t io n s  o f  X.
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The va r ia n c e  o f  y x -  . 5 2 y Q can now be w r i t t e n  as
V ar(yx -  . 5 2 y0 ) = a 2 1/zX2 + ( . 2 7 0 4 ) (1 /n  + X2/ z X 2 ) + ( 1 . 0 4 ) (X/zX2 )
An independent Chi-Square may be formed as
SSE 2 
2 ~ x n-2a
where SSE i s  the sum o f  squared er r o r s  from the r e g r e s s i o n  and n-2  
are  the  degrees  o f  freedom. Now a t - s t a t i s t i c  may be s e t  up as the  
r a t i o  o f  a standard normal d iv id e d  by the square root  o f  an independent  
Chi-Square d iv id e d  by i t s  d egrees  o f  freedom.
A A
______________________ x l  -  - M r p _________________________
v£2 [ l / z X 2 + ( . 2 7 0 4 ) (1 /n  + X2/zX2 ) + ( 1 . 0 4 ) (X/lX2 )] ~ n" 2
~  / ¥ / * «  
or more c o n v e n i e n t l y ,
y x -  . 5 2 y 0
+ ( - 2 7 0 4 > (?  + l S  + ( 1 - 0 4 ) ( ^ ) )
which can be e a s i l y  c a l c u l a t e d  from the data .
*n-2
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